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A GUIDE TO BORROWER LITIGATION AGAINST THE
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM AND THE RIGHTS OF FARM
CREDIT SYSTEM BORROWERSf
By CHRISTOPHER R. KELLEY*
AND BARBARA J. HOEKSTRA**
I. INTRODUCTION
The farm financial crisis of the 1980's has produced and con-
tinues to produce an unprecedented amount of litigation against
the lending institutions of the Farm Credit System by the owners
of those institutions, their borrowers. Although no single charac-
terization of the substance of the claims made by those borrowers
can be all-encompassing, the gist of most claims has been that the
Farm Credit System lender behaved imprudently or unfairly in
the servicing, including foreclosure, of the borrower's loans. Coin-
ciding with that litigation have been entreaties to Congress to
mandate changes in the ways in which Farm Credit System lend-
ers deal with their borrowers. As a result, the 1980's produced
dramatic revisions in the organic law governing the Farm Credit
System.
This article will survey both the recent litigation against Farm
Credit System lenders and the statutory and judicially created
rights of the borrowers of those institutions. In doing so, this arti-
cle's intent is to provide the reader with a succinct, but reasonably
complete, primer on its subject. The article is structured topically
to facilitate the reader's access to issues of particular interest.
Although exhaustive treatment of the myriad issues that have
arisen in borrower litigation against the Farm Credit System is
beyond the scope of this article, greater attention is devoted to the
f Copyright 1990 by Christopher R. Kelley
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more significant or problematic issues. For those issues in particu-
lar, this article references additional sources of guidance or
information.1
If for no other reason, the legal aspects of the relationship
between Farm Credit System lenders and their borrowers are
important because, until 1987, the Farm Credit System was the
nation's "largest single provider of credit to farmers, ranchers, and
their cooperatives."'2 For most of the last decade, Farm Credit
System lenders have shared roughly one-third of the farm loan
market.3 Accordingly, the behavior of Farm Credit System lend-
ers has a significant impact on the financial well being of agricul-
tural producers who are permanently or periodically reliant on
credit.4
1. At various points in this article, note is made of the unsettled nature of the issue
discussed. Because the jurisprudence governing the Farm Credit System continues to
develop, the reader is urged to be attentive to developments post-dating this article.
In addition to the usual sources for recent developments, there are at least three
periodicals that provide coverage of Farm Credit System litigation. The AGRICULTURAL
LAW UPDATE, a monthly publication of the American Agricultural Law Association, is
available through membership in the AALA, Robert A. Leflar Law Center, University of
Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701. The IOWA AGRICULTURAL LAw REPORTER is available
from the Agricultural Law Center, The Law School, Drake University, Des Moines, IA
50311. The FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION REPORT is available from the Farmers' Legal Action
Group, Inc., 1301 Minnesota Building, 46 East Fourth Street, St. Paul, MN 55101. A fourth
publication, THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT LETrER, published by Webster Communications
Corporation, P.O. Box 9153, Arlington, VA 22209, offers twice monthly coverage of various
matters affecting the System. Unlike the first three publications, THE AGRICULTURAL
CREDIT LETTER primarily covers institutional developments within the System, and its
coverage of litigation is generally limited to cases that affect the System as a whole.
2. H.R. 295 (I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 54, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2723, 2726. "In 1987, commercial banks surpassed the Farm Credit System as the
principal holder of combined real estate and non-real estate farm debt." ECON. RESEARCH
SERV., USDA, PUB. No. AFO-33, AGRICULTURAL INCOME AND FINANCE: SITUATION AND
OUTLOOK REPORT 13 (May 1989)[hereinafter AGRICULTURAL INCOME AND FINANCE].
3. Boehlje & Pederson, Farm Finance: The New Issues, CHOICES, Third Quarter 1988,
at 16,17 [hereinafter Boehlje & Pederson]. Since 1980, the Farm Credit System has shared
close to or over one-third of the farm loan market, although that share is declining. In 1980,
the System held a thirty-two percent share of the farm loan market. That share increased
to thirty-four percent in 1983. However, in 1986, the System's share declined to twenty-
nine percent. By way of comparison, in 1986, commercial banks held a twenty-six percent
market share, life insurance companies held six percent, the Farmers Home Administration
held fifteen percent, and individuals and others shared twenty-three percent of the farm
loan market. Id. See also Jensen, Agricultural Lending in the 1980"s: An Insurance
Company's Perspective, 18 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 353, 354 (1988) (discussing agricultural
lending by insurance companies in the 1980s). By 1989, the System's market share had
declined to less than twenty-seven percent while the share of commercial banks had
increased to thirty-two percent. AGRICULTURAL INCOME AND FINANCE, supra note 2, at
13-14. For an account of the recent competition for borrowers between Farm Credit
System institutions and commercial banks, see Webster, Interest Rate Turf Battles: Farm
Credit Versus the Commercial Banks, AGRIFINANCE, Dec. 1989, at 18. See also S. 2830,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. Si1,232, S11,314 (1990) (a directive in the Senate
version of Food, Agricultural, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (informally referred to
as the 1990 farm bill) for a General Accounting Office study of rural credit cost and
availability including a review of the interest rates of System lenders).
4. For discussions of the reliance of farmers on debt financing, see e.g., T. FREY & R.
BEHRENS, LENDING TO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES (1981); M. STRANGE, FAMILY
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In a general sense, the legal aspects of the relationship
between Farm Credit System lenders and their borrowers are
colored and occasionally complicated or confused by four fumda-
mental attributes of Farm Credit System lenders. First, Farm
Credit System lenders are federally chartered.5 Second, as feder-
ally chartered institutions, Farm Credit System lenders are subject
to regulation by the Farm Credit Administration [hereinafter
FCA], an agency of the federal government with authority and
power generally equivalent to other federal financial regulators.6
Third, Farm Credit System lenders must operate within the con-
fines of the statutory authority underlying their federal charters,
the Farm Credit Act of 1971, as amended.7 Finally, although they
are federally chartered entities, regulated by a federal agency, and
FARMING: A NEW ECONOMIC VISION 104-26 (1988); N. Harl, The Financial Crisis in the
United States, in Is THERE A MORAL OBLIGATION To SAVE THE FAMILY FARM? 115-16 (G.
Comstock ed. 1987) (a similar discussion can be found at Harl, The Architecture of Public
Policy: The Crisis in Agriculture, 34 KANSAS L. REV. 425, 426-32 (1986)); Baker, Structural
Issues in US. Agriculture and Farm Debt Perspectives, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 457 (1986);
Boehlje & Pederson, supra note 3, at 16-17; Roberts, Deregulating the Agricultural
Industry: A Wise Policy Choice?, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 49, 59-61 (1986); Kelley, Imposing the
Duties of Fairness, Good Faith, and Honesty On the Agricultural Lender, ARK. L. NOTES
18, 18-19 (1987) [hereinafter Kelley].
5. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2002(a), 2011(a), 2071(a), 2091(a) (West 1989).
6. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2241-74 (West 1989). The FCA is "an independent agency in the
executive branch .. " 12 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. pt. 600 (1990)
(setting forth the organizational structure and the functions of the FCA). For summaries of
the current responsibilities of the FCA, see Kayl, Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985:
Congressional Intent, FCA Implementation, and Courts' Interpretation (And the Effect of
Subsequent Legislation on the 1985 Act), 37 DRAKE L. REV. 271, 285-300 (1987-88)
[hereinafter Kayl]; Dewey, The Farm Credit System, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 287 (1987)
[hereinafter Dewey]. See also Massey & Schneider, Title I of the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987: "A Law in Search of Enforcement"; 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 613-14
(1990Xcriticizing the FCA's lack of enforcement of the rights of System borrowers)
[hereinafter Massey & Schneider]; infra notes 78-80, 100 and the accompanying text
(discussing in greater detail the responsibilities of the FCA).
7. As amended to date, the statutory authority for the Farm Credit System is found at
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2279 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). As is discussed in greater detail in
various portions of this article, the Farm Credit Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-181, 85 Stat.
583, has been substantially amended four times, specifically by the Farm Credit Act
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-592,94 Stat. 3437; the Farm Credit Amendments Act
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874; and the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100-
233, 101 Stat. 1568-1717 (1988). Technical corrections were made to the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1987 by the Agricultural Credit Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-399, 102 Stat. 989. See also Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related Agencies
Appropriation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-460, 102 Stat. 2229, 2266 (1988) (amending
section 6.29 of the Farm Credit Act of 1971); Act of Dec. 12, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-220, 103
Stat. 1876, 1879-81 (amending sections 5.55 and 6.29 of the Farm Credit Act of 1971 and
section 646 of the Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act of 1989).
This article was prepared prior to the enactment of the 1990 farm bill. The Senate
version of that legislation, the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990,
proposes several amendments to the Farm Credit Act of 1971. S. 2830, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 136 CONG. REC. Sll,232, S11,314-316 (1990). Only one of those amendments, a
provision for production credit association first liens on borrower stock and participation
certificates in the association, directly affects the rights of System borrowers. Id. at S 11,314.
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subject to Congressionally imposed limits of authority and other
requirements, Farm Credit System lenders are neither owned nor
managed by the federal government. Rather, they are owned on a
cooperative basis by their member-borrowers. 8 Those four funda-
mental attributes must be understood and appreciated for it is
their presence and the interplay among them that gives the law
governing the relationship between Farm Credit System lenders
and their borrowers its uniqueness.
Because the four attributes essentially arise from the statutory
purposes, history, and structure of the Farm Credit System, this
article begins with a discussion of those purposes and that history
and structure. The article next focuses on the unique issues that
have arisen in litigation by borrowers against System lenders and
the various statutory "borrowers' rights" available to System bor-
rowers. Finally, the article concludes with some thoughts and
comments on the future of Farm Credit System lenders and their
relationships with their borrowers.
II. THE PURPOSE OF THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM
The objective of the Farm Credit System has been defined as
the satisfaction of ".... the peculiar credit needs of American farm-
ers and ranchers while encouraging those farmers and ranchers to
participate through management, control, and ownership of the
8. Borrower ownership was achieved by conditioning borrowing on the purchase of
stock in the local association either making or servicing the loan. In turn, the associations
purchased stock in the "upstream," supervisory bank, a federal land bank or federal
intermediate credit bank (now merged as district farm credit banks). When the initial
capitalization by the federal government was repaid, the System became wholly owned and
controlled by its borrowers. See infra notes 15-36 and the accompanying text. See generally
FREY & BEHRENS, supra note 4, at 385-97 (describing how the System's borrowers became
the owners of the System through the purchase of stock in federal land bank and
production credit associations); W. LEE, M. BOEHLJE, A. NELSON, & W. MURRAY,
AGRICULTURAL FINANCE 354-69 (7th ed. 1980) (same).
Occasionally, the stock purchase requirement is incorrectly or loosely stated when a
federal land bank loan is at issue. For example, in In re Massengill, 100 Bankr. 276 (E.D.
N.C. 1988), the court referred to the borrower's stock as "Land Bank stock". 100 Bankr. at
278. However, the court also expressly noted that the stock had been purchased in the
federal land bank association, not in the federal land bank. 100 Bankr. at 278 & n.1. Other
courts have simply stated incorrectly that the borrower had purchased stock in the federal
land bank. E.g., In re Cansler, 99 Bankr. 758, 759 (W.D. Ky. 1989). At least one court has
admitted uncertainty about the stock purchase requirement. In re Shannon, 100 Bankr.
913, 916 n.9 (S.D. Bankr. Ohio 1989).
Prior to the effective date of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, borrowers who
obtained federal land bank funds had to apply for a loan through a federal land bank
association and purchase stock in the association. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2016 (West 1980).
Currently, borrowers who reside in an area not served by a federal land bank association
may borrow directly from the successor to the federal land bank in each district, the farm
credit bank, after purchasing stock in the respective farm credit bank. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2017,
2021(b) (West 1989). See also infra notes 119-34 and the accompanying text (discussing the
restructuring of the System resulting from the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987).
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system."' The Congressional expression of the policy and objec-
tives of the Farm Credit System is as follows:
(a) It is declared to be the policy of the Congress, recog-
nizing that a prosperous, productive agriculture is
essential to a free nation and recognizing the grow-
ing need for credit in rural areas, that the farmer-
owned cooperative Farm Credit System be designed
to accomplish the objective of improving the income
by furnishing sound, adequate, and constructive
credit and closely related services to them, their
cooperatives, and to selected farm-related businesses
necessary for efficient farm operations.
(b) It is the objective of this chapter to continue to
encourage farmer- and rancher-borrowers participa-
tion in the management, control, and ownership of a
permanent system of credit for agriculture which
will be responsive to the credit needs of all types of
agricultural producers having a basis for credit, and
to modernize and improve the authorizations and
means for furnishing such credit and credit for hous-
ing in rural areas made available through the institu-
tions constituting the Farm Credit System as herein
provided.
(c) It is declared to be the policy of Congress that the
credit needs of farmers, ranchers, and their coopera-
tives are best served if the institutions of the Farm
Credit System provide equitable and competitive
interest rates to eligible borrowers, taking into con-
sideration the creditworthiness and access to alterna-
tive sources of credit for borrowers, the cost of funds,
including any costs of defeasance under section
4.8(b), the operating costs of the institution, including
the costs of any loan loss amortization under section
5.19(b), the cost of servicing loans, the need to retain
earnings to protect borrowers' stock, and the volume
of net new borrowing. Further, it is declared to be
the policy of Congress that Farm Credit System insti-
tutions take action in accordance with the Farm
Credit Act Amendments of 1986 in such manner that
borrowers from the institutions derive the greatest
9. Daley v. Farm Credit Admin., 454 F. Supp. 953, 954 (D. Minn. 1978).
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benefit practicable from that Act: Provided, That in
no case is any borrower to be charged a rate of inter-
est that is below competitive market rates for similar
loans made by private lenders to borrowers of
equivalent creditworthiness and access to alternative
credit. 10
The policy and objectives assigned to the Farm Credit System
reflect that the System was created as a result of a need by farmers
for "dependable sources of adequate credit, on terms suited to the
particular needs of agriculture, from lenders who understood their
problems."1 1
III. THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE FARM
CREDIT SYSTEM
A. THE EUROPEAN COOPERATIVE MODEL
In response to difficulties faced by farmers in obtaining credit
in the early 1900's, two commissions, one appointed by President
Taft and the other created by a private organization, undertook
studies of the European rural credit systems.12 Three different
proposals for responding to the credit needs of American farmers
were generated from the combined work of the commissions:
1. obtaining loan funds through the sale of bonds to
investors;
2. organizing cooperatives; and
3. making direct government loans to farmers.'"
The first proposal, the realization of funds through the sale of
bonds to investors, was based on the method used by the German
10. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2001 (West 1989).
11. W. HOAG, THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SELF-HELP 1
(1976) [herinafter HOAG]. See also McGowan & Noles, The Cooperative Farm Credit
System, 4 MERCER L. REV. 263, 263 (1953) [hereinafter McGowan & Noles] ("[The System]
is a complete, dependable and permanent system for the furnishing to farmers on a
cooperative basis of various types of sound agricultural credits at reasonable rates of interest
and costs."). See generally 11 N. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAW, ch. 100 (1986) (describing the
purposes of the System); 2 J. DAVIDSON, AGRICULTURAL LAW, ch. 10 (1981) (same); K.
MEYER, D. PEDERSON, N. THORSON & J. DAVIDSON, AGRICULTURAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 269-74 (1985) (same); J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, AGRICULTURAL LAW
§ 14.3 (1982Xsame).
12. HOAG, supra note 11, at 211-12. The commissions especially focused on the
successful Landshaft system that had been functioning for 100 years in Germany. Id. See
also FEDERAL LAND BANK OF ST. PAUL, DOWN THE ROAD TOGETHER 6 (1967) (describing
the commissions' studies and asserting that "there is some reason to believe that the
German Landshafts were patterned on early agricultural credit programs which originated
in the American colonies").
13. HOAG, supra note 11, at 212.
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Landschaften banks.14 It ultimately became the method adopted
by the federal land banks, the banks for cooperatives, and the fed-
eral intermediate credit banks.' 5 Those Farm Credit System insti-
tutions currently obtain loan funds by selling bonds and
debentures on the money markets.' 6
The cooperative approach was based on the organization of
the European Raiffeisen banks. This form was adopted by the
local federal land bank associations and production credit associa-
tions.' 7 The third approach, direct governmental loans to farmers,
was incorporated into the Farmers Home Administration
programs.' 8
B. TAE FEDERAL LAND BANKS (FLB)
Acting on the recommendations contained in the commission
reports, Congress, in 1916, enacted the Federal Farm Loan Act of
191619 authorizing the establishment of federal land banks for the
purpose of making long-term loans secured by real estate.2" Each
federal land bank was initially capitalized by federal government
subscription of the institution's stock, and supervision of the banks
was placed in a five-member Federal Farm Loan Board serving
under the Treasury Department.2' However, the Act provided
that the government owned stock was to be eventually retired
14. Id. at 213.
15. Id.
16. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2153, 2160 (West 1989) (authorizing System banks to borrow and
to issue notes, bonds, and other obligations and creating the Federal Farm Credit Banks
Funding Corporation to serve as the marketing agent for those obligations, replacing the
System's Fiscal Agency which had previously served that function). See also 12 C.F.R. pt.
615, subpts. A, C, D, 0 (1990) (relating to the funding of the System and the issuance of
notes, bonds, and other obligations); 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,887 (1990) (revising the
authority for 7 C.F.R. pt. 615).
17. HOAG, supra note 11, at 213.
18. Brake, A Perspective On Federal Involvement In Agricultural Credit Programs, 19
S.D.L. REV. 567, 568-69 (1974) [hereinafter Brake]. See also HOAG, supra note 11, at 209-
17; 11 N. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAw 100.0112] (1986) (discussing the historical
development of the System); J. KNAPP, THE ADVANCE OF AMERICAN COOPERATIVE
ENTERPRISE: 1920-1945 246-87 (1973) (same, with an emphasis on the cooperative nature
of the System); M. ABRAHAMSEN, COOPERATIVE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 323-37 (1976)
(same, also with an emphasis on the cooperative nature of the System); McGowan & Noles,
supra note 11, at 263-65 (same); Home, Sources of Agriculture Financing With an
Emphasis on the Farm Credit System, AGRiC. LJ. 15 (1980-81) (same). Although a
discussion of the lending programs administered by the Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) is beyond the scope of this article, excellent explanatory materials on those
programs are available from the Farmers' Legal Action Group, Inc., 1301 Minnesota
Building, 46 East Fourth Street, St. Paul, MN 55101. See also Lancaster, Current Issues in
FmHA Loan Servicing, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 713 (1990) (discussing the application of the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 to FmHA borrowers).
19. Pub. L. No. 64-158, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360 (1916) (repealed 1923).
20. Id. at 362-63.
21. Id. at 360-63.
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through farmer-borrower purchases so that the federal loan banks
would eventually be solely owned by farmers.22 Since 1947, the
federal land banks have been completely farmer owned.23
Pursuant to the Farm Loan Act of 1916, the Federal Farm
Loan Board created twelve federal land bank districts.24 In addi-
tion, national farm loan associations, later renamed federal land
bank associations, were established to act as agents for the regional
federal land bank associations. 25 Farmer-borrower purchases of
stock in local federal land bank associations which, in turn,
purchased stock in the federal land banks, ultimately achieved
farmer ownership of both entities. 26
C. THE FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE CREDIT BANKS (FICB)
In 1923, pursuant to the Agricultural Credit Acts,2 7 the fed-
eral intermediate credit banks were created to discount the notes
of other lenders made for short or intermediate term farm loans.28
Although initially capitalized by the federal government in a man-
ner similar to the capitalization of the federal land banks, the fed-
eral intermediate credit banks did not make direct loans to
farmers as did the federal land banks.29 Rather, the initial function
of the federal intermediate credit banks was to purchase notes
made by other lenders.30
D. THE PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS (PCA)
Because existing lenders did not make substantial use of the
federal intermediate credit banks, regional production credit cor-
porations were authorized in 1933.3 1 The Farm Credit Act of
193332 created twelve regional production credit corporations,
twelve regional banks for cooperatives, and the Central Bank for
Cooperatives.33 The banks for cooperatives were established to
22. Id. at 364-65.
23. HOAG, supra note 11, at 254.
24. Id. at 214. For a map of the federal land bank districts, now the farm credit bank
districts, see Appendix C to this article. See also 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2002(b), 2 2 5 2 (a) (West 1989)
(providing that there shall not be more than twelve farm credit districts and authorizing the
merger of districts).
25. Id. at 216.
26. Brake, supra note 18, at 570-72; HOAG, supra note 11, at 213-17.
27. Pub. L. No. 67-503, ch. 252, 42 Stat. 1454 (1923) (repealed 1933).
28. Id. at 1455-56.
29. HOAG, supra note 11, at 25. The Federal Intermediate Credit Banks stopped using
government capital in 1956. Id.
30. Brake, supra note 18, at 572; HOAG, supra note 11, at 231-43.
31. HOAG, supra note 11, at 237.
32. Pub. L. No. 73-75, 48 Stat. 257 (1933) (repealed 1953).
33. Id. at 257-64.
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make loans to farmer cooperatives.34
The Farm Credit Act of 1933 also authorized the establish-
ment of local production credit associations modeled after the fed-
eral land bank associations.3 5 However, unlike federal land bank
associations, the production credit associations were not merely
agents of the regional production credit corporations.3 6 Rather,
they made direct loans that were discounted by the regional cor-
porations. Later, in 1956, the federal intermediate credit banks
assumed the discounting function for production credit associa-
tions, and the assets of the twelve regional production credit cor-
porations were transferred to the federal intermediate credit
banks.38
E. THE FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
The Farm Credit Act of 1933 created the Farm Credit Admin-
istration to coordinate all federal lending activities. 39 For the first
six years of its existence, the Farm Credit Administration operated
as an independent agency of the executive branch.4 ° However, in
1939, an executive order placed the agency in the Department of
Agriculture.4 ' The Farm Credit Administration remained within
the Department of Agriculture until the Farm Credit Act of
195342 re-established its independent status.43
34. See Brake, supra note 18, at 572-73; HOAG, supra note 11, at 231-43.
35. Farm Credit Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-76, 48 Stat. 257, 259 (1933) (repealed
1953).
36. HOAG, supra note 11, at 46-48.
37. Id. at 50-53.
38. Brake, supra note 18, at 569. For a detailed account of the early history of the
Farm Credit System, see McGowan & Noles, supra note 11.
39. Farm Credit Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-76, 48 Stat. 257, 262-64 (1933) (repealed
1953). See also HOAG, supra note 11, at 233, 234 (discussing the Farm Credit Act of 1933).
The functions and powers transferred to the Farm Credit Administration included the
following: the Federal Land Bank, National Farm Association and Federal Intermediate
Credit Bank supervision from the Federal Farm Loan Board in the Treasury Department;
loans to cooperatives from Agricultural Marketing Revolving Fund from the Federal Farm
Board; Regional Agricultural Credit Corporations supervision from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation; Crop Production and Seed Loan Offices supervision from the
Secretary of Agriculture; and the Fund for Investments in Stock of Agricultural Credit
Corporations from the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. at 234.
40. HOAG, supra note 11, at 233.
41. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939, 53 Stat. 1423, 1429 (April 25, 1939) (repealed
1953).
42. Pub. L. No. 83-202, 67 Stat. 390 (1953) (repealed 1971).
43. Id. at 390-94.
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F. DECENTRALIZATION OF THE SYSTEM - THE FARM
CREDIT ACT OF 1953
Not only did the Farm Credit Act of 1953 re-establish the
independent status of the Farm Credit Administration, it rede-
fined and redirected the Farm Credit System, moving it toward
decentralization, farmer ownership and control, and cooperative
development.44 The 1953 Act created the Federal Farm Credit
Board as the policy making body of the Farm Credit Administra-
tion.45 In addition, the Farm Credit Administration, with its Gov-
ernor responsible to the Board rather than the President, was
accorded supervisory authority over the regional banks, the fed-
eral land banks [hereinafter FLBs] and federal intermediate credit
banks [hereinafter FICBs], and their local associations, the federal
land bank associations [hereinafter FLBAs], and production credit
associations [hereinafter PCAs] respectively. 46 Farmer participa-
tion and control was increased by giving farmer members the
authority to elect six of the seven members on each of the twelve
district farm credit boards.47 Also, recommendations were sought
for retiring all of the remaining government capital in the sys-
tem.48 Further, the impetus of the Farm Credit Act of 1953 con-
tributed to the repayment of all government capital in the Farm
Credit System by the end of 1968. 49
G. THE MODERN SYSTEM - THE FARM CREDIT ACT OF
1971
The Farm Credit Act of 197150 continued the trend toward
decentralization by authorizing that more decisions be made at
local district levels. 51 To implement decentralization, lending
authority was expanded in three areas by the authorization of the
following: long term mortgage loans for rural housing;52 loans to
44. See generally HOAG, supra note 11, at 231-43 (identifying and describing the broad
themes of the Farm Credit Act of 1953).
45. Farm Credit Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-202, 67 Stat. 390 (1953) (repealed 1971).
46. HOAG, supra note 11, at 257-58. The restoration of the Farm Credit
Administration to the status of an independent agency after fourteen years as an agency
within the United States Department of Agriculture was primarily motivated by a desire to
insulate it from political influence. Id.
47. Id. at 121.
48. Id. at 259.
49. Brake, supra note 18, at 574-76; HOAC, supra note 11, at 257-61.
50. Pub. L. No. 92-181, 85 Stat. 583 (1971) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2001-2279aa-14 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990).
51. Id. at 584-86 (FLBs), 590-97 (FICBs). See generally Kayl, supra note 6, at 275-77
(discussing the major features of the Farm Credit Act of 1971).
52. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2014, 2018 (West 1980). In amending the Farm Credit Act of 1971,
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1572-1662 (1988),
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persons furnishing custom services to farmers;5" and financial serv-
ices to farmers including financial management, record keeping,
and estate planning.5 4
1. FLBs and FLBAs
After the Farm Credit Act of 1971, the Farm Credit System
was entirely farmer owned for the last government subscription
had been retired in 1968.5 5 Long-term mortgage credit was pro-
vided through the FLBs and the FLBAs.56 Although each FLB
and each FLBA were separate corporations, each FLBA owned a
portion of the stock of the regional FLB.57 Farmers who sought
FLB funds made application through their local FLBA.58
restructured the system. The previously separate FLBs and FICBs were required to merge
into district farm credit banks. Although FLBAs and PCAs were permitted, with limited
exceptions, to remain separate, the 1987 Act also allowed FLBAs and PCAs to merge as
agricultural credit associations. See infra notes 125-27 and the accompanying text.
However, the authority of the farm credit banks and the PCAs to make loans for rural
housing was retained. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2019(b), 2075(b) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R.
§ 613.3040 (1990) (rural resident loan program); 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,878 (1990) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 613.3040) (same). A FLBA can also make direct loans for rural
housing if that authority has been delegated to it by the district farm credit bank. See 12
U.S.C.A. § 2013(18) (West 1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,881 (1990) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. 614.4030(aX3)).
53. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2016 (West 1980). As with the authority to make housing loans to
rural residents, the authority to make loans for persons furnishing custom services to
farmers has been retained under the current amended version of the Farm Credit Act of
1971. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2019(c), 2075(aX3) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 613.3050 (1990)
(farm-related businesses); 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,878 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 613.3050) (same).
54. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2019, 2076 (West 1980). Under the current version of the Farm
Credit Act of 1971, "technical assistance" may be provided by System lenders to their
borrowers. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2020(a), 2076 (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 618.8000 (1990)
(technical assistance); 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,888 (1990) (revising the authority for 12
C.F.R. § 618).
55. See supra note 49 and the accompanying text.
56. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2093 (West 1980). Currently, as a result of the Agricultural Credit
Act of 1987, the authority formerly possessed by FLBs is held by the district farm credit
banks (FCBs). 12 U.S.C.A. § 2015(a) (West 1989). See also 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,800
(1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 614.4000) (long-term real estate lending authority of
farm credit banks). Lending for long-term real estate purposes is still provided through a
FLBA unless there is not an active association in the lending area. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2021(a)-(b)
(West 1989). See also 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,881 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 614.4030) (long-term real estate lending authority of federal land credit associations).
However, a farm credit bank may delegate its direct lending authority to an association. 12
U.S.C.A. § 2013(18) (West 1989). When direct lending authority for long-term real estate
loans is transferred to a FLBA, the association is referred to as a "federal land credit
association." 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,889 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 519.9155).
See also infra notes 119-27 and the accompanying text (discussing the changes in lending
authority occasioned by the 1987 Act).
57. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2093 (West 1980). Under the current version of the Farm Credit Act
of 1971, FLBAs still subscribe to the stock of their respective farm credit bank. 12 U.S.C.A.
4 2093(10) (West 1989).
58. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2020 (West 1980). Currently, borrowers seeking long-term loans for
real estate purposes still apply for those funds through a FLBA if there is an association
serving the prospective borrower's area. To obtain the funds, the prospective borrower
must purchase stock in the association. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2017 (West 1989). If there is not an
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The farmer borrower of FLB funds was required to purchase
capital stock in the FLBA in an amount at least equal to five per-
cent of the face value of his loan.59 With the purchase of stock, the
borrower became a voting member of the FLBA, and the FLBA
purchased a like amount of stock in the regional FLB.60 Each
stockholder was entitled to only one vote.6 ' Further, the FLB and
FLBA held a first lien on the borrower's stock.62
The primary source of FLB funds was derived from the sale of
consolidated federal land bank bonds which were joint obligations
of the twelve district FLBs.63 However, the United States bears no
liability on the bonds.64
2. FICBs and PCAs
PCAs under the Farm Credit Act of 1971 made short and
intermediate term loans that were, in turn, discounted by the
regional FICBs.65 The capital stock of the FICBs was owned by
association serving the prospective borrower's area, the loan may be obtained directly from
the district farm credit bank, and stock must be purchased in the district farm credit bank.
12 U.S.C.A. § 2021(b), (c) (West 1989).
59. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2034(a) (West 1980). For a discussion of current requirements
regarding the amount of stock that must be purchased, see infra notes 131 and 132 and the
accompanying text. See also In re Massengill, 100 Bankr. 276, 278 & n. 1 (E.D. N.C. 1988)
(describing in detail the stock purchase requirements under the Farm Credit Act of 1971
prior to its amendment by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987).
60. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2034 (West 1980). The voting shareholders of each FLBA continue to
elect the association's board of directors. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2092 (West 1989). See also supra
note 58 (discussing the current requirements for the purchase of stock). Under current law,
when a FLBA has merged with a PCA, the stock purchased would be that of the
agricultural credit association formed as a result of that merger. See infra notes 125-27 and
the accompanying text.
61. Id. The one vote principle still applies. Thus, irrespective of the number of shares
owned, a shareholder in a System institution has only one vote. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 615.5230(aXlXi) (1990).
62. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2054 (West 1980). Under the current law, FLBAs continue to be
entitled to a first lien on borrower's stock and participation certificates issued by the
association. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2097 (West 1989).
63. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2155 (West 1980). See also 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2153, 2155 (West 1989) (the
System continues to issue notes, bonds, debentures, and other obligations for which each
bank in the System is jointly liable).
64. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2155(c) (West 1989). For an extensive and highly critical study of the
Farm Credit System's funding of loans with long-term, non-callable, fixed rate bonds during
the early 1980's, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GGD-86-150 BR, FARM
CREDIT SYSTEM: ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION (1986). See also Barry, Financial
Stress For the Farm Credit Banks: Impacts On Future Loan Rates For Borrowers, 46 AGRIC.
FINANCE REV. 27 (1986) (discussing the effect on loan rates resulting from the financial
distress experienced by the System in the mid-1980s).
65. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2096, 2072(6) (West 1980). Under the Farm Credit Act of 1971, as
currently amended, PCAs largely retain the same status and function that they assumed
under the 1971 Act. PCAs continue to extend short- and intermediate-term credit. 12
U.S.C.A. § 2075(a) (West 1989). However, the functions formerly performed by FICBs are
now the responsibility of the district farm credit banks. Those functions include the
discounting of PCA loans. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2015(bXA) (West 1989). See also infra notes 119-27
and the accompanying text (discussing the lending authority of System lenders under the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987).
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PCAs.66 The FICBs obtained funds through the sale of consoli-
dated debentures.67 As was required of FLBA and FLB borrow-
ers, PCA borrowers also were required to purchase stock in an
amount equal to at least five percent of the face value of the
loan. 68
3. Board of Directors
Each PCA and FLBA had a board-of directors elected by its
members.6 9 Similarly, each of the twelve farm credit districts had
a board of directors consisting of seven members.7 ° Prior to the
enactment of the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985,11 one
director was appointed by the Governor of the Farm Credit
Administration and the remaining six were elected by the district's
FLBAs, PCAs, and borrowers from the bank of cooperatives, with
each of the three System institutions electing two directors.7 2
Under the 1985 Act, the seventh member of the district board was
elected by the "borrowers at large in a district," a phrase defined
as follows:
(i) a voting shareholder of a Federal land bank associa-
tion and a direct borrower, and a borrower through
an agency, from a Federal land bank;
(ii) a voting shareholder of a production credit associa-
tion; and
(iii) a voting shareholder or subscriber to the guaranty
fund of a bank for cooperatives.13
66. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2073 (West 1980). Currently, PCAs continue to subscribe to stock in
the "upstream" bank. However, that bank is now the district farm credit bank rather than
the district FICB. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2073(7) (West 1989).
67. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2094 (West 1980). As a result of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987,
the successors to the district FICBs, the farm credit banks, are responsible for obtaining
funds through the sale of obligations for which all of the System banks are liable. 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 2013(10), 2153, 2155(a) (West 1989).
68. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2094 (West 1980). Currently, prospective borrowers still must
purchase stock in the PCA making the loan. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2017 (West 1989). For a
discussion of the current requirements regarding the amount of stock that must be
purchased, see infra notes 131-32 and the accompanying text.
69. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2092, 2032 (West 1980). Under the current law, each PCA's
shareholders continue to elect the PCA's board of directors. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (West
1989).
70. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2222 (1980). Currently, the number of directors serving on the board
of directors of the district farm credit banks is dictated by the respective bank's bylaws. See
12 U.S.C.A. § 2012 (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 611.310-611.340 (1990) (relating to
the election of bank and association directors).
71. See infra notes 74-92 and the accompanying text.
72. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2223 (West 1980) (repealed 1988).
73. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2223(a) (West Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988). Currently, the only
statutory requirement concerning the qualification of a director is that "at least one
member shall be elected by the other directors, which member shall not be a director,
officer, employee, or stockholder of a System institution." 12 U.S.C.A. § 2012 (West 1989). A
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H. THE FARM CREDIT AMENDMENTS OF 1985
The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 T7 also made struc-
tural changes in levels above the district board of directors. Prior
to the 1985 Act, the Federal Farm Credit Board was a part-time
board consisting of thirteen members, one nominated by each of
the twelve districts and appointed by the President and one
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture as his representative.7 5
The 1985 Act renamed the board the Farm Credit Administration
Board and reduced its membership to three full-time members. 6
The three members are appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.7 7
The shift in the responsibilities of the Farm Credit Adminis-
tration was a second major structural change caused by the 1985
Act.7 8 Under prior law, the Farm Credit Administration directly
participated in the supervision and management of the System.7 9
Under the 1985 Act, the Farm Credit Administration assumed the
function of an independent regulatory agency. 0 The enumerated
powers of the Farm Credit Administration included the power to
modify the boundaries of farm credit districts, approve the merger
of districts, and promulgate regulations."' In addition, the Farm
Credit Administration was directed to examine System institutions
in the same manner as followed by examiners under the National
Bank Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Federal Deposit Insur-
concise description of the System as it existed under the 1971 Act is found in Rosantrater,
Farm Credit: An Overview, 15 CoLO. LAw. 1594 (1981).
74. Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.A. (West 1989 & Supp. 1990)).
75. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 1980).
76. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (West 1989).
77. Id.
78. The significance of this change and its consequences are analyzed in Kayl, supra
note 6, at 279-94, and Dewey, supra note 6, at 287-89.
79. See Dewey, supra note 6, at 287 (describing the selection process for the former,
part-time, Federal Farm Credit Board, a process in which twelve of the thirteen members
were nominated by the twelve farm credit districts, as a "process in which directors could
place allegiances to their individual district's interests above their responsibilities to the
federal regulatory body"). See also Kayl, supra note 6, at 288 ("the situation was the classic
'tail wagging the dog' wherein the FCA was intimidated by the FCS members").
80. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2243, 2252 (West 1989) (setting forth the authority of the FCA
board and the powers and duties of the FCA). See also Dewey, supra note 6, at 287-88
("The 1985 Amendments recognized the wisdom in establishing the FCA as a non-captive
agency which could carry out its governmental functions free of institutions' influence.");
Kayl, supra note 6, at 286 ("Stronger independent regulation is an euphemism for greater
control of the FCS by the FCA."); Bailey v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 788 F.2d
498, 499 n. 3 (8th Cir. 1986) ("the concern of Congress was with decreasing the FCA's day-
to-day involvement and increasing its role as an 'arm's length' regulator of the farm credit
system" (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d
1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The role of the Farm Credit Administration has been changed
from supervisor to arms-length regulator").
81. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2252(aXl), (2), (9) (West 1989).
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ance Act.82 Further, the Farm Credit Administration was given
broad enforcement powers under the 1985 amendments including
the authority to issue cease and desist orders8 3 and to suspend or
remove System institution directors and officers.8 4 Finally, the
chairman of the Farm Credit Administration Board also serves as
the chief executive officer of the Farm Credit Administration
under the 1985 Act.85
The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 also centralized
the power to raise and distribute funds within the System.8 The
Act created the Farm Credit System Capital Corporation which, in
turn, was granted the authority to require all of the System institu-
tions to purchase its stock, to pay assessments to it, and to contrib-
ute to its capital.8 7 The purposes of the Capital Corporation
included the following functions:
1. provide financial assistance to System institutions;
2. acquire from and participate with other System insti-
tutions the nonperforming assets of those institutions;
3. "hold, restructure, collect, and otherwise administer
nonperforming assets required from or participated
in with other Farm Credit System institutions, and
guarantee performing and nonperforming assets held
by other Farm Credit institutions"; and
4. provide technical and other services to other System
institutions relating to their loan portfolios.'
Probably the most controversial of the powers accorded to the
Capital Corporation was the authority to draw funds from stronger
districts to buttress weaker ones.8 9 The Corporation's attempts to
exercise that authority spawned numerous lawsuits initiated by
district banks and local associations.90
82. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1989).
83. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2261-63 (West 1989).
84. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2264-74 (West 1989).
85. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 1989).
86. One of the goals of the 1985 amendments was to "[g]ive the Farm Credit System
broader authority to use its own resources to shore up weak system units". Kayl, supra note
6, at 285 (citing H.R. REP. No. 425,99th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 2587).
87. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2216-16k, 2152 (West Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988).
88. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2216 (West Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988).
89. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2216(fXaX14) (West Supp. 1986) (repealed 1988).
90. Eg., Federal Land Bank of Springfield v. Farm Credit Admin., 676 F. Supp. 1239
(D. Mass. 1987); Sikeston Production Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 647 F. Supp. 1155
(E.D. Mo. 1986). For general discussions of the issues presented in the litigation, see
Webster, Joined in Battle: Who Will Control the Farm Credit System? AGRIFINANCE,
March 1987, at 6; Taylor, Big Trouble at Farm Credit, FARM J., Nov. 1986, at 20; Kayl, supra
note 6, at 289-305 (citing additional cases).
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The Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 also gave the Sec-
retary of the Treasury the authority to provide financial assistance
to the system on a "certification... [of] need" by the Farm Credit
System. 91 Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail later in this
article, the 1985 Act granted to System borrowers certain rights
not previously afforded to them.9 2
I. THE FARM CREDIT ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1986
The mid-1980's saw continuing deterioration in the financial
condition of the Farm Credit System.9" The Congressional
response, contained in the Farm Credit Act Amendments of
91. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2216 (West Supp. 1986). A good, but brief, discussion on the
structural changes mandated by the 1985 Act is contained in Note, The Congressional
Response To A Crisis In Agricultural Credit: The 1985 Farm Credit Amendments, 31 S.D.L.
REV. 471 (1986). See also Duncan, Farm Credit System - Current Matters, 38 ALA. L. REV.
537, 539 (1987) (discussing the 1985 Act); Kayl, supra note 6, at 279-305 (same). See
generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. RCED-86-126BR, FARM FINANCE:
FARM DEBT, GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS, AND OPTIONS TO RELIEVE FINANCIAL STRESS
(1986) (discussing the agricultural economy at the time of the 1985 Act and the options
available to improve that economy).
92. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(a) (disclosure of interest rates), 2199(b) (forbearance), 2200
(access to loan documents and other information), 2201 (prompt action on loan
applications), 2202 (reconsideration of action on loan applications) (West Supp. 1986) (some
of the borrower rights currently found in sections 2199-2202 were added by the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-233, tit. I, 101 Stat. 1568, 1572-85 (1988)).
See infra notes 340-434 and the accompanying text.
In addition to the codified protections for System borrowers, the 1985 Act also
contained an uncodified provision mandating that System lenders review all loans that had
been placed in "non-accrual" status "based on changes in the circumstances of such
institutions as the result of this Act and the amendments made by this Act.... " Borrowers
were to be notified in writing of the results of that review. Farm Credit Amendments Act
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 307, 99 Stat. 1678, 1709 (1985).
Perhaps the most significant of the borrower protections contained in the 1985 Act was
the requirment that System lenders develop forbearance policies. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(b)
(West Supp. 1986). Previously, there had been no statutory requirement for such policies.
Rather, the only directive for such policies was contained in the regulations at 12 C.F.R.
§ 614.4510 (1985). Section 614.4510 merely required that the banks and associations have
policies providing a "means of forbearance for cases when the borrower is cooperative,
making an honest effort to meet the conditions of the loan contract, and is capable of
working out of the debt burden."
The imposition of a statutory mandate for the development of forbearance policies,
though itself not specific regarding the availability and means of forbearance, reflected
Congressional displeasure with the System's prior procedures and attitudes toward
forbearance. See H.R. REP. No. 99-425, 99 CONG., 1ST SESS., reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2587, 2598. See also Kayl, supra note 6, at 287 ("Testimony before
House and Senate committees [considering the 1985 legislation] dealt with borrowers'
perceptions that they had been treated high-handedly by FCS member institutions"
(citations omitted)). Later, with the passage of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987,
Congress became more specific in its directives to the System regarding its treatment of its
member-borrowers. See infra notes 340-434 and the accompanying text.
93. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PuB. No. RCED-89-33BR, FARM FINANCE:
FINANCIAL CONDITION OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1987, 66-73
(1988); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-88-26BR, FARM FINANCE:
FINANCIAL CONDITION OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1986, 64-71
(1987). See also Guebert, Confessions of a Farm Credit Regulator, ToP PRODUCER, June-
July 1987, at 15 (discussing the deteriorating financial condition of the System); Taylor, Day
of Reckoning for Farm Credit, FARM J., March 1987, at 26 (same).
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1986,94 was to partially decentralize authority by giving district
banks the power to set interest rates and to implement new "regu-
latory accounting practices" (RAP) that, among other things,
allowed System institutions to amortize for up to twenty years the
additions to their loss reserves.9 5
J. THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT ACT OF 1987
The Agricultural Credit Act of 198796 was signed by the Presi-
dent on January 6, 1988.17 The 1987 Act operates in two ways that
have resulted or will result in structural changes to the System.
First, it makes available up to four billion dollars of federal funds to
improve the financial condition of System institutions.9" Second, it
mandates the merger of certain System institutions and provides
for the voluntary consolidation of others."
94. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 1031-1037, 100 Stat. 1874, 1877-79 (1986) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West 1989 & Supp. 1990)).
95. Id., 1035-1037, 100 Stat. at 1878-79, See generally Banner & Barry, RAPPING The
Farm Credit System: Spreading Costs to the Future, CHOICES, First Quarter 1988, at 31
(discussing the economics of the new regulatory accounting practices); How the Farm
Credit System Could Harvest a Big Profit, WASH. POST NAT. WEEKLY ED., Oct. 27, 1986, at
20, col. 1 (same); Kayl, supra note 6, at 309-10 (discussing the 1986 Act in general). The
"regulatory accounting practices" regulations are currently found at 12 C.F.R. § 624 (1990).
96. Pub.L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568-1718 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of
Titles 7, 12, & 14 of 12 U.S.C.A. (West 1988, 1989 & Supp. 1990)).
97. The 1987 Act substantially changed the loan servicing procedures for the loan
programs administered by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) and made minor
changes to other agricultural programs, including the Conservation Reserve Program. See
generally Hayes, Farmers Home Administration: What the New Law Provides, 3 FARMERS'
LEGAL ACTION REP. 6 (1988) (discussing, in detail, the changes made by the 1987 Act to
FmHA loan servicing procedures); Hertzler, Jr., The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987-A
View from the Farmers Home Administration, 2 J. AGRIC. LENDING 17 (1988) (briefly
describing how the 1987 Act affected the FmHA); McEowen & Harl, A Look at the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and How It Affects Owners and Tenants of Marginal
Land, 12 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 121 (1990) (discussing the Conservation Reserve Program).
98. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278b-6 (West 1989).
99. An uncodified provision of the 1987 Act required the merger of the FLB and FICB
in each district within six months of the Act's enactment. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 410, 101 Stat.
1568, 1637 (1988). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 2011 (West 1989) (setting forth in the annotations
the terms of section 410). See generally 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2279a-2279a-3 (West 1989)
(authorizing the merger of banks within a district).
In addition, another uncodified provision of the 1987 Act required each FLBA and
PCA sharing substantially the same geographic territory to submit to their respective
shareholders a plan for merging the associations within six months after the merger of the
district FLB and FICB. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 411, 101 Stat. 1568, 1638 (1988). See also 12
U.S.C.A. § 2071 (West 1989) (setting forth in the annotations the terms of section 411). See
generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 2279c-1 (West 1989) (authorizing the merger of associations).
Finally, the 1987 Act also required the development of a proposal for the consolidation
of farm credit districts, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 412, 101 Stat. 1568, 1638-39 (1988), and the
voluntary merger of the banks for cooperatives, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 413, 101 Stat. 1568,
1639-42 (1988). See also 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2221, 2121 (West 1989) (setting forth in the
annotations the terms of sections 412 and 413, respectively).
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1. Financial Assistance to System Institutions
Under the 1987 Act, the Farm Credit Administration remains
the regulatory authority over System institutions. 100 However, a
new threefold approach to financial assistance is undertaken.
First, the Capital Corporation, a creation of the 1985 Act, has been
abolished. 10 In its place, an entity known as the Farm Credit Sys-
tem Assistance Board has been created to certify financially dis-
tressed institutions.'0 2  Once certified, an institution can issue
preferred stock and receive financial assistance.' 0 3 If the book
value of the stock of a System institution is less than seventy-five
percent of the par value of the stock, that is, if its value is less than
$3.75 per share, the institution is required to seek certification.10 4
Second, the 1987 Act also created an entity known as the
Financial Assistance Corporation. 0 5 That entity is authorized to
issue federally guaranteed bonds and to purchase the preferred
stock of System institutions that have been certified as eligible to
issue preferred stock, thereby funnelling the federal "bail-out"
funds to those institutions. 0 6 The Financial Assistance Corpora-
tion will terminate on the maturity and full payment of its
100. See generally Dewey, supra note 6, at 289 (discussing the role of the FCA under
the 1987 Act).
101. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 207(aX3), 101 Stat. 1568, 1607 (1988). The assets and
liabilities of the Capital Corporation were assumed by the Farm Credit System Assistance
Board. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278a-9 (West 1989).
102. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278a (West 1989). The mission of the Assistance Board is to protect
borrower's stock and "to assist in restoring System institutions to economic viability...." 12
U.S.C.A. § 2278a-1 (West 1989). The Board has three directors, one appointed by the
Secretary of the Treasury, one by the Secretary of Agriculture, and the third member, who
is to be an agricultural producer "experienced in financial matters", is appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278a-2 (West 1989).
The Assistance Board is granted broad powers with which to fulfill its mission. See 12
U.S.C.A. § 2278a-3 (West 1989). Those powers include the authority to issue regulations
without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Board is not subject to
regulation by the FCA. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278a-10(a), (b) (West 1989).
103. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278a-4, 2278a-5 (West 1989). The preferred stock issued by
certified institutions is purchased by the Financial Assistance Corporation using funds the
Corporation obtained by issuing federally guaranteed bonds. See infra note 106 and the
accompanying text.
104. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278a-4(b) (West 1989). The $3.75 per share figure assumes that the
stock had a par value of $5.00, which it usually did prior to the 1987 Act. See 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2034(a), 2094(f) (West 1980). See also In re Massengill, 100 Bankr. 276, 278 & n. 1 (E.D.
N.C. 1988) (discussing the stock purchase requirements in effect prior to the 1987 Act).
105. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278(b) (West 1989). The purpose of the Financial Assistance
Corporation is the provision of capital to financially distressed System institutions. 12
U.S.C.A. § 2278b-1 (West 1989). The board of directors of the Financial Assistance
Corporation consists of the Board of Directors of the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding
Corporation. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278b-2(a) (West 1989).
106. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2278b-6(a), 2278b-7(b) (West 1989). Interest must be paid on the
federally guaranteed bonds. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2278b-6(c), 2278b-8 (West 1989). Although
the Secretary of the Treasury bears some initial responsibility for interest payments, the
System is ultimately obligated to repay the Secretary up to the sum of $2,000,000,000 for
interest payments. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2278b-6(c), 2278b-8(b) (West 1989).
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bonds. 10 7 The bonds will have a fifteen year maturity period.10 8
In addition to creating an "assistance fund" through the issu-
ance of federally guaranteed bonds, the 1987 Act created a "trust
fund" funded solely from the proceeds from a one-time required
purchase of Financial Assistance Corporation stock by the PCAs
and Farm Credit Banks.109 The creation of the "trust fund"
already has been challenged as an unconstitutional taking under
the fifth amendment."10
Third, the 1987 Act also creates the Farm Credit System
Insurance Corporation."' The Corporation's function is to create
an insurance fund by assessing and collecting premiums from Sys-
tem institutions. 1 2 The fund is intended to protect System institu-
tions, investors, and stockholders beginning in 1993 by satisfying
defaults on payments of bonds, preferred stock, and borrower
stock. 113
The 1987 Act also created, as part of the Farm Credit System,
the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation to oversee a new
agricultural mortgage secondary market.1 4  Lenders other than
System lenders will be eligible to participate in the secondary
107. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278b-1 1 (West 1989). The System is required to pay the bond
obligations. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278b-6(c) (West 1989).
108. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2278b6(a) (West 1989). For an excellent discussion of the federal
"bailout" provisions of the 1987 Act, see Massey, Farm Credit System: Structure and
Financing Under the New Act, 3 FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION REP. 52, 58-64 (1988)
[hereinafter Massey] (includes flow chart diagrams of the "bailout" mechanisms).
109. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2278b-5(b), 2278b-9 (West 1989 & Supp. 1990). The purpose of the
"trust fund" is to provide intermediate security for each System institution's share of
interest and principal repayment on the "assistance fund" bonds. See Massey, supra note
108, at 63-64.
110. Colorado Springs Production Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 695 F. Supp. 15
(D.D.C. 1988) (order denying in part and granting in part motion to dismiss).
111. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2277a-1 (West 1989).
112. Id. See also Massey, supra note 108, at 65-68 (discussing purposes and functions of
the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation); Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding
Corp. v. Farm Credit Admin., 731 F. Supp. 217, 219-20 (E.D. Va. 1990) (briefly describing
the Insurance Corportation and the Insurance Fund).
113. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2277a-9(a), (c) (West 1989).
114. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2279aa - 2279aa-14 (West 1989). See generally Pariser,
Agricultural Real Estate Loans and Secondary Markets, IV AGRIC. & HUMAN VALUES 29
(1987) (discussing the possible effects of the secondary market on the Farm Credit System);
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. RCED-90-118, FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
MORTGAGE CORPORATION: SECONDARY MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND RISK IMPLICATIONS
(1990) (discussing a variety of issues presented by the secondary market); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. RCED-88-55FS, FARM FINANCE: PROVISIONS FOR
SECONDARY MARKETS FOR FARM REAL ESTATE LOANS IN H.R. 3030 (1987) (same);
AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOC., FINANCING FARM REAL ESTATE: A COMPREHENSIVE
TRAINING MANUAL FOR THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR AGRICULTURE (1988) (a lender's
guide to the secondary market created by the 1987 Act); D. FRESHWATER & D. TRECHTER,
NEw APPROACHES TO FINANCING LONG-TERM FARM DEBT (Econ. Res. Serv., USDA,
Agric. Info. Bull. No. 511, March 1987) (discussing secondary agricultural mortgage markets
in general); Killebrew, The Case for the Secondary Market, 1 J. AGRIC. LENDING 6 (1987) (a
commercial lender's argument for a secondary agricultural mortgage market).
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market."15
In addition, the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corpora-
tion was created as the System's fiscal agent for the marketing of
System bonds. In addition to marketing System bonds, the Fund-
ing Corporation will determine the terms and other conditions of
those bonds. 16
Questions have already been raised about the efficacy of the
federal "bail-out." ' 1 7 Moreover, on Friday, May 20, 1988, the Fed-
eral Land Bank of Jackson was closed and placed in a receivership
by the Farm Credit Administration after examiners determined
that an additional infusion of federal funds would be "futile." 11
2. Merger of System Institutions
The 1987 Act mandated the merger of the federal land bank
and the federal intermediate credit bank in each district within six
months after January 6, 1988."19 The merged FLB and FICB
within each district are now known as the Farm Credit Banks.12 0
The Farm Credit Banks, acting through FLBAs, will continue
to provide real estate loans. 12  However, the Farm Credit Banks
can transfer direct loan making authority to an FLBA.122
115. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2279aa-5(2) (West 1989).
116. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2160 (West 1989).
117. Bullock & Dodson, The Farm Credit System: It Was A New Lease On Life,
But. . ., CHOICES, First Quarter 1988, at 32.
118. 53 Fed. Reg. 18,812 (1988) (order appointing receiver) (the order has been
amended at least twice, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,762 (1988), 55 Fed. Reg. 3,644 (1990)). See also
Wall St. J., May 23, 1988, at 4, col. 1 (reporting on the receivership order); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GGD-90-16, FARM CREDIT: BASIS FOR DECISION NOT TO
ASSIST JACKSON FEDERAL LAND BANK (1989) (critical study of the decision to place the
Jackson FLB in receivership); Behind The Takeover of Jackson Farm Credit, AGRIFINANCE
NEWS, July 1988, at 1 (discussing the Jackson FLB receivership); Hughes, Jackson FLB In
Receivership, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, July 1988, at 20 (same). Subsequently, the loans of the
Jackson FLB were sold to the Farm Credit Bank of Texas, and the three states formerly
served by the Jackson FLB, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, are now served by the
Farm Credit Bank of Texas. FARM CREDIT ADMIN., 4 FCA BULL. 2-3 (1989). Some of the
events leading up to the placing of the Jackson FLB in receivership are discussed in Federal
Land Bank of Jackson in Receivership v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (of Jackson), 727
F. Supp. 1055, 1056-57 (S.D. Miss. 1989). See also Grant v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson,
559 So.2d 148, 150-55 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the Jackson FLB's receiver's liability
under the "D'Oench doctrine" [D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 315 U.S. 676 (1942)] in a lender liability action), cert. denied, 563 So.2d 886, 887 (La.
1990); Note, Borrower Beware: D'Oench, Duhme and Section 1823 Overprotect the Insurer
When Banks Fail, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 253 (1988) (discussing the "D'Oench doctrine").
119. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 401, 101 Stat. 1568, 1622 (1988). See also supra note 99
(discussing the mandatory merger of district FLBs and FICBs into district farm credit
banks).
120. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2011 (West 1989).
121. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2015, 2013(18), 2021(a), 2091, 2093(9) (West 1989). Where there is
no active association, the Farm Credit Bank may make the loan directly. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 2021(b) (West 1989).
122. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2013(18) (West Supp. 1989). When the direct lending authority has
been delegated to a FLBA, the association is referred to as a "Federal land credit
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PCAs will .continue to provide short and intermediate term
loans.12 3 Those loans may be discounted by the Farm Credit
Banks, and associations, including both federal land bank and pro-
duction credit associations, will continue to be supervised by the
Farm Credit Banks.124
Under the 1987 Act, a PCA and an FLBA may merge.'2 5 If a
merger occurs, the Farm Credit Banks must transfer the direct
lending authority for long-term real estate mortgage loans to the
FLBA.126 Further, merged associations are referred to as "agricul-
tural credit associations" (ACAs).' 27
The Act also required the twelve banks for cooperatives and
the Central Bank for Cooperatives to consider consolidation into
one national bank for cooperatives.' 28  The St. Paul, Springfield,
Jackson, and Spokane Banks recently voted not to consolidate; the
remaining eight banks will consolidate into one national bank.' 29
The 1987 Act removed the requirement that a borrower must
purchase stock in the amount of five percent of the face value of
the loan.' 30 A borrower now must purchase stock in an amount as
set by the lender, subject to FCA regulation. 13  The FCA has
association". 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,889 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 619.9155).
See also 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,881 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 614.4030) (lending
authority for federal land credit associations).
123. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2073(13), 2075 (West 1989).
124. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2013(6), (13), (17)-(21) (West Supp. 1989). See also 55 Fed. Reg.
24,861, 24,882-83 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. subpt. C) (final rules relating to the farm credit
bank/association relationship) (The FCA still has not adopted in final form other rules
relating to loan policies and operations proposed on November 3, 1988, at 53 Fed. Reg.
44,438-44,456 (1990)). See 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24862 (1990)).
125. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2279c-1 (West 1989). The 1987 Act directed that, not later than six
months after the merger of the FLBs and FICBs into district farm credit banks, the board of
directors of the FLBAs and PCAs were to submit to their respective association's
shareholders a proposal to merge the FLBAs and.PCAs serving the same geographical area.
Pub. L. No. 10-233, 411, 101 Stat. 1568, 1368 (1988). See also 12 U.S.C.A. § 2071 (West
1989) (setting for section 411 in the annotations). The 1987 Act also permits "like"
associations to merge, i.e., a PCA may merge with another PCA. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2279f-1
(West 1989).
126. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2279b(b) (West 1989). See also 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,882 (1990)
(loan authority for the "agricultural credit associations" formed by the merger of "unlike"
associations).
127. 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,888 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 619.9015).
128. Pub. L. No. 100-233, 413, 101 Stat. 1568, 1639-42 (1988). See also 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 2121 (West 1989) (setting forth the terms of section 413 in the annotations).
129. National Bank for Cooperatives Formed by Merger Vote, AGRIFINANCE NEWS,
August 1988, at 4. A bank for cooperatives may merge with district farm credit bank. 12
U.S.C.A. § 2279fRa) (West 1989). When such a merger occurs, the resulting bank is known as
an "agricultural credit bank". 55 Fed. Reg. 24,861, 24,888 (1990) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 619.9020). See generally Hopkin, Sporleder, Padberg & Knutson, Evaluation of
Restructuring Alternatives for the Banks for Cooperatives, 3 J. AGRIC. COOPERATION 71
(1988) (discussing the consolidation alternatives for the banks of cooperatives).
130. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2034, 2294 (West 1980). See supra notes 59 & 68 and the
accompanying text.
131. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2074, 2094 (West Supp. 1989).
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issued regulations providing that the amount of stock required to
be purchased must be not less than two percent of the loan
amounts or $1,000, whichever is less. 132
Finally, the 1987 Act also requires the Farm Credit Adminis-
tration to propose a plan for the merger of the twelve districts into
no less than six districts. 133 The various Farm Credit Banks are to
submit the proposed merger affecting it to its members for their
approval.13 4
K. "FARM CREDIT SERVICES" As A TRADE NAME, THE
FEDERAL FARM CREDIT CORPORATION OF
AMERICA, AND THE FARM CREDIT COUNCIL
As has been briefly described above and is discussed else-
where in this article, the Farm Credit System consists of various
"System institutions," most notably the district Farm Credit
Banks, Banks For Cooperatives, and various federal land bank
associations and production credit associations within each district.
Each System institution is a federally-chartered instrumentality
and, as such, is a separate legal entity.135  However, the various
institutions often hold themselves out as being, or being a part of,
"Farm Credit Services." "Farm Credit Services" is a trade name;
132. 12 C.F.R. § 614.5220(d) (1990).
133. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 412, 101 Stat. 1568, 1638-39 (1988). See also 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 2002 (West 1989) (setting forth the terms of section 412 in the annotations).
134. Id. A more detailed explanation of the structural changes occasioned by the 1987
Act can be found in a FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GROUP, INC., SPECIAL REPORT ON THE
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT ACT OF 1987 (1988), available from the Farmers' Legal Action
Group, Inc., 1301 Minnesota Building, 46 East Fourth Street, St. Paul, Minnesota, 55101.
See also Davidson, Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Feb. 1988, at 7
(surveying the provisions of the 1987 Act); M. HUGHES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AT THE
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM (Econ. Res. Serv., USDA, Agric. Inf. Bulletin No. 572, 1989)
(summarizing the structural changes in the System resulting from the 1987 Act); Koenig &
Hiemtra, More Than A Faceliftfor FCS, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, March 1988, at 22 (same); Kayl,
supra note 6, at 311-18 (same); Duncan, The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987-A View from
the Farm Credit Administration, 2 J. AGRIC. LENDING 7 (1988) (same); Lugar, The
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 - A View from the Hill, 2 J. AGRIC. LENDING 12 (1988)
(same); Harl, Policy Considerations Related to Further Intervention in the Farm Credit
System, 2 J. AGRIC. COOPERATION 57 (1987) (written before the passage of the 1987 Act,
this article highlights many of the policy considerations underlying the provisions that were
enacted). Appended to this article as Appendix B is a flow chart of the Farm Credit System
current as of July 1989.
The 1987 Act also contained significant new "borrowers' rights" provisions. Those
provisions are discussed later in this article. See infra notes 340-434 and the accompanying
text. See also Massey & Schneider, supra note 6, at 589-624 (focusing exclusively on the
"borrowers' rights" provisions of the 1987 Act); Hambright, The Agricultural Credit Act of
1987, 17 COLO. LAw. 611 (1988) (same); Saxowsky, Government Response to Financial
Stress: The Farm Experience, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 28 (1989) (surveying the
governmental response to the farm credit crisis of the 1980s, including the changes
legislatively imposed on the System).
135. See infra note 150 and the accompanying text.
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it is not a legal entity. Accordingly, "Farm Credit Services," as
such, is not capable of suing or being sued.
The various Farm Credit System banks are authorized to cre-
ate organizations to perform certain functions or services for the
banks.' 36  Two such organizations have been organized under
charters issued by the FCA. The first, initially established in July,
1985, by the district banks, is the Farm Credit Corporation of
America (FCCA) located in Denver, Colorado. 137 Among other
things, the FCCA provides centralized financial and management
guidance to the district banks. 138 The second, the Farm Credit
Council, is the trade association of the System banks and associa-
tions.' 39 Essentially a lobbying organization, its offices are in
Washington, D.C.' 4 °
III. LITIGATION INVOLVING THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM
A. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Federal jurisdiction over FLBAs and PCAs is limited. Unless
diversity of citizenship exists to satisfy the requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1332,141 the only other currently possible bases for federal
jurisdiction over FLBAs and PCAs are federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,142 premised on the theory that the Farm
Credit Act, as amended, implies a private cause of action; 143 the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; 144 and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act.'14  As will be discussed later in this
article, the prevailing view is that the Farm Credit Act of 1971
does not create an implied private cause of action.' 46 Further, it
also appears that claims based on the Farm Credit Amendments
Act of 1985 may not satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Eighth Circuit
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals have recently held that the
136. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2211 (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 611.1135 (1990) (providing
for the incorporation of service organizations).
137. See generally The Farm Credit System: New Players, New Goals (Interview with
Brent Beesley, President and Chief Executive Office of the FCCA), LANDOWNER, Aug. 25,
1986, at 3 (discussing the history of the FCCA).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. In late 1989, plans were underway to disband the Farm Credit Corporation of
America (FCCA) and to divide its functions between the Farm Credit Council (FCC) and
the Federal Farm Credit Banks Funding Corporation. See Farm Credit System Aims for
New Year Start of New Farm Credit Council, AGRIC CREDIT LETTER, Dec. 15, 1989, at 1.
141. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990).
142. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990).
143. See infra notes 184-267 and the accompanying text.
144. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
145. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-1691f (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
146. See infra notes 184-94 and the accompanying text.
1990] .
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:127
1985 Act did not create an implied private right of action for dam-
ages. 47 Whether the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 implies a
private right of action also appears to be headed for a negative
resolution. The Ninth, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits have held that
there is no implied private cause of action for injunctive relief
under the 1987 Act. 148 The Eighth Circuit's decision, one reached
by the court sitting en banc, vacated an earlier panel decision find-
ing an implied cause of action for injunctive relief to remedy the
failure of System lenders to follow a procedural directive in the
1987 Act. 14
9
1. Status as Federally Chartered Instrumentalities
The mere status of the FCBs, FLBAs, and PCAs as federally
chartered instrumentalities of the United States does not create
federal court jurisdiction. FLBAs and PCAs are federally
chartered instrumentalities of the United States.150 In that regard,
29 U.S.C. § 1349's' provides as follows:
The district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any
civil action by or against any corporation upon the ground
that it was incorporated by or under an Act of Congress,
unless the United States is the -owner of more than one-
half of its capital stock.15 2
Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1349 has beenheld to preclude federal court
jurisdiction over a claim against a FLB premised on an allegation
147. The following cases have found that there is no implied right of action for
damages in the 1985 Act: Redd v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.
1988); Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 862 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988);
Ebenhoh v. Production Credit Ass'n of Southeast Minnesota, 426 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988). See also Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Grand Forks, 407 N.W.2d
206, 208-10 (N.D. 1987) (finding no implied action in a wrongful discharge action and
holding that a'member of Congress's statements made during the debate on the 1985 Act
were irrelevant to determining whether Congress intended to create an implied cause of
action under the 1971 Act).
148. Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 867 (1990); Griffin v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 902 F.2d 22 (10th
Cir. 1990); Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, No. 88-5353ND (8th Cir. July 31, 1990)
(en banc) (1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932).
149. Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 887 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated on
grant of reh'g en banc, Dec. 7, 1989 (1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18809).
150. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011(a) (FCBs), 2091(a) (FLBAs), 2071(a) (PCAs) (West 1989).
151. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1349 (West 1976).
152. Id. The United States does not own stock in the Farm Credit System, the last
federal government stock having been retired in 1968. Brake, supra note 18, at 576; In re
Hoag Ranches, Inc., 846 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1988). The "bail out" provisions of the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 did not involve the acquisition of System institution stock by
the United States. See generally supra notes 105-08 and the accompanying text (discussing
the "bail out" provisions of the 1987 Act).
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that the FLB was a federally chartered instrumentality.
53
Also, System institutions are generally not considered foreign
corporations under state certificate of authority statutes. This is
because
[i]t is well settled that "[c]orporations created by the
authority of the United States are not foreign corporations
but have legal existence in every state in which they may
transact business pursuant to the authority conferred
upon them by Congress."1
5 4
Thus, the status as federally chartered instrumentalities does not
create federal court jurisdiction.
2. Citizenship
For purpose of diversity and other jurisdictional bases, a Sys-
tem institution is "deemed to be a citizen of the State, common-
wealth, or District of Columbia in which its principal office is
located."' 5
3. Fifth Amendment
There is no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 against an FLBA or PCA based on a claim arising under the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution because those
153. Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Cotton, 410 F. Supp. 169, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(also holding that the FLB was not an agency within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 451 &
1349 (West 1976) Id. at 171) (In subsequent litigation involving the same parties, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1349 was cited for the proposition that "[t]he mere fact that- defendant is federally
chartered does not support federal jurisdiction". Cotton v. Federal Land Bank of
Columbia, 647 F. Supp. 37, 38 n. 1 (M.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1091 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Accord Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Keiser, 628 F. Supp. 769, 771 (C.D. IU. 1986). See
also Franklin v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 96 Bankr. 929, 931-34 (W.D. Mo. 1989)
(holding that a FLB's status as a federally chartered instrumentality is not sufficient to
support procedural due process claim or federal question jurisdiction); LPR Land Holdings
v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 651 F. Supp. 287, 289-92 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (same,
rejecting the argument that Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314
U.S. 95 (1941), and Greene County Nat'l Farm Loan Ass'n v. Federal Land Bank of
Louisville, 152 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1945), stand for the contrary proposition); Hill v. Farm
Credit Bank of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (same, citing additional
cases); In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1988) (PCA not an "agency"
within the meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 4(aX1)).
154. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Gefroh, 390 N.W.2d 46, 47 (N.D. 1986) (quoting
Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Felt, 368 N.W.2d 592, 595 (S.D. 1985)). See also Federal
Land Bank of St. Paul v. Anderson, 410 N.W.2d 709, 713 (N.D. 1987) (holding that a FLB is
not subject to state registration requirements); Kolb v. Naylor, 658 F. Supp. 520, 526 (N.D.
Iowa 1987) (same); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bagge, 394 N.W.2d 694, 696 (N.D.
1986) (same, relying on Gefroh).
155. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2258 (West 1989). See also Engelmeyer v. Production Credit Ass'n
of the Midlands, 652 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (D.S.D. 1987) (citing section 2258; Cotton v.
Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 647 F. Supp. 37, 38-39 (D. Ga. 1986)); and Apple v. Miami
Valley Production Credit Ass'n, 614 F. Supp. 119, 122 (D. Ohio 1985)).
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entities are private rather than governmental. 156 However, the
Eighth Circuit has found a "colorable basis" for jurisdiction for a
fifth amendment claim against a PCA based on the "pervasive
.involvement of the federal government in the creation and opera-
tion of the production credit associations.' 15 7
4. Federal Common Law
There is no 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction under the federal
common law based on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty.158 The
fiduciary obligations of FLBAs and PCAs will be discussed in
greater detail later in this article. 59
5. Section 1983
Federal instrumentalities are not "persons" subject to section
1983 liability. 160 Thus, there is no 28 U.S.C. § 1343 jurisdiction
based on a claim arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6. Tucker Act
Unless there is at issue a claim based on a substantive right,
there is no jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.' 6 ' In addition, the
156. E.g., Birbeck v. Southern New England Production Credit Ass'n, 606 F. Supp.
1030, 1034-35 (D. Conn. 1985) (citing DeLaigle v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 568 F.
Supp. 1432, 1439 (S.D. Ga. 1983), overruled on other grounds sub noma. Smith v. Production
Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544, 1548 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1985)); Federal Land Bank of Wichita v.
Jost, 761 P.2d 270, 271 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (relying on DeLaigle and Federal Land Bank v.
Read, 703 P.2d 777, 78-81 (Kan. 1985)). See also supra note 153 (citing other cases).
157. Schlake v. Beatrice Production Credit Ass'n, 596 F.2d 278, 281 (8th Cir. 1979)
(citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978)).
But see Hill v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 1201, 1208 (E.D. Mo. 1989)
(declining to follow Schlake); Franklin v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 96 Bankr. 929, 934
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (declining to follow Schlake and citing Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d 1121
(8th Cir. 1980), in support of the assertion that "[e]ven the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has treated Schlake as an aberration"); LPR Land Holdings v. Federal Land Bank of St.
Louis, 651 F. Supp. 287, 291 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (declining to follow Schlake); Birbeck v.
Southern New England Production Credit Ass'n, 606 F. Supp. 1030, 1034 n. 1 (D. Conn.
1985) (criticizing Schlake); United States v. Haynes, 620 F. Supp. 474, 477 (M.D. Tenn.
1985) (declining to follow Schlake); In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (9th Cir.
1988) (same).
158. Birbeck, 606 F. Supp. at 1039-44. See also Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d 1121, 1125
(8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the fiduciary obligations of System institutions are governed by
state law, not federal law).
159. See infra notes 300-39 and the accompanying text.
160. Birbeck, 606 F. Supp. at 1044-45. See also Harper v. Federal Land Bank of
Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that section 1983 is not available
because of the absence of state action), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 867 (1990); Walker v. Federal
Land Bank of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 211, 214 (C.D. Ill. 1989) ("the FCB is, itself, not a state
actor, and thus is not a 'person' for purposes of 1983"); Kolb v. Naylor, 658 F. Supp. 520,
524 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (the "use of state law to foreclose is not sufficient to allege a claim
under section 1983").
161. 28 U.S.C.A: §§ 1346(aX2), 1491(aXl) (West Supp. 1990). The Tucker Act gives the
federal district courts and the United States Claims Court jurisdiction over claims against
the United States founded on the United States Constitution, an Act of Congress, a
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Tucker Act does not create substantive rights. 162 Also, the Tucker
Act does not extend to entities in which the United States has no
proprietary interest, and, thus, it does not apply to System
lenders.'63
7. Truth In Lending
Credit transactions primarily for agricultural purposes are
exempt from the disclosure requirements of the Truth-In-Lending
Act.' 64 Thus, in virtually all instances, FLB and PCA loans will be
exempt from disclosure requirements of the Truth-In-Lending
Act.16 5
8. Federal Tort Claims Act
The correct rule is that FLBAs and PCAs are not agencies for
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).'1 However, the
Montana Supreme Court recently took the opposite position on
this issue, although it later reversed its position in the same case
and withdrew its earlier decision. In its initial decision in Tooke v.
Miles City Production Credit Association,67  the Montana
Supreme Court held that PCAs were subject to the FTCA.168 In
Tooke, the Tookes brought suit against the PCA in state court
alleging that the PCA had breached its fiduciary duties to them
and committed fraud in considering the Tookes' loan applica-
tion. 6 9 The court found that the case should have been brought
under the FrCA for two reasons.' 70 First, the PCA was a federal
instrumentality under the test set out in Lewis v. United States,'7 '
regulation of an executive department, an express or implied contract with the United
States, or an other basis for liquidated or unliquidated damages not sounding in tort. The
district court's jurisdiction is limited to claims up to $10,000 and does not include certain
claims under the Contract Disputes Act. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(aX2) (West Supp. 1990).
162. Birbeck, 606 F. Supp. at 1045.
163. Id.
164. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603(1) (West 1982).
165. See Gregory v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 515 So. 2d 1200, 1203 (Miss. 1987).
See also Felt v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Belle Fourche, 760 F.2d 209, 210-11 (8th Cir.
1985) (affirming dismissal of claim under the Truth in Lending Act on grounds that the
action was time-barred and because of the agricultural purpose exemption).
166. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680 (West 1965 & Supp. 1990); South Central Iowa
Production Credit Ass'n v. Scanlon, 380 N.W.2d 699, 700-03 (Iowa 1986); Kolb v. Naylor,
658 F. Supp. 520, 525-26 (N.D. Iowa 1987).
167. Tooke v. Miles City Production Credit Ass'n, No. 87-409 (Mont. March 3, 1988)
(Westlaw, MT-CS database, 1988 WL 27167) [hereinafter Tooke 1], withdrawn, 763 P.2d
1111 (Mont. 1988).
168. That holding was reversed when the initial opinion was withdrawn by Tooke v.
Miles City Production Credit Ass'n, 763 P.2d 1111 (Mont. 1988).
169. Tooke I, slip op. at 3.
170. Id.
171. 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982). Lewis described the test to determine whether an
entity was a federal agency within the meaning of the FTCA as follows: the entity must
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and, as a federal instrumentality, it was subject to the FTCA unless
the FTCA specifically exempted it from coverage.17 2  Second,
while the FLB and the FICB were specifically exempted from the
FTCA,1 7 3 PCAs were not; thus, they were subject to the FTCA.17 4
The decision was unsound. In essence, it was premised on the
notion that the federal government exercises "control over the...
[PCA's] detailed physical performance and day to day opera-
tion.' 7 5 Although recent federal legislation governing the Farm
Credit System has been increasingly prescriptive, and the FCA has
acquired the status of an independent regulator, PCAs continue to
be farmer-owned cooperatives with considerable autonomy.1 7 1
Fortunately, although it claimed to base its change of opinion on
..new authority" and not its initial faulty reasoning, the Montana
Supreme Court subsequently withdrew its initial opinion in Tooke
and substituted it with one holding that the PCA was not a federal
agency for purposes of the FTCA. 1 7 7
9. Securities Act
FLBA and PCA Class B stock is not subject to the Securities
Act of 1933178 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 17 Thus,
have federal government control over detailed physical performance and daily operation of
the entity. Id. at 1240. Other factors considered include whether the entity is an
independent corporation, whether the government is involved in the entity's finances, and
whether the mission of the entity furthers the policy of the United States. Id. at 1240-41.
172. Tooke I, slip op. at 7.
173. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(n) (West 1965).
174. Tooke I, slip op. at 7.
175. Id.
176. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, FARM CREDIT
ADMINISTRATION'S ROLE IN THE SYSTEM'S CRIsis, H. REP. No. 99-561, 99th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 3 (recommending that the FCA implement its new functions under the Farm Credit
Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-205, 99 Stat. 1678 (1985), so as to "zealously guard
the cooperative principles of FCS so that as much authority as possible can be exercised at
the lowest possible level of the system"); Federal Land Bank of Springfield v. Farm Credit
Admin., 676 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (D. Mass. 1987) (characterizing Farm Credit System banks
and associations as "autonomous and locally-oriented," while also being "interdependent
and financially interrelated"); Central Kentucky Production Credit Ass'n v. United States,
846 F.2d 1460, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The FCA is an independent regulatory agency that
does not itself make, subsidize, or guarantee agricultural loans. Instead, borrowers obtain
credit from a national network of privately owned banks and associations"). The autonomy
of some PCAs allowed them to prosper while other System institutions were floundering in
the 1980s. See Sikeston Production Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 647 F. Supp. 1155
(E.D. Mo. 1986); Colorado Springs Production Credit Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 695 F.
Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1988).
177. Tooke v. Miles City Production Credit Association, 763 P.2d 1111, 1114-16 (Mont.
1988) (The court relied heavily on the analysis followed in In re Hoag Ranches, 846 F.2d
1225 (9th Cir. 1988), which concluded that a PCA was not a government agency under Fed.
R. App. P. 4(aX 1)).
178. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77bbbb (West 1981 & Supp. 1990).
179. 15 U.S.C.A. § 771 (West 1981); Dau v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 627 F. Supp.
346, 348-49 (N.D. Iowa 1985); Seger v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of Omaha, 850
F.2d 468, 469 (8th Cir. 1988); Wiley v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 657 F. Supp. 964,
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farm borrowers are denied any remedies under the Securities Act.
10. Federal Indenture Act
FLBA and PCA stock is exempt under the Federal Indenture
Act,180 thus preventing farm borrowers from seeking any reme-
dies under the Act.
11. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Farm Credit System institutions are subject to the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act."8 Therefore, Farm Credit Institutions
must not violate the Equal Credit Opportunity Act regulations.
12. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
In virtually all instances, FLBAs and PCAs will be exempt
from the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act'8 2 because the debt
was not incurred for "personal, family, or household purposes."'"
Thus, farm borrowers cannot look to the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act for relief.
13. Implied Cause of Action Under the Farm Credit Act of
1971 and the Farm Credit Amendments Act of
1985
Claims of an implied private right of action under the Farm
Credit Act of 1971 as the Act existed prior to the effective date of
the 1985 amendments have been unsuccessful.1s 4 In virtually all
of those cases, the borrowers were seeking the benefit of the loan
966 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (also holding that System institutions are not subject to the National
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86).
180. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a-78kk (West 1981 & Supp. 1990); Dau, 627 F. Supp. at 349 (also
rejecting a claim under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2601-17 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990), because of the exemptions for parcels in excess of 25
acres).
181. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-1691f (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
182. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1692-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
183. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(5) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); Munk v. Federal Land Bank of
Wichita, 791 F.2d 130, 132 (10th Cir. 1986).
184. The following cases have rejected a private cause of action under the Farm Credit
Act of 1971: Bowling v. Block, 785 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829
(1986); Smith v. Russellville Production Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1985);
Aberdeen Production Credit Ass'n v. Jarrett Ranches Inc., 638 F. Supp. 534 (D.S.D. 1986);
Corum v. Farm Credit Services, 628 F. Supp. 707 (D.Minn. 1986); Spring Water Dairy Inc.
v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank of St. Paul, 625 F. Supp. 713 (D. Minn. 1986); Apple v.
Miami Valley Production Credit Ass'n, 614 F. Supp. 119 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d
917 (6th Cir. 1986); Hartman v. Farmers Production Credit Ass'n of Scottsburg, 628 F.
Supp. 218 (S.D. Ind. 1983); Yankton Production Credit Ass'n v. Jensen, 416 N.W.2d 860
(S.D. 1987); Production Credit Ass'n of Worthington v. Van Iperen, 396 N.W.2d 35 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); and Johansen v. Production Credit Ass'n of Marshall-Ivanhoe, 378 N.W.2d
59 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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servicing regulations 85 promulgated pursuant to the Act.
As it existed prior to the regulations promulgated under the
1985 amendment, those loan servicing regulations provided, in
relevant part, that System banks and associations that were
originating lenders were to "adopt loan servicing policies and pro-
cedures to assure that loans will be serviced fairly and equitably
for the borrower while minimizing the risk for the bank and
associations."18 6 Also, the regulations provided that the "policy
shall provide a means of forbearance for cases when the borrower
is cooperative, making an honest effort to meet the conditions of
the loan contract and is capable of working out of the debt
burden."'1 8 7
At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, the courts that have
rejected the argument that the Farm Credit Act of 1971 implies a
private cause of action have done so on two basic grounds. First,
with the exception of one federal district court, courts have
refused to find that the forbearance policies contemplated by the
former loan servicing regulations are substantive rules having the
force and effect of law.' Rather, the forbearance rules have been
found to be merely general statements of agency policy and there-
fore did not provide a basis for an implied cause of action.'89
The second ground for rejecting assertions of an implied cause
of action under the Farm Credit Act of 1971 has been the absence
of any legislative history reflecting a Congressional intent to imply
a federal remedy.'10 In applying the fourfold test for ascertaining
the existence of an implied cause of action in a federal statute
enunciated in Cort v. Ash,' 9 ' the courts have tended to focus on
the legislative intent prong of the test. The conclusion of the court
in Bowling v. Block' 92 is representative:
It is readily apparent that the Farm Credit Act
185. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510 - .4512 (1986) (removed 51 Fed. Reg. 39,486, 39,502 (1986)).
186. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510 (1986) (removed 51 Fed. Reg. 39, 486, 39,502 (1986).
187. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(dXl), (2) (1986) (removed 51 Fed. Reg. 39,486, 39,502 (1986).
188. Compare DeLaigle v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 568 F. Supp. 1432, 1436-
38 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (concluding that section 614.4510 has the "force and effect of law") with
Smith v. Russelville Production Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d at 1457-58 ("we disapprove of
DeLaigle v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, supra, to the extent that it may be
inconsistent with this opinion").
189. Smith v. Russellville Production Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d at 1548; Federal Land
Bank of Springfield v. Saunders, 108 A.D.2d 838, 485 N.Y.Supp. 2d 342 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985), appeal denied, 479 N.E.2d 827.
190. See, e.g., Bowling v. Block, 602 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 556
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986).
191. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
192. 602 F. Supp. 667, 670-71 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 556 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986).
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merely established the machinery by which its purpose,
to augment the amount of credit available to the farming
community, would be effected. It does not create specific
enforceable rights which would necessitate the existence
of a private right of action. Further, the Act intimates
that the specific entities it creates for the purpose or pro-
viding the needed credit - the production credit associa-
tions, the federal land bank associations and the banks for
cooperatives - are to be operated much like any other
private lending institution. Therefore, whatever disputes
arise between plaintiffs and the nonfederal defendants
must be resolved in the same manner that such a dispute
would be resolved if the defendants were common banks
or savings and loans.19 3
Thus, the issue of whether the Farm Credit Act of 1971, prior
to its 1985 amendment, creates an implied cause of action appears
to be firmly resolved in the negative. In light of recent decisions,
the same also may be said for the issue of whether the Act, as
amended in 1985, created an implied cause of action.
The enactment of the 1985 amendments arguably strength-
ened arguments for an implied cause of action in at least two
respects. First, the availability of forbearance became no longer
solely a matter of institutional policy. It was a congressional man-
date. 194 Second, the legislative history of the 1985 amendments
appeared to support the argument in favor of an implied cause of
action.' 95 In particular, during the floor debate in the House, Rep-
resentative De La Garza, the Chairman of the House Committee
on Agriculture and sponsor of the House bill 196 that formed the
basis for the Act stated that ".... it would be my understanding
that the rights . . . [in the Act] shall be enforceable in courts of
law.'1
97
The test for determining whether one has an implied cause of
action for relief under a federal statute was articulated by the
United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.' 98 Those factors are
as follows:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose espe-
193. Id.
194. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(b) (West Supp. 1986) (amended 1988).
195. 131 CONG. REC. H11518-19 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985).
196. H.R. 3792, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
197. 131 CONG. REC. H11518-19 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1985).
198. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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cial benefit the statute was enacted.., that is, does the
statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Sec-
ond, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one?... Third, is it consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff? . . .And finally, is the cause of action one
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?' 99
Shortly after the enactment of the 1985 amendments, two
courts offered, in dicta, observations as to whether the 1985
amendments to the Farm Credit Act would support a private
cause of action.2 0 ' However, in both cases, the court did not need
to resolve the issue because the plaintiff was asserting claims based
on the Farm Credit Act arising prior to its amendment in 1985.01
In the first case to be reported, Aberdeen Production Credit v.
Jarrett Ranches, Inc.,2 the court noted the remarks on the House
floor by Representative De La Garza.20 3 However, because the
acts challenged by the plaintiff occurred prior to the enactment of
1985 amendments, the court's remarks were limited to the
following:
This Court does not read this statement to indicate that
all regulations of the Farm Credit System were intended
to be enforceable in courts of law. The statement was
expressly made in reference to "borrowers' rights" estab-
lished in Title III, 301 et seq. of the 1985 Farm Credit
Amendments Act - the "rights" of disclosure and access
to documents. The defendants are not claiming any viola-
tion of rights allegedly established under the 1985
amendments. Therefore, this Court is not required to
consider the significance of the 1985 Farm Credit
Amendments Act in determining the existence of a pri-
vate cause of action.0 4
In the second case, Production Credit Association of Worth-
199. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
200. See infra notes 204-10 and the accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. 638 F. Supp. 534 (D.S.D. 1986).
203. Aberdeen Production Credit Union v. Jarrett Ranches, 638 F. Supp. 534, 536-37
(D.S.D. 1986).
204. Jarrett Ranches, 638 F. Supp. at 537.
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ington v. Van Iperen,2 °5 the court also found it unnecessary to
resolve the issue of whether the 1985 amendments created a pri-
vate cause of action.20 6 A decision was unnecessary because "the
amendments referred to by the [appellants] were not effective
until after the contract date between the parties herein. '20 7  In
passing over-the question, however, the court correctly noted that
the "substance of the Act" must also be examined and that exclu-
sive reliance could not be made on the statements of Representa-
tive De La Garza.20°  The same court later held that no implied
private cause of action exists under the 1985 Act.20 9
In subsequent actions where the issue was squarely presented,
two federal district courts rejected contentions that the borrow-
ers's rights provisions of the Farm Credit Amendments Act of
1985 created an implied cause of action in favor of Farm Credit
System borrowers.21 0 In the first of the two cases to be subse-
quently decided an appeal, Redd v. Federal Land Bank of St.
205. 396 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
206. Production Credit Ass'n of Worthington v. Van lperen, 396 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986).
207. Id. at 38.
208. Id.
209. Ebenhoh v. Production Credit Ass'n of Southeast Minnesota, 426 N.W.2d 490
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
210. Redd v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 661 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd,
851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988); Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 656 F.
Supp. 1212 (D.S.D. 1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988). However, addressing a
related issue, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that an FLB's failure to comply with
the System's forbearance regulations may afford a basis for an equitable defense to a
foreclosure action notwithstanding the absence of an implied cause of action. Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445, 447-50 (N.D. 1987). See also Federal Land
Bank of St. Paul v. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1988) (following Overboe in the
application of the "equitable defense"); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Asbridge, 414
N.W.2d 596, 597 (N.D. 1987) (same); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d
710, 715 (N.D. 1990) (same).
Unlike the issues in Redd and Mendel, the issue presented to the North Dakota
Supreme Court in Overboe assumed that the Farm Credit Act did not afford borrowers a
right of action. In Overboe, the question was whether, in the absence of a private right of
action, a borrower could assert a federal land bank's failure to follow the System's
forbearance regulations as a defense to a foreclosure action. 404 N.W.2d at 447. Relying on
a line of cases that have allowed a mortgagee's failure to follow HUD mortgage servicing
regulations promulgated under the National Housing Act to be asserted as an affirmative
defense notwithstanding the absence of a private cause of action under that Act, the court
resolved the issue in favor of the borrower. Id. at 450.
The administrative forbearance defense permitted by the Overboe court permitsjudicial consideration of both the procedural and substantive aspects of the System
institution's action. In that regard, the initial inquiry is whether the institution "has
established a general policy of forbearance and whether it applied that policy in arriving at
its decision to seek foreclosure. Id. at 450. If the trial court finds that the borrower's
qualifications were considered by the institution in accordance with its procedures, the
court's review of the merits of that consideration must be confined to whether the
institution abused its discretion. Id. In other words, to prevail, the borrower must show
that the institution acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable or unconscionable
manner." Id. The Overboe court indicated that the appellate review of a trial court's
determination of the substantive issue will be guided by the standard of whether the abuse
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Louis,21 l the district court relied on the House Report's discussion
of the rejection of an amendment to the 1985 legislation that
would have held "directors and officers of the System personally
and individually liable for damages suffered when they knowingly
violate.. . [the] Act, or any rate regulation or order issued there-
under" as indicating an absence of any intention to create a pri-
vate cause of action.212 It bolstered its reliance on the House
Report by concluding that the Act's granting of cease and desist
powers to the Farm Credit Administration reflected a Congres-
sional intention to so limit the remedy available for violations of
the Act.2 1 3 The court discounted Representative De La Garza's
statement that the Act created a private cause of action2 1 4 by find-
ing that understanding to be inconsistent with the Act's creation of
a remedy in favor of the Farm Credit Administration. 1 5
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in
Redd by finding that the second and third tests under Cort v. Ash
were not met.2 16 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the remarks of Representative De La Garza were not binding
on the court in determining whether an implied cause of action
exists.2 17 The court looked at the "substance of the amendment to
determine whether a cause of action should be implied, rather
than the comments of committee persons as they field questions
about the bill."' 218 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Congress was
aware of the enforcement problems in the Act, but the court
found that Congress had answered the problem by granting the
FCA broad cease and desist powers.2 19 The granting of such broad
regulatory powers suggested to the court that Congress did not
intend to grant borrowers a private right of action.22 °
The third test under Cort v. Ash also provided grounds for the
of discretion standard of review "appears to have been misapprehended or grossly
misapplied." Id.
The Overboe decision is discussed in greater detail later in this article. See infra notes
454-74 and accompanying text.
211. 661 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988).
212. H.R. REP. No. 425, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2587, 2631.
213. Redd v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 661 F. Supp. at 863 (citing 12 U.S.C.A.§§ 2261, 2264, 2267(b), 2268(a) and (g), and 2269 (West Supp. 1986)).
214. See supra note 197 and the accompanying text.
215. Redd, 661 F. Supp. at 863-64 (citing 131 CONG. REC. H11518-19 (daily ed. Dec.
10, 1985)).
216. Redd, 851 F.2d at 221-22. See supra notes 198-99 and the accompanying text for a
discussion of the Cort v. Ash test.
217. Id. at 222.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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Eighth Circuit to determine no implied cause of action exists. 2
The court found that the purpose of the 1985 Act was to
strengthen the financial condition of the System. 2  Thus, the
court reasoned that granting money damages to the Redds would
deplete the already diminishing resources of the System and
defeat the legislation's purpose.2 3
In the second case to be decided on appeal, also by the Eighth
Circuit, Mendel v. Production Credit Association of the Mid-
lands,24 the district court disagreed with the Redd court's dismis-
sal of Representative De La Garza's remark.z 5 The Mendel court
found that Representative De La Garza's statement was sufficient
to demonstrate intention to create a private remedy. 26 Neverthe-
less, the district court in Mendel also found that the underlying
purpose of the 1985 amendments was to "shore up" the finances of
the System, and that allowing recovery of monetary damages
against a System institution would be inconsistent with that pur-
pose.227 On that basis, the court in Mendel invoked the third ele-
ment of the Cort v. Ash test to deny a private right of action.228
Relying on its earlier decision in Redd, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the result reached by the district court.229
14. Implied Cause of Action Under the Agricultural Credit
Act of 1987
The 1987 Act also does not expressly provide a private cause
of action against institutions of the Farm Credit System. However,
shortly after System lenders began to implement the 1987 Act,
borrowers began asserting that the 1987 Act created an implied
private cause of action.3 0
221. Id. See supra notes 198-99 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the Cort
v. Ash test.
222. Id. at 222.
223. Id. at 222-23.
224. 656 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.D. 1987), aff'd, 682 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988).
225. Mendel, 656 F. Supp. at 1216.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 862 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1989).
The Mendel court repeated the court's earlier holding in Redd that the 1985 Amendments
to the Farm Credit Act did not create an implied right of damages. Id. at 182.
230. Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, No. 88-5353ND (8th Cir. July 31, 1990) (en
banc) (1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932) (no implied cause of action); Griffin v. Federal Land
Bank of Wichita, 902 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1990) (no implied cause of action); Harper v.
Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 692 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Or. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 1172 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 867 (1990) (no implied cause of action); Walker v. Federal
Land Bank of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 211 (C.D. 11. 1989) (no implied cause of action); Renick
Bros., Inc. v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Dodge City, 721 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Kan. 1989) (no
implied cause of action); Stoppel v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, No. 89-1221-C (D. Kan.
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The early-reception by the federal district courts to those
assertions was mixed. In Martinson v. Federal Land Bank of St.
Paul,23 x Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane,232 and Leck-
band v. Naylor,233 the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 was found
to have implied a private cause of action. However, in Zajac v.
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul,234 Wilson v. Federal Land Bank of
Wichita,2 35 and Neth v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson2 36 no
implied cause of action was found.
When the issue reached the courts of appeals, the reception
ceased to be mixed. Of the three courts of appeals to have
reached the issue to date, all have found against an implied cause
of action. In those cases, Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spo-
Sept. 26, 1989X1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11642) (no implied cause of action relying on Renick);
Ochs v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, NO. 87-4113-R (D. Kan. July 12, 1989) (1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9079) (no implied cause of action); Wilson v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, No.
88-4058-R (D. Kan. Jan. 30, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1558) (no implied cause of action);
In re Reilly, 105 Bankr. 59 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1989) (no implied cause of action); Neth v.
Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 717 F. Supp. 1478 (S.D. Ala. 1988) (no implied cause of
action); Martinson v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 725 F. Supp. 469 (D.N.D. 1988), appeal
dismissed, No. 88-5202 (8th Cir. May 5, 1989) (finding an implied cause of action); Leckband
v. Naylor, 715 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Minn. 1988), appeal dismissed, No. 88-5301 (8th Cir. May 5,
1989) (finding an implied cause of action); In re Jarrett Ranches, Inc., 107 Bankr. 963
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1989) (finding an implied cause of action). See also Payne v. Federal Land
Bank of Columbia, 711 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. N.C. 1989) (implicitly finding an implied cause of
action); In re Hilton Land & Cattle Co., 101 Bankr. 604 (D. Neb. 1989) (implicitly finding an
implied cause of action); Meredith v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 690 F. Supp. 786 (E.D.
Ark. 1988) (implicitly finding an implied cause of action). Aff'd, 873 F.2d 1447 (8th Cir.
1989).
For a brief period, the Eighth Circuit recognized an implied cause of action. Zajac v.
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 887 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated on grant of reh 'g en
banc, Dec. 7, 1989 (1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18809) (finding an implied cause of action).
Before that decision was vacated, it was followed by at least one district court in the Eighth
Circuit. Hill v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 1201 (E.D. Mo. 1989).
At least two courts have recently considered whether there is an implied cause of
action to remedy violations of regulations promulgated under the Farm Credit Act, as
amended. Winkel v. Production Credit Ass'n of East Central Wisconsin, 451 N.W.2d 440
(Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (finding no implied cause of action and apparently considering the
1987 Act); Williams v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 729 F. Supp. 1389 (D.D.C. 1990)
(same).
231. 725 F. Supp. 469 (D.N.D. 1988), appeal dismissed, No. 88-5202 (8th Cir. May 5,
1989).
232. 878 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 867 (1990).
233. 715 F. Supp. 1451 (D. Minn. 1988), appeal dismissed, No. 88-5301 MN (8th Cir.
May 5, 1989). Accord In re Jarrett Ranches, Inc., 107 Bankr. 963, 965 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989)
(relying on Leckband and Martinson, and noting that "the'Eighth Circuit has yet to provide
guidance on ... [the] issue"). Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit held against an implied
cause of action. Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, No. 88-5353ND (8th Cir. July 31,
1990) (1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932).
234. No. A3-88-115 (D.N.D. July 19, 1988)(1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16698), aff'd, No. 88-
5353ND (8th Cir. July 31, 1990) (1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932).
235. No. 88-4058-R (D. Kan. Jan. 30, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1558). Accord
Renick Bros., Inc. v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Dodge City, 721 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Kan.
1989); Stoppel v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, No. 89-1221-C (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1989)
(1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11642); Ochs v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, No. 87-4113-R (D.
Kan. July 12, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9079).
236. 717 F. Supp. 1478 (S.D. Ala. 1988).
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kane,"3 7 Griffin v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 38 and Zajac v.
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul,2 39 the Ninth, Tenth, and Eighth
Circuits each rejected the claim that the 1987 Act created an
implied private cause of action.
The differences between the courts can best be illustrated by
a comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in Zajac.
Each opinion addressed each element of the Cort test, and each
made reference to the prior decision of the Ninth Circuit in
Harper.
As noted earlier, 4 ° the first inquiry under Cort is whether the
plaintiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted."'24' In Zajac, the plaintiffs were seeking to secure
through injunctive relief an independent appraisal of the collateral
securing their FLB loan at the credit review committee stage of
the loan restructuring process, a right granted by the 1987 Act 242
which they alleged had been improperly denied them.243 The
Zajacs argued that the provisions of the 1987 Act at issue were
enacted for their benefit as System borrowers.244
The majority in Zajac declined to decide whether the Zajacs
were within the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted on the
grounds that the "Zajacs cannot make the other showings required
by Cort."2 45 However, the majority noted that, in the earlier
Harper decision, the Ninth Circuit had found that the primary
purpose of the 1987 Act was to respond to the financial crisis fac-
ing the System. Specifically, although the Ninth Circuit conceded
that one of the purposes of the loan restructuring provisions of the
1987 Act was to benefit borrowers seeking loan restructuring, the
court chose to "look at the overall purpose of the 1987 Act... and
237. 878 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 867 (1990).
238. 902 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1990).
239. Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, No. 88-5353 ND (8th Cir. July 31,
1990XenbancX1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932).
240. See infra notes 198-199 and the accompanying text.
241. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1978).
242. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2220(d) (West 1989). The right to an independent appraisal where a
loan restructuring application denial is under review by a credit review committee is
specifically afforded to borrowers by the Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-399, sec. 103, 102 Stat. 989,990 (1988Xcodified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(dX1), (2), (3) (West
1989). See infra notes 407-09 and the accompanying text.
243. Zajac, slip op. at 7 (Heaney, J., dissenting). At the time that the Zajacs brought
their action for injunctive relief before the federal district court, a foreclosure action
brought by the FLB was pending against them. In a concurring opinion joined by Judge
McMillian, Judge Arnold concluded that the Zajac's request for injunctive relief was barred
by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Id. at 4-5.
244. Id., slip op. at 2.
245. Id. The loan restructuring provisions are found in Title I of the 1987 Act entitled
"Assistance to Farm Credit System Borrowers." Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568, 1572 (1988).
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conclude that the major impetus for the legislature was the finan-
cial crisis of the Farm Credit System. '2 4 6 In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit in Harper implicitly rejected the claim that the loan
restructuring provisions of the 1987 Act were enacted for the spe-
cial benefit of borrowers. 4 7
The dissent in Zajac addressed the first test of Cort and con-
cluded that it had been satisfied. It found that borrowers were a
"protected class under the Act because its language and structure
established broad rights for borrowers and mandatory duties for
lenders. "248
With respect to the second and most significant aspect of the
Cort test, legislative intent, the majority in Zajac focused on the
rejection of an amendment to the House bill 249 that formed the
basis of the 1987 Act that would have expressly granted borrowers
a right of action to enforce the Act. Although the dissent in Zajac
relied heavily on other aspects of the legislative history of the leg-
islation, it also referenced the rejection of the amendment. How-
ever, the two opinions put a different gloss on that rejection.
246. Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176 (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of
Envt'l Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).
247. The distinction that the Ninth Circuit implicitly made between the financial
interests of the Farm Credit System and those of its borrowers reflects a misunderstanding
of the loan restructuring provisions of the 1987 Act. As is discussed later in this article, the
1987 Act requires a System lender to restructure a loan only when the restructured loan
would result in a greater financial return to the institution than would be achieved through
a foreclosure. In other words, loan restructuring under the Act is intended to force System
institutions to act in their best financial interests by requiring them to consider alternatives
to foreclosure. Accordingly, the distinction implicitly made by the Ninth Circuit is artificial
and at odds with the goals of the Act. See infra notes 365-411 and the accompanying text.
See also Zajac, slip op. at 21 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("Granting borrowers a private right for
injunctive relief requires lenders to weigh the costs of restructuring against the costs of
foreclosure before resorting to the latter. Injunctive relief strenghtens, rather than
weakens, the Farm Credit System by requiring lenders to make a decision based on a
thorough review of all factors and procedures deemed important by Congress"); H. Rep.
100-295 (I), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 62, reprinted in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2723, 2733 ("Complaints about the rights of System borrowers being abused at both the
association and district levels have been like a constant drumbeat in the offices of some
Members of Congress for several years. The package of borrower rights adopted in H.R.
3030 reflect a common sense approach which should have been standard operating
procedures in a cooperative, borrower-owned lending system."). But see Walker v. Federal
Land Bank of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 211, 217 (C.D. Ill. 1989). In reflecting on why
Congress may have decided not to include an express cause of action in the 1987 Act, the
court surmised that, "Congress may well have decided that a private right of action under
the 1987 Act would generate too many meritless lawsuits filed simply to postpone the
inevitable, and that these lawsuits, in addition to those with merit, would pose too heavy a
financial burden upon the already strapped Farm Credit System." Id.
248. Zajac, slip op. at 33 n. 15 (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("The detail and precision with
which Congress set forth borrowers' rights under ... [the restructuring section of the 1987
Act] are powerful indicators [of] Congress' intent to confer specific enforceable rights on
borrowers." Id. at 13).
249. H.R. 3030, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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The dissent in Zajac, relying on colloquies250 on the House
250. In introducing legislation that would have expressly created a cause of action,
Representative Watkins of Oklahoma stated:
My amendment would allow the borrower the right to sue. I really believe
in my heart that the right to sue is implied within the bill itself, but I think it is
our responsibility and our obligation to make sure that there is no question that
the borrower has that right. If a person has a loan and has worked with the Farm
Credit System and has suffered some legal wrong or been aggrieved or adversely
affected by certain violations of the Farm Credit System, they should have a
right to be able to sue.
Every one of us in this Chamber today has heard of dictatorial actions, and
we have heard of rigid abuses from individuals against the farmer and against
the landowner, and they really have had no recourse to try to remedy their
problems. I think my amendment assures them that they have that right if they
can prove the wrong.
131 CONC. REC. H7692 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1987).
Further discussion of the amendment brought about the following exchanges with
Representatives Glickman and De La Garza:
Mr. GLICKMAN: Mr. Chairman, I thank you gentleman for yielding to me.
What factually right now is the state of the law as it relates to a borrower's
right to sue? He is allowed to sue under State law, but not Federal law?
It would be useful to know what right a borrower would have to enforce a
decision by the Farm Credit System right now in court.
Mr. WATKINS: I think, if the gentleman from Kansas might recall, some
States do allow it, and some States do not.
What we are saying is, so there will not be any mistake under this particular
Federal legislation, that it be established that they do have the right to be able to
sue if they feel like they have been legally wronged or adversely affected by
some actions from the Farm Credit System.
Mr. DE LA GARZA: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to
me.
I have no problem with the gentleman's intention in allowing borrowers to
sue, although I think basically they have that right now.
131 CONC. RE:c. H7693 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1987).
The Senate also debated the right of individuals to sue System institutions. Senator
Burdick of North Dakota offered an amendment which gave any person, not just borrowers,
the right to sue:
This amendment is made necessary only because the House, in their Farm
Credit bill, included a right to sue provision that actually restricts the right to
sue.
Currently, any person has the right to sue these two entities. However, the
House provision arguably limits this right to borrowers of the System. This
restricts rights of persons who are not yet borrowers, or who are former borrow-
ers, to sue.
My amendment simply clears up these problems and restores the rights to
all persons, whether borrowers or not.
My amendment also gives persons the right to sue in Federal Court. This
does not create additional litigation, as some will argue, but only gives the option
of suing in Federal court.
131 CONG. REC. S16995 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1987).
Following Senator Burdick's statement, the following exchange occurred:
Mr. BOREN: Mr. President, I have listened with interest as my good friend
and colleague from North Dakota has explained the purpose of his amendment.
I have certainly a high degree of sympathy with thu principles that he has set
forth.
It has been our hope since we have carefully crafted this legislation in the
committee that we not reopen this matter at this time. However, I am told that
the house has unduly restricted the right of the borrower to bring suit and that
this is the proposal that is in the House bill. It would be my thought, and I have
also discussed this with Senator LEAHY, and Senator LUGAR will speak for him-
self, that we would oppose that House provision in the conference committee.
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floor addressing proposals for an express cause of action that
reflected, among other things, the misapprehension that a cause of
action already existed, concluded that Congress contemplated that
the borrowers' rights provisions of the Act would be enforceable
without an express provision to that effect.2 51 On the other hand,
the majority in Zajac declined to give any weight to the remarks of
individual members of Congress. 52 Instead, the majority based its
conclusions on legislative intent solely on the conference commit-
tee report. That report noted that the committee had deleted the
private right of action provision.253
In drawing its conclusions concerning legislative intent from
the conference committee report, the majority in Zajac expressly
adopted the analysis followed by the Ninth Circuit in Harper.
Accordingly, the majority in Zajac reasoned that the conference
committee report "'represents the final statement of the terms
agreed to by both houses' "1254 and that" '[n]ext to the statute itself
it [the report] is the most persuasive evidence on congressional
intent'."2 55
The Harper court had noted that an implied cause of action to
enforce Farm Credit legislation had been consistently denied by
courts as of the time of the debate on the 1987 Act. It then
invoked the "normal rule of statutory construction... that if Con-
gress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judi-
That would have much the same effect as the adoption of the Burdick amend-
ment would have without our attempting to write the actual language of the
amendment here on the floor at this time.
I wonder if the Senator might consider withholding the actual offering of
this amendment with the understanding that the Senate conferees would oppose
the House amendment in the conference.
Mr. BURDICK: The proposal of the Senator is very acceptable.
Mr. BORDEN: I thank my colleague, and I believe the Senator from Indi-
ana also has the same view.
Mr. LUGAR: Mr. President, I would confirm the understanding that the
distinguished Senator from this amendment. We will in fact oppose the House
amendment in conference. We understand the problem, and we would appreci-
ate the Senator's not pursuing this amendment on this occasion with that
assurance.
131 CONG. REC. S16995 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1987).
The Senate was concerned that the House amendment would limit the existing right of
individuals to sue System institutions and opposed the House amendment in Conference
Committee. The House amendment was thus deleted. H.R. REP. No. 100-490, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 178, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2723, 2973. See also
Zajac, slip op. at 21-24 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (discussing the foregoing and other remarks
made on the floor).
251. Zajac, slip op. at 22 n. 5 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
252. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176).
255. Id.
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cially created concept, it makes that intent specific. '25 6 Applying
that rule, the Ninth Circuit found that the deletion from the final
version of the 1987 Act of a provision for an express cause of action
reflected a Congressional intention that a cause of action also
should not be implied. ,7 The Zajac majority concurred. 58
The Zajac majority and dissent were also at odds in their
application of the third aspect of the Cort test; whether an implied
cause of action would be consistent with the legislation's pur-
pose. 25 9 The majority agreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
in Harper that the enforcement powers granted to the Farm
Credit Administration revealed a legislative intention to exclude
any other remedy. 260 The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion
even after acknowledging that those remedies might be inappro-
priate or ineffective because
... there is no procedure for filing charges or for compel-
ling FCA to commence an investigation.... [The] FCA's
enforcement apparatus is inadequate to enforce the bor-
rower's rights. ... [The] FCA's authority to issue tempo-
rary cease and desist orders is limited to violations likely
to cause insolvency and that FCA's issuance of permanent
cease and desist orders is extremely time consuming....
[And] [t]here is no provision in the statute' guaranteeing
any remedy for the individual borrower. "61
However, the dissent in Zajac vigorously took issue with the
assertion that an implied cause of action would not be consistent
with the scheme of the 1987 Act. The dissent seized on the inade-
256. Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176 (citing Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of
Envt'l Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)).
257. Id.
258. Zajac, slip op. at 3-4. The dissent in Zajac argued that the Harper court's
approach, specifically, its heavy reliance on the conference committee report, "relegates
the language and structure of the statute to insignificant status under its Cort v. Ash
analysis." Id. at 14 (citation omitted). The dissent maintained that "[a]s long as the implied
cause of action doctrine exists, the dominant focus must be the language and structure of
the Act in question." Id. at 15 (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 520 (1988)).
259. Cort, 422 U.S. at 66.
260. Zajac, slip op. at 3 (citing Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176).
261. Harper, 878 F.2d at 1176. But see Leckband v. Naylor,.715 F. Supp. 1451, 1455
(D. Minn. 1988) (finding an implied cause of action for reasons including that "[t]he cease
and desist powers granted FCA by 12 U.S.C. § 2262 are inappropriate, both in scope and
timimg, to effectively protect... [the right of first refusal granted to borrowers under the
1987 Act]"), appeal dismissed No. 88-5301 MN (8th Cir. May 5, 1989); In re Jarrett Ranches,
Inc., 107 Bankr. 963, 967-68 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989) (discussing the inadequacy of the FCA's
powers as a means of protecting the right of first refusal granted to borrowers under the
1987 Act and finding an implied cause of action based, in part, on those inadequacies). See
also Massey & Schneider, supra note 6, at 613-14 (discussing the inadequacy of the FCA as a
protector of the borrowers rights provisions of the 1987 Act).
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quacies of the FCA's powers noted in Harper as evidencing "[t]he
plain fact... that the FCA is in no position to effectively enforce
the borrowers rights provisions of the 1987 Act."'26 2 Moreover, it
noted that the record before it did not support the view that the
FCA has "either the ability or the willingness to enforce the bor-
rowers' rights provisions. 263
Finally, in addressing the fourth element of the Cort test,26
the Zajac majority held that protecting rights created by federal
law such as the right at issue would be "inappropriate" "because
foreclosure is an area 'traditionally controlled by state law'.1265
That holding is consistent with Harper. There, the Ninth Circuit
held that because the loan restructuring provisions of the 1987 Act
were tied to the commencement of state law-governed foreclosure
proceedings, the cause of action sought to be implied was one tra-
ditionally relegated to state law.266
On the other hand, the dissent in Zajac concluded that the
protection of the federally created rights was appropriate, particu-
larly when the right being protected, such as the right to an
independent appraisal, was procedural. For that reason, the dis-
sent would have limited the cause of action to injunctive relief tai-
lored to secure lender compliance with the procedures prescribed
by one or more of the specific borrowers' rights provisions. The
dissent expressly disavowed any desire to imply a cause of action in
favor of borrowers to secure judicial review of the merits of lender
decisions, such as the decision to foreclose rather than to
restructure.2 67
262. Zajac, slip op. at 29 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 30 (Heaney, J., dissenting). But see Walker v. Federal Land Bank of St.
Louis, 726 F. Supp. 211, 216 (C.D. 111. 1989) (in finding no implied private right of action,
the court stated, "[blut clearly the Zajac court missed the point.... That the Farm Credit
Administration has been lax in complying with Congressional intent is of no moment .... ").
One of the borrowers' rights provisions relating to loan restructuring provides that "[t]he
Farm Credit Administration may issue a directive requiring compliance with any provision
of this section [Restructuring distressed loans] to any qualified lender that fails to comply
with such provision." 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(i) (West Supp. 1989). Although that broad grant
of authority would appear not to encompass the enforcement of borrowers' rights in areas
other than loan restructuring, it does afford the basis for a more zealous oversight of the
protection of borrowers in the process of seeking loan restructuring than the FCA has
chosen to exercise. See generally Massey & Schneider, supra note 6, at 613-14 (discussing
the "passivity" of the FCA in enforcing the borrowers' rights provisions of the 1987 Act).
264. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
265. Zajac, slip op. at 4 (citing Harper, 878 F.2d at 24).
266. Harper, 878 F.2d at 1177.
267. Zajac, slip op. at 33 n. 15 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent stated
that it "would not be appropriate for a federal court to intrude into credit decisions of a
System lender if the lender complies with the statutorily mandated procedures." Id., slip
op. at 33. Such an approach, had it been adopted by the majority, would have been
consistent with earlier analogous decisions of the Eighth Circuit concerning the scope of
review of the denial of Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loan applications. Tuepker
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The three courts of appeals that have ruled against an implied
cause of action encompass within their respective circuits large
areas of the major agricultural regions of this country. Accord-
ingly, their respective decisions have a significant impact on large
numbers of System borrowers. Moreover, their decisions will most
certainly influence other circuits that may confront the issue. It
appears that if borrowers are to be given the right to enforce the
borrowers' rights provisions of the Farm Credit Act, as amended,
the grant will have to be expressly made by Congress.
15. RICO
The federal RICO statute268 appears to offer a basis for federal
jurisdiction over PCAs and FLBs. However, there are no reported
successful RICO actions against a PCA or FLB.269 At least one fed-
eral district court, in an action brought pro se, has held, without
elaboration, that because Farm Credit System institutions are fed-
eral instrumentalities, they are immune from liability under
RICO.270
v. Farmers Home Admin., 708 F.2d 1329, 1332 (8th Cir. 1983) (declining to review the
denial of an FmHA loan in the absence of a claim "alleging a substantial departure from
important procedural rights, a misconstruction of governing legislation, or some like error,
going to the heart of the administrative determination"); Woodsmall v. Lyng, 816 F.2d
1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1987) (declining to review the denial of an FmHA loan because the
applicant was not creditworthy on the grounds that the federal courts "are not equipped to
undertake such a task, for in these matters we have neither the training nor the experience
of an FmHA loan officer").
268. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-68 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990). The federal RICO statute
(racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations) claims are usually brought under § 1962(c)
which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
269. See Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Gibbs, 809 F.2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1987)
(stating that plaintiff's RICO claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be given);
Brekke v. Volcker, 652 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Mont. 1987) (holding plaintiff's RICO claim
inadequate); Creech v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 647 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-11 (D. Colo.
1986) (stating that plaintiff's RICO claim failed to state underlying facts with enough
specificity); Schroder v. Volcker, 646 F. Supp. 132, 135 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding that plaintiff
failed to state a claim), aff'd, 864 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1988); Jacobson v. Western Montana
Production Credit Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 391, 395-96 (D. Mont. 1986) (stating that RICO action
failed due to lapsed statute of limitations); Criswell v. Production Credit Ass'n, 660 F. Supp.
14, 16 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (stating that RICO claim failed to distinguish between enterprise
and culpable person).
270. Wiley v. Federal Land Bank of Louisville, 657 F. Supp. 964, 967 (S.D. Ind. 1987)
(also holding that the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 85, 86, does not apply to System
institutions).
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16. Other Theories
The following are other theories or claims which have been
unsuccessfully asserted against System institutions:
a. Purchase of Stock
A Mississippi court has held that FLBA and PCA
required purchases of stock are valid requirement in
order to obtain financing, and those purchases do not
create an "'unlawful debt"' for "'seeming nonexis-
tent capital stock'."27
1
b. Renouncing Citizenship
The appellate court of Colorado rejected a farmer's
attempt to stop foreclosure by renouncing his United
States citizenship. 27
2
c. Land Patent
At least two courts have held that arguing that posses-
sion of an original land patent precludes foreclosure
constituted a frivolous claim under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure warranting
sanctions.27 3
B. STATE COURT JURISDICTION
The amenability of Farm Credit System institutions to suits in
state court on common law causes of action is beyond dispute. 4
271. Gregory v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 515 So. 2d 1200, 1204 (Miss. 1987).
272. Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Deatherage, 739 P.2d 905, 906 (Colo. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that no basis in law exists to support plaintiff's claim).
273. Federal Land Bank of Spokane v. Redwine, 755 P.2d 822, 825 (Wash. Ct. App.
1988) (stating that use of the land patent was an obvious attempt to improve title by
personal fiat); Britt v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of St. Louis, 505 N.E.2d 387 (InI. Ct. App.
1987) (holding that filing of alleged "land patent" by former mortgagors after judgment of
foreclosure did not vest mortgagors with superior title), appeal denied, 515 N.E.2d 102 (Ill.
1987).
274. E.g., Bowling v. Block, 602 F. Supp. 667, 670 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 556
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d 1121, 1125 (8th Cir.
1980); Johansen v. Production Credit Ass'n of Marshall-Ivanhoe, 378 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985). In recent years, many of the state court actions against System lenders
premised on common law causes of action have been lender liability claims. The literature
on lender liability is becoming voluminous. For a sampling, see Flick & Replansky,
Liability of Banks to the Borrowers Pitfalls and Protections, 1986 BANKING L.J. 220; Bahls,
Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liability, 48 MONT. L.
REV. 213 (1987); Kelley, Some Observation on Lender Liability and Representing the
Farmer/Borrower, AGRIC. L. UPDATE, Dec. 1986, at 4; Kelley, supra note 4; Special Project,
Lender Liability: A Survey of Common Law Theories, 42 VAND. L. REV. 855 (1989);
Lawrence & Wilson, Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in Refusing to Extend
Additional Financing, 63 IND. L.J; 825 (1988); Ebke & Griffin, Good Faith and Fair Dealing
in Commercial Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and Beyond, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1397 (1989); Kunkel, The Fox Takes Over the Chicken House: Creditor Interference
with Farm Management, 60 N.D.L. REV. 435 (1984); Tyler, Emerging Theories of Lender
Liability in Texas, 24 HOUSTON L. REV. 411 (1987); Note, The Fiduciary Controversy:
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However, courts have been vigilant in frustrating attempts to con-
vert violations of the Farm Credit Act or the regulations promul-
gated under into state law causes of action. For example, it has
been held that the Farm Credit Act and the regulations promul-
gated under it neither create enforceable duties upon which to
base a negligence claim 275 nor does their violation support a claim
based on the tort of bad faith.Y Similarly, alleged violations of
the Act have been held not to support a claim based on the breach
of the contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing. 7  In
essence, the rejection of such claims has been based on the
absence of an expressed or implied cause of action under the Farm
Credit Act and the reasoning that "'the law does not permit by
indirection what cannot be accomplished directly'. 2 7 8
V. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
A. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The prevailing view is that punitive damages are not awarda-
Injection of Fiduciary Principles into the Bank-Depositor and Bank Borrower
Relationships, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 795 (1987); Hagedorn, The Impact of Fiduciary
Principles on the Bank-Customer Relationship in Washington, 16 WILLAMErrE L. REV.
803 (1980); Ellis & Gray, Lender Liability for Negligently Processing Loan Applications, 92
DICK. L. REV. 363 (1988); Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131
(1989); Nickles, The Objectification of Debtor-Creditor Relations, 74 MINN. L. REV. 371
(1989); Weissman, Lender Liability: The Obligation to Act in Good Faith and Deal Fairly,
8 CoM. DAMAGES REP. 239 (1986); Douglas-Hamilton, Creditor Liabilities Resulting from
Improper Interference with the Management of a Financially Troubled Debtor, 31 Bus.
LAW. 343 (1975); Comment, Lenders'Liability - The Shift from Contract to Tort Doctrine
Deters Banks from Enforcing Unjustified and Detrimental Contract Provisions, 21 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 369 (1988); Note, Trust and Confidence and the Fiduciary Duty of
Banks in Iowa, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 611 (1985-86); Annotation, Existence of Fiduciary
Relationship Between Bank and Depositor or Customer So As To Impose Special Duty of
Disclosure upon Bank, 70 A.L.R. 3D 1344 (1976); Annotation, Measure and Elements of
Damages for Breach of Contract to Lend Money, 4 A.L.R. 4TH 682 (1981); Annotation,
Recoverability of Compensatory Damages for Mental Anguish of Emotional Distress for
Breach of Contract to Lend Money, 52 A.L.R. 4TH 371 (1987); Annotation, Bank's Liability
for Breach of Implied Contract of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 55 A.L.R. 4TH 1026 (1987).
Lender liability litigation on behalf of borrowers against System institutions can be
frustrating. For examples, see Zwemer v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 792 P.2d
245 (Wyo. 1990); Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 729 F. Supp. 677 (D.
Neb. 1989); In re Louden, 106 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1989) (adversary proceeding
against FLB); Lawrence v. Farm Credit System Capital Corp., 761 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1988).
But see, e.g., Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, No. 12-88-00231-CV (Texas Ct.
App. May 31, 1990) (1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 1345) (partially successful lender liability action
against FLBA).
275. Yankton Production Credit Ass'n v. Jensen, 416 N.W.2d 860, 864 (S.D. 1987). See
also infra note 299 and the accompanying text (discussing the related, but distinct, issue of
negligence claims based on lender violations of their internal loan policies).
276. Production Credit Ass'n of Fargo v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 121-25 (N.D. 1990).
277. Mendel v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 656 F. Supp. 1212, 1217
(D.S.D. 1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 180, 183-84 (8th Cir. 1988).
278. Production Credit Ass'n of Fargo v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 124-25 (N.D. 1990)
(citation omitted). For a discussion of the implied cause of action issue under the Farm
Credit Act, as amended, see infra notes 184-267 and the accompanying text.
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ble against a Farm Credit System institution. Generally, a federal
instrumentality enjoys immunity from suit unless it waives that
immunity. Congress has waived immunity from suit for Farm
Credit System institutions by giving them the authority "to sue
and be sued."2 7 9
Nevertheless, a federal instrumentality "retains its immunity
from punitive damages unless Congress explicitly authorizes liabil-
ity for such damages. ' 2 0 Several courts have held that the "sue
and be sued" clause for PCAs does not waive immunity from puni-
tive damages.28 ' However, a federal district court recently denied
a motion to dismiss a claim for punitive damages against an FLB
on the grounds that the FLB's tort liability was the same as a pri-
vate lender. 28 2
By analogizing the Farm Credit System to the law governing
federal and other public officers and employees, Farm Credit Sys-
tem directors, officers, or employees may not enjoy immunity from
punitive damage awards for unlawful acts or conduct outside the
scope of their authority when they are sued in their individual
capacities.28 3 Attorneys representing borrowers should be aware
that the bylaws of many FLBA's and PCA's forbid indemnification
of directors, officers, and employees for liabilities arising out of the
person's gross negligence or willful misconduct in the perform-
ance of official duties. 28 4 Therefore, a suit against an individual
based on gross negligence or willful misconduct is not, in effect, a
suit against the institution. However, at least two courts have held
that Farm Credit System employees are not subject to punitive
damages for acts undertaken in their employment.285
279. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2013(4) (FCBs), 2073(4) (PCAs), 2093(4) (FLBAs) (West 1989). See In
re Sparkman, 703 F.2d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr,
309 U.S. 242 (1940)).
280. In re Sparkman, 703 F.2d at 1101 (emphasis in original).
281. Id. See also Smith v. Russelville Production Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d 1544, 1549-50
(11th Cir. 1985). In re Sparkman, 703 F.2d at 1101; Rohweder v. Aberdeen Production
Credit Ass'n, 765 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1985). Accord Smith v. Russellville Production
Credit Ass'n, 777 F.2d at 1549-50. See generally PCAs and Other Chameleons, 3 AGRIC. L.
UPDATE 1 (March 1986) (discussing the scope of the "sue and be sued" provision).
282. Jackson v. Farm Credit Admin. of America, No. CV-F-88-636 REC, slip op. at 30-
31 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 1989) (citing Sterrett v. Milk River Production Credit Ass'n, 647 F.
Supp. 299, 303 (D. Mont. 1986)).
283. E.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (stating that congressmen may be sued
for sexual discrimination); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1084 (1985) (FBI agent held subject to punitive damages under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3)).
284. The bylaws of System institutions are available to member-borrowers on request.
12 U.S.C.A. § 2200 (West 1989).
285. Reilly v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, No. 11243 (Osceloe Co., Iowa,
Dist. Ct. Sept. 4, 1986) (holding that punitive damages were not awardable against a PCA
employee sued in his capacity as an employee); Wilson v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita,
No. 88-4058R (D. Kansas Jan. 30, 1989) (1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1558) (FLB agents and
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B. DISCOVERY
Rather than operating as a shield from discovery, the Farm
Credit System regulations have been held "to disclose an intent to
provide information in a court proceeding....8 In that case,
Agrivest Partnership v. Central Iowa Production Credit Associa-
tion," 7 a PCA declined to produce certain board minutes as
requested by the plaintiff.' The PCA asserted a privilege based
on 12 C.F.R. §§ 618.8300 and 618.8320 (1985) which imposed both
specific and general confidentiality requirements.2 9
In resolving the issue under an evidentiary rule similar to Rule
501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Iowa Supreme Court
noted that "privileges should not be called into play merely
because an agency, acting on only general authority, issues regula-
tions declaring certain information privileged. '290  From that
point, the court reviewed other Farm Credit System regulations
relating to the dissemination of information. 9 1 It found that 12
C.F.R. § 618.8330 (1985), which authorized employee testimony of
production of documents "to the extent as under the conditions
directed by the court," as counseling "greater liberality" than that
shown by the PCA in the action before it.292 Moreover, the court
held that the regulations invoked by the PCA were not intended
to apply to discovery requests, and that the PCA had no statutory
or regulatory privilege.293 The court also declined to find a com-
mon law governmental privilege. 9 4
attorneys not liable for punitive damages for actions taken in the course of the agency
relationship).
286. AgriVest Partnership v. Central Iowa Production Credit Ass'n, 373 N.W.2d 479,
485 (Iowa 1985).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 481.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 483 (citations omitted). See also Matter of Nelson, 131 F.R.D. 161, 163 (D.
Neb. 1989) (FCA regulations "cannot supplant the authority of the judicial branch to
control discovery proceedings" (citations omitted)). However, courts have held that "[iun
order to secure information within the scope of regulations such as 12 C.F.R. § 602.289
[relating to responses to demands for FCA documents served on non-FCA employees and
entities], a litigant must comply with agency regulations regarding discovery requests."
Interstate Production Credit Ass'n v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 128 F.R.D. 273, 276 (D. Ore.
1989) (citation omitted).
291. AgriVest, 272 N.W.2d at 483.
292. Id. at 485.
293. Id. See also Matter of Nelson, 131 F.R.D. 161, 162-65 (D. Neb. 1989) (discussing
the deliberative process privilege as applied to the minutes of FICB board of director and
other FICB meetings and finding that the privilege did apply).
294. AgriVest, 373 N.W.2d at 485-86. In Minnesota, borrowers were successful in
obtaining orders directing a PCA to turn over Farm Credit Administration examination
reports by relying on AgriVest. See Rieks v. Production Credit Ass'n of River Falls, No.
95566 (Dakota Co., Minn., Dist. Ct. December 11, 1986, & August 14, 1987) (orders
compelling production of documents). But see Interstate Production Credit Ass'n v.
Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 128 F.R.D. 273, 276 (D. Ore. 1989) ("The federal courts have
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C. No AGENCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLBs AND
FLBAs
Generally, there is no agency relationship implied by law
between a FLB and a FLBA within the FLB's district, for the two
are distinct and separate entities. Although FLBAs accept applica-
tions to the'district FLB for loans, the United States Supreme
Court has held that an association could not be deemed the agent
of the FLB in disbursing the proceeds of a loan.295 Nevertheless,
the Farm Credit Banks (FLBs and FICBs prior to the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1987) have the authority to supervise the associations
within their respective districts and to "delegate to Federal land
bank associations such functions as the bank determines appropri-
ate."'29 6 Thus, an agency in fact may exist.
D. INCORPORATION OF FARM CREDIT SYSTEM
REGULATIONS IN CONTRACT DOCUMENTS
Members of some PCAs will have signed a "Membership
Agreement" in connection with their loan application. Paragraph
10 of one such agreement provides as follows:
10. One Agreement/Interpretation: The Agreement
includes and incorporates all amendments and sup-
plements hereto, and all notes, security instruments,
documents, and other writings submitted by Debtor
to PCA in connection with this Agreement. Neither
debtor nor the PCA shall be bound by the agree-
ment or undertaking, nor shall this Agreement be
amended or supplemented except as expressed in
writing and signed by the party against whom
consistently ruled that a court may not order an institution such as IPCA [a PCA] to
produce information in violation of regulations such as 12 C.F.R. § 602.289 [relating to
demands for FCA documents served on non-FCA employees or entities]" (citations
omitted)).
295. Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Gaines, 290 U.S. 247, 254 (1933). See also
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Langley, 792 F.2d 541, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1986) (FLB not bound
by the misrepresentations and omissions of the president of an FLBA), afftd, 484 U.S. 86
(1987); Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Jones, 456 So. 2d 1, 5-10 (Ala. 1984) (detailed
discussion of the relationship between an FLB and FLBA, concluding that "[i]n the present
case, the controlling statutes clearly provide for the creation of two autonomous entities,
and the courts interpreting those statutes have recognized that statutorily there is no
agency relationship between the Bank and the Association" (citing Gantt v. Gunter, 225
Ala. 679, 145 So. 146 (1932)); Hinds v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 235 Ala. 360, 179
So. 194 (1938)); Sterrett v. Milk River Production Credit Ass'n, 764 P.2d 467, 68-70 (Mont.
1988) (holding that FICB's supervisory duties over PCA did not establish agency
relationship to impose on the FICB liability for alleged misrepresentations of PCA
employee).
296. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2013(13), (18) (West 1989).
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enforcement is sought. The invalidity or unenforce-
ability of any term or provision of this Agreement
shall not affect the validity or enforceability of the
remaining terms and provisions hereof.
This Agreement and the transactions between
the Debtor and PCA shall be governed by the Farm
Credit Act of 1971 as amended, the Regulations
adopted thereunder, the PCA bylaws and, where
not inconsistent, applicable state law.297
This agreement provision appears to contemplate that all
existing and future provisions of the Farm Credit Act of 1971 and
the regulations promulgated under it are incorporated into the
terms of the contractual relationship between borrower-members
and the PCA. If so, then any failure by the PCA to abide by the
Act or the regulations would be a breach of contract. This
appeared to be one way for the borrower to avoid the obstacles
inherent in attempting to assert claims based on violations of the
Act or regulations under an implied cause of action theory. How-
ever, such an attempt was rebuffed in Production Credit Associa-
tion of Worthington v. Van Iperen. 98
E. NEGLIGENT FAILURE TO FOLLOW LOAN POLICIES
An assertion that is notable for its persistent appearance
despite repeated rebuffs by the courts is the claim that the loan
policies of System lenders create enforceable standards of care in
favor of borrowers. The Eighth Circuit, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals have rejected the
argument that a PCA's internal policies set a standard of conduct
that creates a cause of action based on common-law negligence if
the policies are not followed.299
297. PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION OF NORTHEAST ARKANSAS MEMBERSHIP
AGREEMENT (1986).
298. 396 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). On the subject of the incorporation of
regulations into contract documents, see Smithson v. United States, 847 F.2d 791 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (declining to broadly incorporate the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)
regulations into agreements between FmHA borrowers and the FmHA), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1004 (1989).
299. Overvaag v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, No. 87-5332 (8th Cir. Mar.
7, 1988) (See 845 F.2d 1028 (D.S.D. 1988) (Table of Decisions Without Published Opinions));
Ebenhoh v. Production Credit Ass'n of Southeast Minnesota, 426 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988); Bevier v. Production Credit Ass'n of Southeast Minnesota, 429 N.W.2d 287,
289 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Winkel v. Production Credit Ass'n of East Central Wisconsin,
451 N.W.2d 440, 442-43 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989). See also supra notes 275-78 and the
accompanying text (discussing related, but distinct claims); Williams v. Federal Land Bank
of Jackson, 729 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D.D.C. 1990) (construing the provisions of the FLB's
Credit and Operations Manual as not supporting borrower's claim). The argument
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VI. THE FARM CREDIT SYSTEM'S FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
ITS MEMBER-BORROWERS
In several reported actions, Farm Credit System borrowers
have advanced claims premised on the assertion that the FLBA or
the PCA of which they were a member owed them a fiduciary
duty. The alleged sources of that duty have varied. For example,
in Boyster v. Roden,3 °° the plaintiff-borrowers sought to sustain
federal question jurisdiction on the assertion that the White River
PCA in Newport, Arkansas, owed them a fiduciary duty as a mat-
ter of federal common law.3 0 1 The borrowers in Boyster alleged
that the fiduciary duty was breached when the PCA disclosed con-
fidential information about the borrowers to a third-party.30 2 In
support of their claim, the borrowers argued that the various Farm
Credit Administration regulations specifying the standards of con-
duct for System officers and employees coupled with the "perva-
sive involvement of the federal government" in the creation and
operation of PCAs established that the federal interest was of such
a nature as "to require that the fiduciary responsibilities of produc-
tion credit association officers and directors be governed by a body
of federal common law rather than state law."30 3
In rejecting the borrowers' claim, the Eighth Circuit held as
follows:
We are not persuaded that the substantial federal interest
in successful operation of the Farm Credit System will be
impaired by application of state law to appellants' claims.
Even if the fiduciary law varies somewhat from state to
state, no burden to the System is perceived; each produc-
tion credit association is a separate entity with a local
situs, and its business transactions are with farmers and
ranchers in its locale.3 0 4
advanced by the borrowers in each of these cases overlooked the fundamental premise that
tort duties are created by the law, not a lender's internal policies. For a properly developed
negligence claim, see Jacques v. First National Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d
756 (Md. Ct. App. 1986). But see Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n of the Midlands, 729 F.
Supp. 677, 686-88 (D. Neb. 1989) (applying Nebraska law and noting that even if the
Nebraska Supreme Court were to adopt the Jacques reasoning, it would not apply in the
case before it).
300. 628 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1980).
301. Id. at 1122.
302. Id. at 1123.
303. Id. at 1123-24.
304. Id. at 1125. See also Federal Land Bank of Jackson in Receivership v. Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank, 727 F. Supp. 1055, 1059-60 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (relying on Boyster
and Birbeck v. Southern New England Production Credit Ass'n, 606 F. Supp. 1030, 1041(D. Conn. 1985), for the proposition that "[flederal law has not preempted the regulation
and supervision of the Farm Credit System."); In re Louden, 106 Bankr. 109, 113 (Bankr.
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However, the court indicated that the regulations imposing
certain standards of conduct on System employees, could "proba-
bly be used by appellants as evidence in a trial of their claim under
state law." 305
Boyster was followed in Hartman v. Farmers Production
Credit Association of Scottsburg.3° In Hartman, the borrowers
had asserted various claims against the PCA including a claim
based on an assertion of an implied right of action under the Farm
Credit Act of 1971.307 In rejecting the borrower's argument that
the purpose of the Farm Credit Act would be frustrated if a pri-
vate cause of action was not implied, the court concluded that the
borrower's state law remedies, including a claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty, would adequately protect the borrower's rights.3a 8
In Umbaugh Pole Building Co., Inc. v. Scott,30 9 the borrowers
sought to establish that a PCA owed them a fiduciary duty, appar-
ently as a result of the course of dealing between the borrowers
and the PCA arising from a series of loans during a two year
period.3 10 Although the trial court found that a fiduciary relation-
ship existed, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed that finding." 1
In reaching its decision, the court in Umbaugh noted that,
ordinarily, the relationship between a debtor and creditor is not a
fiduciary relationship.3 12 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that
a fiduciary relationship may be created out of an informal relation-
ship, but "only when both parties understand that a special trust or
confidence has been reposed. ' 31 3 When the court examined the
W.D. Ky. 1989Xstating that any fiduciary relationship between a FLB and a borrower is
governed by state law (citing Creech v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 647 F. Supp. 1097,
1101 (D. Colo. 1986)).
305. Id. at 1125 n.5. See also Creech v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 647 F. Supp.
1097, 1101 (D. Colo. 1986) (noting that "The regulations governing operation of Farm
Credit Associations impose high standards of honesty, integrity and professionalism on
officers, employers and agents of the Farm Credit System" (citations omitted)).
306. 628 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Ind. 1983).
307. Id. at 219.
308. Id. at 222. Accord Creech v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 647 F. Supp. 1097,
1101 (D. Colo. 1986); Spring Water Dairy, Inc. v. Federal Intermediate Bank of St. Paul, 625
F. Supp. 713, 720 (D. Minn. 1986); Apple v. Miami Production Credit Ass'n, 614 F. Supp.
119, 122 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1986); Birbeck v. Southern New
England Production Credit Ass'n, 606 F. Supp. 1030, 1034-44 (D. Conn. 1985); Bowling v.
Block, 602 F. Supp. 667, 672, n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 785 F.2d 556 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S.. 829 (1986).
309. 58 Ohio St. 2d 282, 390 N.E.2d 320 (1979).
310. Umbaugh Pole Building Co., Inc. v. Scott, 390 N.E.2d 320, 322 (1986).
311. Id. at 320.
312. Id. at 323.
313. Id. For a discussion of the generally applicable elements of an "informal"
fiduciary relationship between a borrower and a lender, see infra note 336.
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dealings between the borrowers and the PCA, it concluded as
follows:
There was no property or interest of the Scotts
entrusted to the association. The only basis for the find-
ings of the fiduciary relationship was the association's giv-
ing of advice and counseling to the Scotts relevant to their
loans and business activities. But here the offering and
giving of advice was insufficient to create a fiduciary rela-
tionship. While the advice was given in a congenial
atmosphere and in a sincere effort to help the Scotts pros-
per, nevertheless, the advice was given by an institutional
lender in a commercial context in which the parties dealt
at arms length, each protecting his own interest.
There was no promise for a continuing line of credit,
and while a limited amount of advice and counseling was
given, this did not vitiate the business relationship
because neither party had, nor could have had, a reason-
able expectation that the creditor would act solely or pri-
marily on behalf of the debtor. Also, the rendering of
advice by the creditor to the debtors does not transform
the business relationship into a fiduciary relationship.
The borrowers could not reasonably believe that the asso-
ciation was acting in a fiduciary capacity.3 14
314. Umbaugh, 390 N.E.2d at 323 (citations omitted). In Stone v. Davis, 66 Ohio St.2d
74, 419 N.E.2d 1094, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081 (1981), the Ohio Supreme Court made a
distinction between loan negotiations and "loan processing" in characterizing the
relationship between the lender and borrowers. Stone, 419 N.E.2d at 1098. At issue was a
mortgage lender's failure to advise and assist the borrowers in procuring mortgage
insurance. Id. at 1095. In essence, the court found that the relationship between the parties
changed after the loan agreement was completed and the loan transaction entered the
processing or servicing stage. In the court's words:
[t]he facts surrounding and the setting in which a bank gives advice to a loan
customer on the subject of mortgage insurance warrant a conclusion that, in this
aspect of the mortgage loan process, the bank acts as its customer's fiduciary and
is under a duty to fairly disclose to the customer the mechanics of procuring such
insurance.
We observe that, while a bank and its customer may be said to, stand at
arm's length in negotiating the terms and conditions of a mortgage loan, it is
unrealistic to believe that this equality of position carries over into the area of
loan processing, which customarily includes advising the customer as to the
benefits of procuring mortgage insurance on the property which secures the
bank's loan.
Id. at 1098.
See also Walters v. First National Bank of Newark, 69 Ohio St.2d 577, 433 N.E.2d 608,
610 (1982) ("The fiduciary nature.., of the bank-customer relationship is predicated upon
the bank's superior conversance with the area of loan processing .... ). The reasoning of
the Ohio Supreme Court in Stone v. Davis is beneficial to borrowers in that most breaches
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In Jacobson v. Western Montana Production Credit Associa-
tion,3 1 a PCA was held to a fiduciary standard in its dealings with
a borrower.316 However, inJacobson, unlike the allegations based
solely on a lender-borrower relationship as in Umbaugh,317 the
borrower alleged that the fiduciary relationship existed as a result
of the PCA's involvement with a commodities broker in advising
the borrower to participate in a futures trading venture.318 Under
those circumstances, the court in Jacobson found that the "obliga-
tion of the PCA was that of a fiduciary and the law would imply a
duty to use reasonable care in giving of advice."'31 9
In Production Credit Association of Lancaster v. Croft, ° the
borrowers attempted to establish that the PCA owed them a fidu-
ciary duty, and that the PCA was negligent in making loans to the
borrowers which the PCA knew the borrowers could not repay.3 2'
The trial court granted the PCA summary judgment and the bor-
rowers appealed.3 2 On appeal, the Crofts argued that the PCA
owed them a fiduciary duty that was implied in law because the
loan agreements gave the PCA control of the repayment require-
ments, and that there was a great disparity in knowledge and
experience between the PCA and the Crofts.323 The court held
that the loan agreement did not create a fiduciary relationship
because the provisions in the agreement that appeared to give the
PCA control were necessary to protect PCA's interest in the collat-
eral.324 The court also held that the advice was offered by the
PCA to the Crofts did not create a fiduciary relationship because
the advice was not outside of what a lender would normally offer
in protecting its interest.325
of the lender's duties of honesty, disclosure, good faith, and fair dealing occur in the loan
servicing stage.
315. 643 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mont. 1986).
316. Jacobson v. Western Montana Production Credit Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 391, 392
(1979).
317. 390 N.E.2d. 320 (1979).
318. Jacobson, 643 F. Supp. at 395.
319. Id. at 395.
320. 423 N.W.2d 544 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), rev. denied, 428 N.W.2d 554 (Wisc. 1988).
321. Production Credit Ass'n of Lancaster v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Wis. 1988).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 545-46.
324. Id. at 546-47.
325. Id. at 546-49. In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on Bahls,
Termination of Credit for the Farm or Ranch: Theories of Lender Liability, 48 MoNT. L.
REV. 213, 232 (1987) ("So long as the farmer makes his or her own business decisions and
the advice given by the lender is nothing more than optional advice or is reasonably related
to protection of the lender's interest in its collateral, lenders should not be treated as having
a fiduciary responsibility to the borrower"). See also Production Credit Ass'n of West
Central Wisconsin v. Vodak, 441 N.W.2d 338, 344, 346 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that
Croft did not hold that "a lending institution may not, under any circumstances, be liable to
a customer for negligence in advising the customer on financial decisions" and also stating
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A review of'the foregoing cases reveals at least the following
three points pertaining to a PCA's, FLBA's, or Farm Credit Bank's
fiduciary obligations, if any:
1. there is no federal common law fiduciary duty of
PCAs, FLBAs, or Farm Credit Banks, and any fiduci-
ary obligation will arise solely under state law;
2. when a PCA, FLBA, or Farm Credit Bank is charac-
terized simply as a lender in a lender-borrower rela-
tionship, "extraordinary circumstances" must be
present before a fiduciary relationship will arise; and
3. if a PCA, FLBA, or Farm Credit Bank acts as a finan-
cial advisor or a broker, or in some other capacity
where the law will ordinarily impose a fiduciary rela-
tionship, the institution will be treated no differently
than any other entity so acting.32 6
Both Congress and the Farm Credit Administration have
acknowledged that a fiduciary duty may be imposed upon Farm
Credit System officers and directors to their respective institutions
and shareholders under state law. For example, section 2264(a) of
the Farm Credit Act provides that an institution's officers and
directors may be removed from office by the Farm Credit Admin-
istration for a "breach of fiduciary duty as such director or
officer. ' 32 7 Similarly, the Farm Credit Administration Board, in
justifying certain regulations requiring financial disclosures by Sys-
tem officers and directors, has asserted that "such disclosure is
needed to provide shareholders with sufficient information to hold
directors and officers accountable for the performance of their
fiduciary duties... 32
It is unlikely that any Farm Credit System institution would
contend that its officers and directors do not owe a fiduciary duty
that "Croft simply held that a fiduciary relationship did not arise under the facts of that
case," not that there could never be a fiduciary relationship between a PCA and one of its
borrowers), rev. denied, 443 N.W.2d 311 (Wisc. 1989); Nelson v. Production Credit Ass'n of
the Midlands, 729 F. Supp. 677, 685 (D. Neb. 1989) (declining, with little explanation, to
find a fiduciary relationship between a borrower and a PCA, but indicating that it was not
persuaded to find a fiduciary relationship by the assertion that the PCA had a "special
concern" towards its member-borrowers).
326. Farm Credit Banks, FLBAs, and PCAs are authorized to provide technical
assistance and financial related services to borrowers. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2020, 2093(15), 2076
(West 1989)). See also Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Asbridge, 414 N.W.2d 596, 600-01
(N.D. 1987) (holding that the borrowers had not established a fiduciary relationship
between them and the FLB on which to premise the claim that the FLB had a "fiduciary
responsibility... to provide it member borrowers with all necessary information so that
borrowers may make timely payments").
327. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2264(a) (West 1989).
328. 51 Fed. Reg. 42,084-085 (1986) (prefatory comment).
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to the institution. Of course, because the System is a cooperative
entirely owned by its member-borrowers, the borrowers are the
"institution." Moreover, because PCAs and FLBAs are coopera-
tives, they are subject to a body of law that applies only to coopera-
tive associations or cooperative corporations.3 9
Cooperatives owe unique duties to their members. As
expressed in a widely recognized treatise on agricultural coopera-
tives, "the relationship between the members and the [coopera-
tive] association is much more intimate and personal than between
other corporations and their stockholders.-3 3 0
This "more intimate and personal" relationship between a
cooperative's members and the cooperative institution arises from
the basic aim of a cooperative "to create 'a union of men, not a
union of capital, as does the ordinary commercial corporation'."3 3 1
Thus,
.it is particularly important to remember that the
[cooperative] association is an organization of individuals
rather than a mere abstract and impersonal entity. The
personal character of the ownership in a cooperative is
one of the main distinctions between the cooperative and
the ordinary corporation.
3 3 2
The unique relationship between a cooperative and its mem-
bers has led some courts to impose, as a matter of law, fiduciary
obligations on officers of marketing cooperatives in their dealings
329. See, e.g., Knox National Farm Loan Ass'n v. Phillips, 300 U.S. 194, 198 (1937) ("A
national farm loan association [predecessor to FLBAs] is a cooperative enterprise."). It is
extremely important not to confuse corporate law principles with cooperative law
principles. Although many cooperatives are incorporated, their actions and conduct are
subject to a body of law that is in many respects unique to cooperatives. Thus, a claim such
as was made in Production Credit Ass'n of Fargo v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 120-21 (N.D.
1990), that, as a matter of corporate law, there is a fiduciary relationship between a PCA
and its borrowers, is misplaced. In that case, the court correctly held that corporate law
does not create fiduciary duties running from a PCA to its members. Id. at 121. However,
the court was never presented with the question, nor did it address, whether cooperative
law imposed fiduciary duties on the cooperatively organized PCA in favor of its individual
members. For a discussion of the cooperative law duties of a cooperative toward its
members, see infra notes 334-38 and the accompanying text.
330. FARMER COOPERATIVE SERVICE, USDA, LEGAL PHASES OF FARMERS
COOPERATIVES 10-11 (1976) [hereinafter LEGAL PHASES].
331. E. NOURSE, THE LEGAL STATUS OF AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATION 268 (1927).
332. I. PACKEL, THE LAW OF THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF COOPERATIVES
17 (4th ed. 1970). See generally Note, Legal Aspects of Cooperative Organizational
Structure, 27 IND. L.J. 377, 378 (1952) (noting that a member of a cooperative occupies two
roles: "He is both a proprietor and one of the vendors with whom the cooperative transacts
business"); Staatz, Recent Developments in the Theory of Agricultural Cooperation, 2 J.
AGRIC. COOPERATION 74, 79-80, 88-89 (1987) (discussing the theoretical aspects of the
cooperative as a "coalition").
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with cooperative members. 333
To some extent, the imposition, as a matter of law, of fiduciary
duties on marketing cooperatives may be motivated by the fact of
the entrustment of the member's crop with the cooperative for
marketing purposes. If that is the case, then a different basis will
need to be found for imposing a fiduciary duty on non-marketing
cooperatives such as financial or lending cooperatives as are the
institutions of the Farm Credit System.
An argument can be made that there is, as a matter of law, a
fiduciary obligation on the part of a cooperative towards its mem-
bers. In large part, that obligation flows from the following seven
criteria or hallmarks of a cooperative:
1. [t]he basic purpose of cooperatives is to render eco-
nomic benefits to members;
2. [c]ooperatives are organized around the mutual inter-
est of members;
3. [r]isks, costs, and benefits are shared 'equitable'
among members;
4. [c]ooperatives are non-profit enterprises in the sense
that they are organized for the economic benefit of
members as users of the cooperatives' services and
not to make profits for the cooperatives as legal enti-
ties for their members as investors;
5. [c]ooperatives are democratically controlled;
6. [m]embers of cooperatives have an obligation to
patronize their cooperatives; and
7. [c]ooperatives do business primarily with
members.334
For example, because cooperatives are nonprofit organiza-
tions in the sense that they operate at cost, it has been held that
"the cooperative stands in the relationship of a trustee to the
members. '335 Thus, the nature of cooperatives, coupled with
333. E.g., Rhodes v. Little Falls Dairy Co., Inc., 230 App. Div. 571, 245 N.Y.S. 432, 434-
35 (1930), aff'd, 256 N.Y. 559, 177 N.E. 140 (1931). See also Snyder v. Colwell Cooperative
Grain Exchange, 231 Iowa 1210, 3 N.W.2d 507 (1942) (ruling that a cooperative has a duty
to each member to fully disclose all material facts regarding the cooperative and that
member's dealings with the cooperative). In a marketing cooperative, the members
frequently deliver their products to the cooperative for marketing. A fiduciary relationship
usually arises when one entrusts property with another with the understanding that the
latter will use the money for the benefit of the former on in a manner consistent with the
former's desires. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS 2 (1959).
334. LEGAL PHASES, supra note 329, at 4.
335. White, The Farmer and His Cooperative, 7 KANSAS L. REV. 334, 335 (1959) (citing
San Joaquin Valley Poultry Producers v. Comm'r, 136 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1943)). The
"service at cost" principle dictates that there be no exploitation by the cooperative of its
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increasing judicial recognition that lending institutions should be
held to a higher standard than the law of the marketplace,33 6
members. Ultimately, the members of a cooperative bear the risk for the success or failure
of the cooperative. Accordingly, the cooperative must do what it can for its members, not
what it must. Bakken, Principals and their Role in the Statutes Relating to Cooperatives,
1954 Wis. L. REV. 550, 559 (offering an informative discussion of basic cooperative
principles and noting that "in cooperative business there shall be no elements of
exploitation"). A pervasive theme in the academic writings on the law of fiduciaries is the
role of fiduciary law as a shield against the potential abuse of power by the dominant party
or parties in a relationship. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983);
Shepard, Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51 (1981).
336. See, e.g., Barrett v. Bank of America, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 1328, 229 Cal. Rptr.
16, 20 (1986) (holding that relationship between a bank and its borrower to be "at least
quasi-fiduciary"); Lash v. Cheshire County Savings Bank, 474 A.2d 980, 982 (N.H. 1984)
(upholding a jury finding of a commercial bank's breach of fiduciary duty). See also
Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 646 P.2d 616, 619 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982)
("The precarious position of the borrower and the relatively superior position of the bank
mandates there be a counterbalancing special duty imposed on the part of the bank.");
Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937) (noting that the changing role
of banks from mere safeguarders of deposits to advice-givers justifies the imposition of
higher standards of care on a bank that assumes the role of an advice-giver). But see Price v.
Wells Fargo bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d 465, 261 Cal. Reptr. 735 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1989)
(containing a highly critical discussion of injecting fiduciary concepts into the lender-
borrower relationship), rev. denied (Cal. Dec. 7, 1989). See generally Harrell, The Bank-
Customer Relationship: Evolution of a Modern Form, XI OKLA. CrrY U.L. REV. 641 (1986)
(discussing the changing nature of bank-borrower relationships and the standards of care
applicable to those relationships); Oglivie, Banks, Advice-Giving And Fiduciary Obligation,
17 OTTAWA L. REV. 263 (1985) (same); Hagedorn, Fiduciary Aspects of the Bank-Customer
Relationship, 34 Mo. B.J. 406 (1978) (same).
In most jurisdictions, borrowers seeking to establish that an informally created
fiduciary relationship exists between a lender and a borrower must satisfy at least two, and
often three, requirements. First, it must be shown that the borrower had reposed trust and
confidence in the lender. Second, as a result of that reposal of trust, the lender must have
attained a position of influence and superiority over the borrower. E.g., First Bank of
Wakeeny v. Modern, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. 1984) (per curiam). In many jurisdictions a third
requirement is implicitly or explicitly imposed. That requirement is that the trust and
confidence reposed by the borrower "must actually be accepted by the second party [the
bank]." Dewitt County Public Bldg. Comm. v. County of Dewitt, 469 N.E.2d 689, 770 (111.
Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984). Accord Umbaugh Pole Bldg Co. v. Scott, 58 Ohio St.2d 282, 390
N.E.2d 320, 323 (1979) ("A fiduciary relationship may be created out of an informal
relationship, but this is done only when both parties understand that a special trust or
confidence has been reposed") (citations omitted).
An argument has been advanced that the relationship between an agricultural lender
and a farmer-borrower is sufilciently unique to warrant imposing a higher duty of care on
the lender. When the lending relationship involves farm operating loans, this relationship
is typically characterized by six attributes that distinguish it from many other lender-
borrower relationships:
First, the relationship is often a longstanding one. Once a farmer has a
lender for operating capital, that relationship tends to continue.
Second, the relationship is an exclusive one. The farmer depends
exclusively on one lender for his operating money. That exclusivity benefits the
lender by avoiding split repayment and split collateral problems.
Third, the lender is intimately familiar with the operational and financial
affairs of the farmer's enterprise. This familiarity is derived from the annual
planning for loan disbursements and from the financial advice also given by the
lender.
Fourth, the lender, through its advice to the farmer and its realization that it
has a financial interest in the farmer's success, may assume some control over the
farmer's operation. This control is frequently manifested in the joint planning
by the farmer and the lender for loan amounts and disbursements.
Fifth, even if the lender does not exercise actual control, the lender has
extraordinary latent control over the farmer. The source of this latent control is
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strongly suggest that the cooperative institutions of the Farm
Credit System might be held to a high standard of care in their
dealings with their members in a properly presented case.
Of current concern to many System borrowers is the standard
of care that a cooperative owes to its members when the coopera-
tive seeks to expel a member from the cooperative. When a mem-
ber is in default on a loan from a PCA, Farm Credit Bank, or
FLBA, the member's stock in the PCA or FLBA is subject to liqui-
dation.337 Liquidation of the stock effectively expels the member
from the cooperative.
Courts have consistently held that a cooperative seeking to
expel a member must act fairly and in good faith. In essence,
courts have resolved cooperative expulsion issues on the basic
principle that "[a] private organization, especially if it has some
public stature or purpose, may not expel or discipline a member
and adversely affect substantial property, contract, or other eco-
nomic rights unless such action results from proceedings con-
ducted in an atmosphere of good faith and fair play. 313 8 These
judicially imposed standards of good faith and fair play for cooper-
usually twofold. First, the lender has substantial latent control by virtue of its
security interest in most, if not all, of the farmer's machinery, equipment, land,
annual production, and other personal property. Second, latent control may
often exist because the loan is evidenced by a demand note. Because a demand
note is due at any time that the lender desires it to be due, the lender can force a
farmer to refinance or liquidate at will.
Sixth, as a result of their longstanding and relatively close working
relationship with their lenders, most farmers develop expectations regarding
their lenders. Specifically, where the relationship between a farmer and lender
has been a good for one for several years, farmers reasonably expect that their
lender will continue to deal with them honestly, fairly, and in good faith.
Kelley, supra note 4, at 19-20.
However, although this argument may afford a basis for showing that in the typical
farm lender - farmer borrower relationship the borrower had reposed his confidence in
the lender, and, as a result, the lender assumed a position of superiority and influence over
the borrower, satisfying those elements of the three-part test for an informally created fidu-
ciary relationship are usually not the borrower's biggest obstacle. Rather, the biggest obsta-
cle has been showing that the lender tacitly or otherwise agreed to be held to the higher
standard. Indeed, in one case where a borrower had attempted to show through the bank's
advertisements that the bank had solicited the trust and confidence of the public, the bank
disavowed any such intention. In re Werth, 37 Bankr. 979, 989 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984) (the
court characterized the bank's disavowal as "somewhat bizzare and extraordinary," but it
also found that there was no fiduciary relationship established), aff'd, 54 Bankr. 619 (D.C.
Co. 1985). See also Atlantic National Bank of Florida v. Vest, 480 So.2d 1328, 1333 (Fla. Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1985) (noting that where a breach of fiduciary duty between a bank and its
customer has been found, it is generally possible to identify a benefit flowing to the bank as
a result of the breach), rev. denied, 491 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1986), 508 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1987).
337. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2094(k), 2097 (West 1989).
338. Copeland, Expulsion of Members by Agricultural Cooperatives, J. AGRIC.
COOPERATION 76, 82 (1986). See also Developments in the Law - Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REV. 983, 1006-36 (1963) (discussing the
substantive and procedural limitations on actions by private associations against their
members).
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atives expelling member-borrowers from Farm Credit System
institutions may afford the basis for enforcing or challenging the
institution's consideration of the borrower for loan restructuring
under section 2202(a) of the Farm Credit Act.339
VII. FARM CREDIT SYSTEM BORROWER RIGHTS
As a result of the Farm Credit Amendments Act of 1985 and
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, borrowers from System insti-
tutions have statutory rights in the following areas:
1. protection of stock;
2. disclosure of interest rates and related information;
3. access to certain documents and information;
4. written notice on loan applications and review of
loan application denials;
5. protection from foreclosure when loan obligations
are current;
6. written notice of loan restructuring policies and
review of loan restructuring denials;
7. prohibition against waiver of mediation rights;
8. rights of first refusal on land acquired by an institu-
tion from a borrower as a result of foreclosure or cer-
tain voluntary conveyances;
9. review of System lender decisions establishing the
interest rate applied to a loan;
10. application of funds in uninsured accounts to bor-
rower's outstanding loans;
11. use of FmHA guaranteed loans or other state or fed-
eral loan programs in restructuring.340
339. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(a) (West 1989). See also Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v.
Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445, 448-50 (N.D. 1987) (applying equitable principles to protect
FLB borrowers in judicial foreclosure proceedings); Benson Cooperative Creamery Ass'n v.
First District Ass'n, 151 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1967) (holding that a cooperative member
who is wrongfully expelled from a cooperative may recover for any damages resulting from
that wrongful expulsion). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Hoekstra, The
Cooperative Fiduciary Duty Owed by the Farm Credit System Cooperatives to their
Member/Borrowers (1989) (first place winner in the 1989 American Agricultural Law
Association Writing Competition) (available from the National Center for Agricultural Law
Research and Information, Leflar Law Center, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR
72701) (scheduled for publication in the I ofAgric. L. and Tax'n, Spring 1991).
340. Proposed regulations implementing the rights created by the Agricultural Credit
Act of 1987 were published on May 12, 1988, at 53 Fed. Reg. 16,934-947 (1988). The final
regulations appear at 53 Fed. Reg. 35,427-458 (1988). The final regulations are codified at
12 C.F.R. Pt. 614, subpts. L & N (1990). Descriptive summaries of the borrowers' rights
provisions of the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 can be found in N. HAMILTON,
BORROWERS' RIGHTS AND THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT ACT OF 1987: A GUIDE FOR
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION AND FARM CREDIT SYSTEM BORROWERS AND THE
ATTORNEYS (1988) (available from the Agricultural Law Center, Drake University School of
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A. PROTECTION OF BORROWER STOCK
"Eligible borrower stock" in a system institution must be
retired at par value.341 "Eligible borrower stock" is defined as
stock that:
(a) is outstanding on January 6, 1988;
(b) is required to be purchased, and is purchased, as a
condition of obtaining a loan made after January 6,
1988, but prior to the earlier of -
(i) in the case of each bank and association, the
date of approval, by the stockholders of such
bank or association, of the capitalization require-
ments of the institution in accordance with sec-
tion 4.9B; or
(ii) the date that is nine months after January 6,
1988;
(c) was, after January 1, 1983, but before January 6,
1988, frozen by an institution that was placed in liq-
uidation; or
(d) was retired at less than par value by an institution
that was placed in liquidation after January 1, 1983,
but before January 6, 1988.342
B. DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST RATES AND RELATED
INFORMATION
The stock purchase requirement for System loans increases
the equivalent annual rate by one-half to two percentage points
depending on the level of the stock requirement, the interest rate,
whether "automatic or end-of-period cancellation" is used, and
other factors. 343 Prior to the 1985 Act, that increased cost was not
always disclosed to borrowers. Enacted in 1985 and amended by
the 1987 Act, Section 2199(a) of the Farm Credit Act requires that
System lenders provide borrowers with the following information:
Law, Des Moines, Iowa 50311), and Farmers' Legal Action Group, Inc., Special Report on
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, FARMERS' LEGAL AcrION REP. (1988) (available from
the Farmers' Legal Action Group, Inc., 1301 Minnesota Building, 46 East Fourth Street, St.
Paul, Minnesota 55101). See also Massey & Schneider, supra note 6, at 589-613 (describing
the borrowers' rights regulations and discussing some of the problems encountered by
borrowers under the regulations).
341. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2162(a) (West 1989).
342. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2162(dX2) (West 1989).
343. LaDue, Influence of the Farm Credit System Stock Requirement on Actual Interest
Rates, 43 AGRIC. FIN. REV. 50, 51-52 (1983). See also Jones & Barry, Impacts of Production
Credit Association Capitalization Policies on Borrowers' Costs, 46 AGRIC. FIN. REV. 15
(1988) (discussing the affect of PCA capitalization on borrower interest rates).
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. . . meaningful and timely disclosure not later than the
time of the loan closing of:
(1) the current rate of interest on the loan;
(2) in the case of an adjustable or variable rate loan, the
amount and frequency by which the interest rate can
be increased during the term of the loan or, if there
are no such limitations, a statement to that effect,
and the factors (including, but not limited to, the cost
of funds, operating expenses, and provision for loan
losses) that will be taken into account by the lending
institution on the effective rate of interest;
(3) the effect, as shown by a representative example or
examples, of the required purchase of stock or partic-
ipation certificates in the institution on the effective
rate of interest;
(4) any change in the interest-rate applicable to the bor-
rowers loan;
(5) except with respect to stock guaranteed under sec-
tion 2162 of this title [protection of borrower stock],
a statement indicating that stock that is purchased is
at risk; and
(6) a statement indicating the various types of loan
options available to borrowers, with an explanation
of the terms and borrowers' rights that apply to each
type of loan.344
System lenders that offer more than one rate of interest to
borrowers, often referred to as interest rate "tiers," must, at the
request of a borrower holding a loan, provide the following
information:
(1) provide a review of the loan to determine if the
proper interest rate has been established;
(2) explain to the borrower in writing the basis for the
interest rate charged; and
(3) explain to the borrower in writing how the credit sta-
tus of the borrower may be improved to receive a
lower interest rate on the loan.345
344. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(a) (West 1989).
345. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(b) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 614.4365-614.4368 &
614.4440-614.4444(1990) (regulations governing disclosure of loan information).
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C. ACCESS TO CERTAIN DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION
The 1985 Act added section 2200 to the Farm Credit Act to
provide as follows:
In accordance with regulations of the Farm Credit
Administration, System institutions shall provide their
borrowers, at the time of execution of loans, copies of all
documents signed or delivered by the borrower and at
any time, on request, a copy of the institution's articles of
incorporation or charter and bylaws.346
That provision and other borrowers' rights provisions and regula-
tions prompted the only farmer on the Farm Credit Administra-
tion Board to comment, "I think it's a shame when the FCA has to
issue regulations to ensure the rights of stockholders and loan
applicants. ,347 That statement is most telling when it is noted that
an act of Congress was required to give borrowers access to loan
documents that they had signed. Therefore, many observers of
Farm Credit System behavior were not surprised when Congress
chose to act again in,1987 to expand section 2200 to give borrow-
ers the right to receive "copies of each appraisal of the borrower's
assets made or used by the qualified lender.13 4 3
D. WRITTEN NOTICE ON LOAN APPLICATIONS AND
REVIEW OF LOAN APPLICATION DENIALS
Section 2201 of the Act provides as follows:
Each qualified lender to which a person has applied for a
loan shall provide the person with prompt written notice
of -
(1) the action on the application;
(2) if the loan applied for is reduced or denied, the rea-
sons for such action; and
(3) the applicant's right to review under section 2202 of
this title.34 9
If an application for a loan is denied, the applicant may
request a review of that denial before the institution's credit
346. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2200 (West Supp. 1986). See also 12 C.F.R. § 618.8325 (1990)
(disclosure of loan documents).
347. Webster, Lenders of Interest (interview with James R. Billington) AGRIFINANCE
12 (Dec. 1966).
348. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2200 (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 618.8325(b) (1990) (requiring
the furnishing, on request, of copies of appraisals).
349. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4441 (1990) (notice of
action on loan applications).
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review committee.35 The institution must be the lender with the
"ultimate decision making authority on the loan."' ' The request
must be made in writing within 30 days "after receiving a notice
denying or reducing the amount of the loan application."
352
The institution's credit review committee is usually composed
of three individuals. It must include a farmer board member.3 53
The delegation of duties is limited:
The duties of the members of the review committees
may not be delegated to any other person, except that the
credit review committee duties of the board member
may be performed from time to time by an alternate des-
ignated by the board who shall also be a board
member. 354
A loan officer who was involved in the initial decision on a loan
may not serve on the credit review committee reviewing that
loan.355 However, that loan officer may "participate" in the
review to answer questions but may not "serve" on the committee
by being present or voting in the final deliberations.356 The
borrower has a right to appear before the credit review committee
and may be accompanied by an attorney or other
representative.3 57
Unsuccessful applicants for a loan or loan restructuring who
appeal to the credit review committee may include in their
request for review a request for an independent appraisal of any
interest in property securing the loan other than the stock held by
the borrower in the institution.358 The procedure for obtaining
the independent appraisal is as follows:
Within 30 days after a request for an appraisal under
paragraph (1), the credit review committee shall present
350. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202 (West 1989).
351. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4442 (1990).
352. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(bX1) (West 1989).
353. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(aXl) (West 1989).
354. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4442 (1990).
355. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(aX2) (West 1989).
356. See 53 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,436 (1988).
357. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(c) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(a) (1990)
(personal appearance in the review process).
358. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(dX1) (West 1989); Agricultural Credit Technical Corrections
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-399, 103, 102 Stat. 989, 990. See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(c)
(1990) (independent appraisals). The right to an independent appraisal in the review of a
loan restructuring denial was at issue in Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, No. 88-
5353ND (8th Cir. July 31, 1990) (en banc) (1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932) (holding that there
is no implied cause of action under the 1987 Act). For a discussion of the Zajac decision, see
supra notes 242-67 and the accompanying text.
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the borrower with a list of three appraisers approved by
the appropriate qualified lender from which the borrower
shall select an appraiser to conduct the appraisal the cost
of which shall be borne by the borrower and shall con-
sider the results of such appraisal in any final determina-
tion with respect to the loan.35 9
A copy of the appraisal must be provided to the borrower.36 0
"Promptly" after a review by a credit review committee, the com-
mittee must notify the applicant in writing of its decision and the
reasons for that decision.3 1
E. PROTECTION FROM FORECLOSURE WHEN LOAN
OBLIGATIONS ARE CURRENT
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 added a new provision
that prohibits System institutions from foreclosing on any loan
"because of the failure of the borrower thereof to post additional
collateral, if the borrower has made all accrued payments of prin-
cipal, interest, and penalties with respect to the loan. '36 2
In addition, as a result of the 1987 Act, sections 2202d(b) and
(c) now provide as follows:
(b) Prohibition against required principal reduction
A qualified lender may not require any borrower
to reduce the outstanding principal balance of any
loan made to the borrower by any amount that
exceeds the regularly scheduled principal install-
ment payment (when due and payable), unless -
(1) the borrower sells or otherwise disposes of part
or all of the collateral; or
(2) the parties agree otherwise in a written agree-
ment entered into by the parties.
(c) Nonenforcement
After a borrower has made all accrued payments
of principal, interest, and penalties with respect to a
loan made by a qualified lender, the lender shall not
enforce acceleration of the borrower's repayment
359. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(dX2) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(c) (1990)
(independent appraisals in the review process).
360. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(dX3) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(c) (1990)(independent appraisals in the review process).
361. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(e) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(d) (1990) (review
process decisions).
362. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202d(a) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(a) (1990)
(protection of borrowers who meet all loan obligations).
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schedule due to the borrower having not timely
made one or more principal or interest payments.363
The 1987 Act also affords borrowers certain rights with
respect to the placing of a loan in nonaccrual status. Specifically,
section 2202d(d) provides as follows:
(d) Placing loans in nonaccrual status
(1) Notification
If a qualified lender places any loan in
nonaccrual status, the lender shall document
such change of status and promptly notify the
borrower thereof in writing of such action and
the reasons therefore.
(2) Review of Denial
If the borrower was not delinquent in any
principal or interest payment under the loan at
the time of such action and the borrower's
request to have the loan placed back into
accrual status is denied, the borrower may
obtain a review of such denial before the appro-
priate credit review committee under section
2202 of this title.
(3) Application
This subsection shall only apply if a loan
being placed in nonaccrual status results in an
adverse action being taken against the
borrower.364
F. WRITTEN NOTICE OF LOAN RESTRUCTURING POLICIES
AND REVIEW OF LOAN RESTRUCTURING DENIALS
The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 imposed new
"mandatory" restructuring requirements on System lenders. The
requirements are mandatory in the sense that an institution desir-
ing to foreclose on a distressed loan must, except in limited cir-
cumstances,365 notify the borrower of the right to apply for
363. 2202d(b), (c) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 61 4 .4 514(c) (1990)
(nonenforcement of acceleration).
364. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202d(d) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4514(d) (1990)
(nonaccrual status resulting in adverse action against the borrower; the regulation
emphasizes that the placing of the loan in nonaccrual status must have resulted in adverse
action being taken against the borrower).
365. When the lender has reasonable grounds to believe that "loan collateral will be
destroyed, dissipated, consumed, concealed, or permanently removed from the state in
which the collateral is located," the lender may take "appropriate" action to protect the
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restructuring not later than 45 days before commencing foreclo-
sure proceedings, and, after consideration of such an application,
the institution must restructure the loan if the "cost" of the pro-
posed restructuring plan is equal to or less than the "cost" of
foreclosure.36 6
collateral, including foreclosure. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202ao) (West 1989). Assumably, the notice
of the right to apply for loan restructuring would be given after the collateral has been
protected. See notes 475-79 infra and the accompanying text in Appendix A for an
additional discussion of this issue.
It is axiomatic that only "borrowers" have the right to seek restructuring. See 12
C.F.R. §§ 614.4516, 614.4518 (1990) (implicitly defining a "borrower" as a "primary
obligor." A mortgagor of a borrower is not a "borrower" for purposes of loan restructuring.
Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. McGinnis, 711 F. Supp. 952, 957-58 (E.D. Ark. 1989).
366. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. §§ 614.4512 & 614.4514-4522
(1990) (consisting of Part K, subpart N).
A borrower who files a bankruptcy petition is eligible for a loan restructuring under
the 1987 Act. See In re James Desmond Woods, Jr., No. 88-BK-01659-M 11 (W.D. La. March
16, 1989Xinterim order in adversary proceeding) (1987 Act remedies and remedies under
Bankruptcy Code are not mutually exclusive). Thus, it has been held that an FLB's
compliance with the 1987 Act is "a condition precedent to the commencement of a
proceeding in bankruptcy that constitutes a foreclosure proceeding as defined by the Act."
In the Matter of Dilsaver, 86 Bankr. 1010, 1015 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988), aff'd sub noma., In re
Hilton Land & Cattle Co., 101 Bankr. 604, 606 (D. Neb. 1989) (holding that an FLB "must
comply with the [1987] Act by providing the appropriate restructuring process requested
by the debtors prior to commencing a foreclosure proceeding to sequester rents and
profits"); Hill v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (E.D. Mo. 1989)
("[U]pon review of the legislative history of the 1987 Act, the Court is persuaded that
Congress did not intend to exclude debtors in bankruptcy from the protections of the Act");
In re Kramer, 107 Bankr. 668, 669-70 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989X1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2076)
(following Dilsaver as affimed sub noma. In re Hilton Land and Cattle Co.).
However, by the weight of authority, the 1987 Act does not alter or displace any
provision of the Bankruptcy Code. See In re Kraus, No. BK 86-2677, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. D.
Neb. May 20, 1988) (memorandum order denying, inter alia, debtor's motion to dismiss)
(holding that "the enactment of the Agricultural Credit Act [of 1987] should not be
construed to alter the rights, interests and relationships of the parties under a [Chapter 11]
plan confirmed before the effective date of the statute"); In re Pennington, No. 87-01485-
BKC-DTW (Bankr. N.D. Miss. March 22, 1988) (1987 Act does not affect the valuation of
secured property in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)); In re Bellman Farms,
Inc., 86 Bankr. 1016 (S.D. Iowa 1988) (1987 Act does not affect the valuation of secured
property in bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)); In re Kvamme, 91 Bankr. 77, 78
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1988) (1987 Act does not "overrule, repeal, or render inoperative any
portion of the Bankruptcy Code including [11 U.S.C.] section 1111(b)"); In re Felton, 95
Bankr. 629 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988); contra In re Burton, No. 87-01099-K52, slip op. at 1
(Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 1988) (order fixing value of secured claim) (ordering that "the
allowed secured claim of FCB [Farm Credit Bank of Spokane] under 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 1225(aX5XBHii) shall be equal to the fair value of the real property collateral reduced by
the cost of foreclosure as defined in the 1987 Act").
The issue of whether a debtor in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding may surrender
or compel the retirement of his or her stock in an FLBA or PCA has resulted in inconsistent
holdings by the courts addressing the issue. All of the reported decisions have permitted
either full or partial surrender of stock, although the first of those decisions to be reported
was reversed and the most recently decided case is on appeal to the Sixth Circuit. In re
Massengill, 73 Bankr. 1008 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1987), rev'd in part, 100 Bankr. 276 (E.D. N.C.
1988); In re Indreland, 77 Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Chaney, 87 Bankr. 131
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1988); Matter of Arthur, 86 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988); In re Ivy,
86 Bankr. 623 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988); In re Neff, 89 Bankr. 672 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988),
modified in part on reconsideration, 96 Bankr. 800 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); In re Miller, 98
Bankr. 311 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1989), order amended, 106 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1989); In re Shannon, 100 Bankr. 913 (S.D. Ohio 1989), appealfiled, No. 89-3585 (6th Cir.
June 19, 1989). See also In re Greseth, 78 Bankr. 936 (D. Minn. 1987) (affirming the
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As a threshold matter, "restructuring" is broadly defined as
follows:
The terms "restructure" and "restructuring" include
rescheduling, reamortization, renewal, deferral of princi-
pal or interest, monetary concessions, and the taking of
any other action to modify the terms of, or forbear on, a
loan in any way that will make it probable that the opera-
tions of the borrower will become financially viable. 67
A borrower seeking to have a loan restructured must apply in
writing on forms provided by the institution and, where appropri-
ate, must support the proposed restructuring plan with "sufficient
financial information and repayment projections.-3 68
The general criteria for evaluating a restructuring proposal
are as follows:
When a qualified lender receives an application for
restructuring from a borrower, the qualified lender shall
determine whether or not to restructure the loan, taking
into consideration -
(a) whether the cost to the lender of restructuring the
loan is equal to or less than the cost of foreclosure;
(b) whether the borrower is applying all income over
and above necessary and reasonable living and oper-
ating expenses to the payment of primary
obligations;
(c) whether the borrower has the financial capacity and
the management skills to protect the collateral from
diversion, dissipation, or deterioration;
(d) whether the borrower is capable of working out
existing financial difficulties, reestablishing a viable
bankruptcy court's approval of a partial surrender of stock). But cf In re Stedman, 72
Bankr. 49 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1987) (declining to deduct the value of the debtors' FLBA stock
from the debtors' indebtedness to the FLB in determining the debtors' eligibility for
Chapter 12). In addition, in afrming an unreported bankruptcy court decision, a district
court has approved a Chapter 12 plan allowing the debtors to surrender their stock. In re
Cansler, 99 Bankr. 758 (W.D. Ky. 1989).
367. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(7) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4512(h) (1990)
(defining "restructure" and "restructuring"). See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202b (West 1989) and
supra note 366 for the effect of restructuring on the borrower's stock in the institution.
368. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(aX1) (West 1988). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4512(a) (1990)
(defining "application for restructuring"); Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Christensen, No.
22641 (Buena Vista Co. Dist. Ct., Iowa, July 6, 1988) (order granting FLB's motion for
summary judgment on the grounds that an application for restructuring unaccompanied by
a plan was fatally defective); Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. McGinnis, 711 F. Supp. 952,
957 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("FLB has authority to establish a deadline for submitting an
application.").
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operation, and repaying the loan on a rescheduled
basis; and
(e) in the case of a distressed loan that is not delinquent,
whether restructuring consistent with sound lending
practices may be taken to reasonably ensure that the
loan will not become a loan that it is necessary to
place in nonaccrual status.369
Of those five criteria, the initial two warrant explanation and
discussion.
A comparison of the "cost of foreclosure" with the "cost of
restructuring" is at the core of the evaluation process. Indeed,
because section 2202a(eXl) provides that: [i]f a qualified lender
determined that the potential cost to a qualified lender of restruc-
turing the loan in accordance with a proposed restructuring plan is
less than or equal to the potential cost of foreclosure, the qualified
lender shall restructure the loan in accordance with the plan,370
the comparison may be determinative.
"Cost of foreclosure" is specifically defined as follows:
The term "cost of foreclosure" includes-
(a) the difference between the outstanding balance due
on a loan made by a qualified lender and the liquida-
tion value of the loan, taking into consideration the
borrower's repayment capacity and the liquidation
value of the collateral used to secure the loan;
(b) the estimated cost of maintaining a loan as a
nonperforming asset;
(c) the estimated cost of administrative and legal actions
necessary to foreclose a loan and dispose of property
acquired as the result of the foreclosure, including
attorneys' fees and court costs;
(d) the estimated cost of changes in the value of collat-
eral used to secure a loan during the period begin-
ning on the date of the initiation of an action to
foreclose or liquidate the loan and ending on the
date of the disposition of the collateral; and
(e) all other costs incurred as the result of the foreclo-
sure or liquidation of a loan. 1
369. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(dXl) (West 1989).
370. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(eXl) (West 1989).
371. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(aX2) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4512(c) (1990)
(defining "cost of foreclosure").
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"Cost of restructuring," or the computation of it, takes into
account "all relevant factors" including the following:
(a) the present value of interest income and principal
forgone by the lender in carrying out the restructur-
ing plan;
(b) reasonable and necessary administrative expenses
involved in working with the borrower to finalize
and implement the restructuring plan;
(c) whether the borrower has presented a preliminary
restructuring plan and cash-flow analysis taking into
account income from all sources to be applied to the
debt and all assets to be pledged, showing a reason-
able probability that orderly debt retirement will
occur as a result of the proposed restructuring; and
(d) whether the borrower has furnished or is willing to
furnish complete and current financial statements in
a form acceptable to the institution. 2
Because the "cost of restructuring" considers "the present
value of interest income and principal forgone by the lender in
carrying out the restructuring plan," the conceptual approach to
restructuring under the 1987 Act has generated confusion and
questions as to whether Congress intended that the System apply
traditional approaches to restructuring.
Traditionally, most lenders and borrowers have used the
recovery value of the assets securing the note together with any
other unencumbered, nonexempt assets as the benchmark for
assessing the propriety of restructuring. If the borrower could
"cash flow" a restructured note that had a present value equal to
or greater than the value of the recoverable assets, then the lender
could justify restructuring on the grounds that the restructured
note would pay the same sum than the lender would realize
through foreclosure or in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding.373
372. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(eX2) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4517(a) (1990)
(consideration of application).
373. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-31 (West Supp. 1990) (codifying Bankruptcy Judges, United
States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 251-57,
100 Stat. 3088, 3104-16 (1986)). For general discussions of Chapter 12, see Aiken, Chapter
12 Family Farmer Bankruptcy, 66 NEB. L. REV. 632 (1987); Armstrong, The Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986: An Analysis for Farm Lenders, 104 BANKING L.J. 189 (1987);
Hahn, Chapter 12 - The Long Road Back, 66 NEB. L. REV. 726 (1987); Matson,
Understanding the New Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 521 (1987);
Wilson, Chapter 12: Family Farm Reorganization, 8J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 299 (1987); Note,
Bankruptcy Chapter 12: How Many Family Farms Can It Salvage?, 55 UMKC L. REV. 639
(1987); Note, An Analysis of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, 15 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 353 (1987).
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Although each of the Farm Credit districts are operating
under the same statute and essentially the same restructuring poli-
cies,3 7 4 at least three different approaches to computing the appro-
priateness of restructuring appear to be in use. One approach,
apparently employed only by the Seventh Farm Credit District
based in St. Paul, Minnesota, is discussed in detail below. 375
Described charitably, the Seventh Farm Credit District's
approach is nonsensical. As can be seen by examining the work-
sheets and their accompanying instructions set forth below, the
Seventh Farm Credit District determines the cost of restructuring
essentially by subtracting the present value of the proposed
restructured note from the present value of the outstanding prin-
cipal and interest on the original note computed at an interest
rate, currently 12.5 percent, that is higher than the discount rate,
currently 9 percent. 6 In effect, the computational formula used
by the Seventh Farm Credit District allows the sum of money
owed on the original rate that will never be paid, under any cir-
cumstances, to be the reference point for comparing all other cost.
Under traditional, common sense approaches to restructuring, the
reference point is the recovery value of the collateral together
with any other recoverable assets, not a sum of money that the
borrower is unable to repay.
No other district appears to be following the Seventh Farm
Credit District's approach. Most appear to be using a liquidation
analysis.377 A liquidation analysis first determines the recovery
value of any collateral and/or other recoverable assets. 378 Next, it
determines the present value of the proposed restructured
note.379 Finally, it compares the recovery value of the assets with
374. Each system lender was required by the 1987 Act to develop a restructuring
policy. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(g) (West 1989). By and large, each of the policies parroted the
language of the 1987 Act's loan restructuring provisions. (Copies of the policies are
available from Mr. Kelley.) See Massey & Schneider, supra note 6, at 593 (the authors of this
article reviewed the same policies reviewed by Mr. Massey and Ms. Schneider and came to
the same conclusion).
375. See infra notes 389-94 and the accompanying text.
376. Id.
377. Although the meaning of a "liquidation analysis" varies with the context in which
it is used, for bankruptcy purposes, liquidation analysis has been defined as follows: ".... the
debtor's equity (value of debtor's assets less the amount of any liens) in his non-exempt
assets, when divided by all unsecured claims, must not exceed the percentage repayment to
unsecured creditors proposed under the plan." Matson, Understanding the New Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 521, 531 (1987). A further definition is that a
plan cannot be approved unless unsecured creditors receive as much under the plan as they
would have in a chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
[Vol. 66:127
1990] A GUIDE TO BORROWER LITIGATION 197
the present value of the proposed restructured note.38 ° To the
extent that other districts incorporate into their analysis the pres-
ent value of interest income and principal forgiven by the lender
in carrying out the restructure plan, those districts compute that
figure under both the cost of foreclosure and the cost of restructur-
ing so that the sum is "cancelled out." 38 1 In that way, the restruc-
turing decision is not based on the sum of money that the
borrower is unable to repay and that will never be recovered by
the institution. However, at least one court has ruled that the
1987 Act "does not mandate the restructuring of the debt at the
liquidation value of the collateral. 382
At least one of the districts, the Fifth Farm Credit District
based in Jackson, Mississippi, appears to be using what might be
described as an "institutional cash flow analysis" approach to
restructuring.383 The analysis has many of the same features of a
liquidation analysis, but it also incorporates the institution's "cost
of funds" in the computations.384
Currently, borrowers seeking to apply for restructuring are
encountering at least two practical difficulties. First, the computa-
tional process contemplated by the restructuring provisions of the
1987 Act are not discernible from anything less than a laborious,
time-consuming reading of the statute. The restructuring policies
issued to date pursuant to section 2202a(g) and provided to bor-
380. Id.
381. See Wilson, supra note 373, at 302.
382. In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 Bankr. 1016, 1022 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988).
383. See FxFTH FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 1987, INTERNAL RESTRUCTURING MANUAL
(1988) (available from Mr. Kelley).
384. Although the authors of this article have examined restructuring "worksheets"
given to borrowers by System institutions in a number of districts, the authors only have
copies of the internal restructuring manuals for the St. Paul and Jackson districts. Because
North Dakota is in the Seventh Farm Credit District based in St. Paul, that district's
restructuring formula is the focus of this article. Readers who represent borrowers in other
districts may find common issues in the discussion that follows, but they should be aware
that St. Paul may be the only district employing the formula discussed.
Readers are also advised that the restructuring formulas employed by System lenders
may be modified from time to time. There is reason to believe that the restructuring
requirements of the 1987 Act caused some confusion and disagreement among System
lenders as to the specific methods by which the cost of restructuring and the cost of
foreclosure were to be computed. As a consequence, the development of restructuring
formulas has been influenced by differing interpretations of the law and differing
institutional traditions, philosophies, and biases as well as an element of "trial and error."
It has been the experience of one of the authors, Mr. Kelley, an experience reportedly
shared by others, that occasionally a loan will be restructured with little or no regard to the
stated formula. Such experiences should not be unexpected given the number of
differences between institutions, loan officers, and borrowers. Nevertheless, despite the
difficulties of doing so, borrowers would be well advised to attempt to obtain their
respective lender's formula prior to submitting an application for loan restructuring. Those
difficulties are discussed at infra note 390 and the accompanying text. See also Massey &
Schneider, supra note 6, at 592.
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rowers as a part of the restructuring application "packet" gener-
ally parrot the language of the statute.38 5
In other words, as a matter of course, borrowers are not being
provided with a clear, simple explanation of the computational
steps involved in computing and comparing the cost of foreclosure
and the cost of restructuring.
The second difficulty is that borrowers, as a matter of course,
are not being provided with the institution's anticipated costs of
foreclosure. In addition, some of the cost projections used by some
institutions are either not justified or are not justifiable.386
The Seventh Farm Credit District, has issued a manual to its
employees explaining the computational steps and the cost figures
to be used in restructuring.387 The manual includes worksheets
that are to be completed by the loan officer and presented to the
borrower at the credit review committee should review be neces-
sary and requested. The current practice of the Seventh Farm
Credit District is not to provide those worksheets to the borrower
prior to the credit review committee meeting.388 Even then,
some institutions will not provide the borrower with a photocopy
of the worksheets.389
385. The adoption of restructuring policies is required by 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(g) (West
1989).
386. SEVENTH FARM CREDIT SYSTEM 1987, RESTRUCTURING MANUAL (1988).
Significant portions of the manual can be found at Oversight On The Implementation Of
The Agricultural Credit Act Of 1987: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Agricultural
Credit of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, And Forestry, 100th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 415-76 (1988) (statement of James T. Massey, Executive Director of the Farmers' Legal
Action Group, Inc.).
387. A more detailed statement of the views of one of the authors on these difficulties
can be found at Review Of Implementation Of The Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Public
Law 100-233: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, And Rural
Development of the House Committee on Agriculture, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 286-94 (1988)
(statement of Christopher R. Kelley, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell
College of Law).
Although the System lenders are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1977 & Supp. 1990), the Farm Credit Administration is
subject to the Act. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 602.250-602.265 (1990). Pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 2202a(gX3) (West 1989), some System lenders submitted substantial portions of their loan
restructuring manuals or worksheets to the FCA. Those materials are available from the
FCA through an FOIA request. See also Massey & Schneider, supra note 6, at 593
(referencing loan restructuring documents obtained through FOIA). See generally
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 101ST CONG., IST SEss., A CITIZEN'S GUIDE
ON USING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 TO
REQUEST GOVERNMENT RECORDS (Coimm. Print 1989) (a guide to the use of FOIA).
388. This statement is based on one of the author's, Mr. Kelley's, experience with
borrower litigation. He found the practice to result in a significant waste of time at the
credit committee review hearing because time had to be spent reviewing the figures used
and checking the accuracy of the calculations made.
389. This practice is particularly pointless in light of the fact that the committee will
usually permit the copying of the figures and calculations by hand. It underscores why
Congress heard enough complaints from borrowers to prompt it to enact a statute requiring
System lenders to give borrowers copies of the loan documents that they had signed. 12
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The text of two of the basic worksheets used by the Seventh
Farm Credit District together with the text of the instructions pro-
vided by the District together with the text of the instructions pro-
vided by the District to its loan officers follows. The worksheets
included here are used for analyzing a restructuring proposal con-
templating level payments. A restructuring proposal contemplat-
ing a cash-out, partial deed-back, or debt set aside requires the use
of different restructuring worksheets. However, most of the basic
concepts and calculations remain the same regardless of the terms
of the restructuring proposal.
Because the worksheets and instructions require the use of
present value calculations, present value and annuity tables based
on a nine percent discount rate follow the worksheets and instruc-
tions. The Seventh Farm Credit District has chosen nine percent
as its discount factor, and the tables must be consulted to complete
the worksheets. Following the tables is a brief discussion of several
aspects of the worksheets and the instructions that require clarifi-
cation or comment.
U.S.C.A. § 2200 (West 1989). See also supra note 347 and the accompanying text (quoting a
member of the FCA Board as stating that "I think it's a shame when the FCA has to issue
regulations to insure the rights of stockholders and loan applicants").
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MEMBER VIEW
PRINCIPAL
INTEREST
1. INVESTMENT
2. ADD: COSTS
A) TAXES
B) DISPOSITION COSTS
C) LEGAL
D) INSURANCE AND REPAIR
3. TOTAL INVESTMENT
4. LESS: RECOVERABLE ASSETS
A) STOCK
B) AV OF PROPERTY
X (.8780) NPV
C) OTHER RECOVERABLE
ASSET (PV)
5. FORECLOSURE
COSTS
$
$
$
$
$
$ _ _ _ $ _
$
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FORECLOSURE COSTS
WORKSHEET
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COST OF FORECLOSURE
PROCEDURE
1. INVESTMENT - This line shows our total investment to date,
including all expenses advanced and accrued interest.
2. ADD: COSTS -
a) TAXES - This represents all past due taxes (excluding
those advanced and shown above in Line 1) and two years
of estimated future taxes.
b) DISPOSITION COSTS - This represents our anticipated
sales costs. Based on projections and experience in
acquired property sales, this is a flat 3% of appraised
value. Calculation: AV X 3%.390
c) LEGAL - Again, these are anticipated legal expenses
which are not already included in Line 1. We expect 1-
2% of AV for legal expenses; however, your legal expense
levels must be based on individual service center
experience.
d) INSURANCE AND REPAIR - Enter estimated
insurance and repair expenses during the foreclosure
process.
3. TOTAL INVESTMENT - This represents our investment
after adding the foreclosure costs FCS faces in a foreclosure
action. Please note that the added costs are not calculated on a
net present value basis. The timing of expenses is so varied,
including many front-end expenses, such that a present value
calculation would require an inordinate amount of time and
would show only a slight impact on the costs presented.
4. LESS: RECOVERABLE ASSETS
a) STOCK - Enter the current amount of stock held by the
borrower. Remember that on a foreclosure in process
stock may have been applied as a reduction in the
investment amount (Line 1). If that is the case, Line 4a
should be zero.
390. The three percent figure may have been increased to five percent in mid-1988.
Because it is the current policy of the Seventh Farm Credit District not to divulge the
specific contents of current loan restructuring policy manuals, this figure cannot be
confirmed. Telephone interview with William Collins, General Counsel for the Seventh
Farm Credit District, Dec. 22, 1989. Moreover, as noted at supra note 384, loan
restructuring policies for all of the System lenders are subject to change in various respects.
Accordingly, the reader is advised to attempt to obtain the current manual or other written
policy statement prior to relying on the information provided in this article regarding the
contents of the Seventh Farm Credit District's loan restructuring manual. Failing that, the
reader should use the portions of the manual discussed or reproduced in this article only as
a general guide.
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b) AV OF 'PROPERTY - This line represents the present
value of the property we would recover in foreclosure.
We recommend calculating an amount by multiplying
the appraised value of the property by a .8780 discount
factor (based on a 9% discount rate over one and a half
years). However, if the loan officer has strong evidence
that the property value will change (up or down), you
may use the present value of the appreciated or
depreciated property. Also, the length of foreclosure may
vary if properly supported.
c) OTHER RECOVERABLE ASSETS - This line includes
the present value of any other assets we could recover in
the foreclosure process, including the value of any
deficiency judgments. The asset should reflect present
values.
5. COST OF FORECLOSURE - This line represents the cost of
foreclosure for comparison with restructuring costs. It is
calculated by subtracting the Total Recoverable Assets from
Total Investment. Line 3 - (lines 4a + 4b)
COMMENTS - If foreclosure costs exceed restructure costs,
explain here the appropriate credit factors which support
foreclosure over restructure. This section must address factors
supporting foreclosure such as:
a) borrower applying all available income to the payment of
primary obligations
b) borrower's financial capacity and management skills to
protect collateral
c) borrower's capacity to work out of existing financial
difficulties
202 [Vol. 66:127
1990] A GUIDE TO BORROWER LITIGATION 203
RESTRUCTURE COSTS - LEVEL PAYMENTS 391
WORKSHEET
1. RESTRUCTURE TERMS
A) PRINCIPAL
B) CASH
C) STOCK
D) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
E) TOTAL CONSIDERATIONS
F) INTEREST RATE/TERMS
2. PRESENT VALUE ORIGINAL LOAN
$
$
COSTS
3. ADD: PRESENT INTEREST FORGIVEN
A) PRESENT INTEREST $
B) LESS: CASH PAYMENT
C) LESS: STOCK
D) LESS: OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
4. LESS: PRESENT VALUE RESTRUCTURED LOAN $
5. OTHER RESTRUCTURE COSTS
A) $
6. COMPROMISE/RESTRUCTURE COSTS
391. The Seventh Farm Credit District has changed the restructure costs worksheet
that formerly accompanied the instructions that follow. The worksheet set forth is the
newer one. Thus, Item 2 in the instructions that follow, "Present Interest Forgiven," is now
found at Item 3 on the new worksheet. Item 4 is the instructions, "Present Value of Interest
Concessions," is omitted from the newer worksheet. Item 3(a) in the instructions, "Present
Value of Foregone Principal and Interest - Original Amount," is now shown at Item 2 on
the newer worksheet. Item 3(b) of the instructions, "Less: Restructured Amount," is shown
at Item 4 of the newer worksheet.
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RESTRUCTURE COSTS - LEVEL PAYMENTS
PROCEDURES / DEFINITIONS
1. RESTRUCTURE TERMS -
a) PRINCIPAL - This line shows the principal balance of the
loan after the restructure is completed and accounted for.
b) CASH - Enter any cash payment received.
c) STOCK - Enter the value of all stock reductions which are
applied to the loan in the restructure.
d) OTHER CONSIDERATIONS - This category includes any
other monetary considerations received for the restructure,
including up-front cash, set aside loans or net recovery value
of collateral deeded to FCS. In complex restructures, loan
officers have the option to add lines (d, e, f... ) if necessary to
clarify the restructure terms. Do not include the value of
additional collateral as other considerations.
e) TOTAL CONSIDERATION - This line is the sum of Lines
la, 1b, 1c and Id.
f) INTEREST RATE/TERMS - This line briefly defines the
interest rates charged on the restructured loan, including
any concessionary rates (and their duration). It also should
identify the term of the restructured loan. This format is for
level payments.
2. PRESENT INTEREST FORGIVEN - The Agricultural Credit
Act of 1987 provides Farm Credit institutions with the ability to
consider foregone principal and interest as part of its Restructure
Costs. This section identifies the cost associated with present
interest forgiven.
a) PRESENT INTEREST - Enter the present interest balance.
b) LESS: CASH PAYMENT - Enter any cash payment (if any)
intended to be a payment of interest. Show the net of Lines
2a and 2b under the "Cost" column.
c) LESS: STOCK - Enter the value of any stock applied to the
loan as part of the restructure.
d) LESS: OTHER CONSIDERATIONS - Enter the value of
other considerations identified on Line Id. Enter the result
of Lines 2a minus 2b minus 2c minus 2d in the right hand
column.
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3. PRESENT VALUE OF FOREGONE PRINCIPAL AND
INTEREST - This section evaluates the present value of
foregone principal and interest by comparing the present value of
the original loan with the present value of the restructured loan.
We use the present value of the original loan with the present
value of the restructured loan. We use the present value of an
annuity concept (annual payments over a defined period of time)
to determine the present value of a flow of equal payments. The
difference is foregone for the life of the loan.
a) ORIGINAL AMOUNT - Enter the result of the original
payment amount times the appropriate present value factor
(PVF) to show the present value of the original loan.
b) LESS: RESTRUCTURED AMOUNT - This line begins with
a restructured payment amount which is calculated from the
restructured principal amount and the general interest rate
that would apply to the loan without any interest rate
concessions. Enter the result of the restructured payment
times the appropriate present value factor to show the
present value of the restructured loan. Subtract this amount
from the result in Line 3a and enter this difference in the
right hand column.
4. PRESENT VALUE OF INTEREST CONCESSIONS - There are
costs associated with interest concessions which can be calculated
on a present value basis. These calculations are less exact, but
provide a sound approximation of the cost of an interest rate
concession. Use this only when offering a concessionary interest
rate for part of the loan term.
a) RESTRUCTURED PAYMENT AMOUNT - Enter the same
payment amount as shown on Line 3b.
b) LESS: CONCESSION PAYMENT AMOUNT - Enter the
payment amount based on the concessionary interest rate
and the term of the concessionary rate.
c) FOREGONE ANNUAL PAYMENT AMOUNT - Enter the
difference between Line 4a and 4b on this line.
d) TIMES: PRESENT VALUE FACTOR - Multiply the result
on Line 4c by appropriate present value factor based on the
interest rate concession and the length- of the concession.
Show the results of this calculation under the "Cost" column.
(We are using a present value of an annuity table - further
directions will be provided in the final draft.)
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5. OTHER RESTRUCTURE COSTS - Recognizing there may be
additional out of pocket costs for the Farm Credit lender in
restructuring a loan, this section allows for consideration of those
costs. Most will likely be up-front costs and, therefore, no present
value calculations are necessary. Show the total other restructure
costs under the "Cost" column.
6. COMPROMISE/RESTRUCTURE COSTS - Add the costs for
each section and show the total at Line 6 under the "Cost"
column.
1990]
DISCOUNT FACTORS:
DIRECTIONS:
9% annual rate
To use this ordinary annuity table to deter-
mine appropriate present value factors, begin
by identifying the number of years the period-
ic payments will be made. Moving down the
year column to the appropriate year identifies
the present value factors available for month-
ly, quarterly, semi-annual and annual payment
options. Move across from the year column at
the selected number of years to the payment
option that fits the loan being present valued.
The present value factor is the number under
the appropriate payment option and across
from the appropriate year. For example, the
present value factor for a 20 year loan with an-
nual payments is 9.129.
PAYMENT OPTIONS
YEAR MONTHLY
1 11.435
2 21.889
3 31.447
4 40.185
5 48.173
6 55.477
7 62.154
8 68.258
9 73.839
10 78.942
11 83.606
12 87.606
13 91.770
14 95.335
15 98.593
16 101.573
17 104.297
18 106.787
19 109.064
20 111.145
21 113.048
22 114.788
23 116.378
24 117.832
25 119.162
26 120.377
27 121.488
28 122.504
29 123.433
QUARTERLY
3.785
7.247
10.415
13.313
15.964
18.389
20.608
22.638
24.495
26.194
27.748
29.170
30.470
31.660
32.749
33.745
34.656
35.490
36.353
36.950
37.588
38.172
38.706
39.195
39.642
40.051
40.425
40.767
41.080
SEMI-ANNUAL
1.873
3.588
5.158
6.596
7.913
9.119
10.223
11.234
12.160
13.008
13.784
14.495
15.147
15.743
16.289
16.789
17.247
17.666
18.050
18.402
18.724
19.018
19.288
19.536
19.762
19.969
20.159
20.333
20.492
ANNUAL
.917
1.759
2.531
3.240
3.890
4.486
5.033
5.535
5.995
6.418
6.805
7.161
7.487
7.786
8.061
8.313
8.544
8.756
8.950
9.129
9.292
9.442
9.580
9.707
9.823
9.929
10.027
10.116
10.198
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ORDINARY ANNUITY TABLE
(Present Value Factors)
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
PRESENT VALUE TABLES
DISCOUNT FACTOR:
DIRECTIONS:
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
9% annual rate
Use this table to determine the present
value of a single payment at a future
point in time. Determine the present
value factor by moving down the Year
column to the year in which you will re-
ceive the single payment. Then move
across to the Present Value Factor col-
umn and identify the appropriate pres-
ent value factor. For example, the pres-
ent value factor for a single payment in
year 20 is .178. These factors assume an-
nual compounding of the discount factor.
PRESENT VALUE FACTOR
.917
.842
.772
.708
.650
.596
.547
.502
.460
.422
.388
.356
.326
.299
.275
.252
.231
.212
.194
.178
.164
.150
.138
.126
.116
.106
.098
.090
.075
.069
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The preceding worksheets and instructions are largely self-explan-
atory. However, they are imprecise at points and possibly inaccu-
rate with respect to certain foreclosure costs. Therefore, several
comments are in order.392
FORECLOSURE COSTS:
Item 2(b) Disposition Costs: The use of 3% of the appraised
value of the collateral for the disposition cost of that collateral
appears to be extraordinarily conservative. The instructions offer
no justification for that figure. Bearing in mind that arbitrary and
capricious behavior by the institution may be the basis for a
defense to a foreclosure action,393 the institution should be put to
the task of justifying all of its foreclosure cost figures.
Item 2(c) Legal Costs: Note that the instructions require that
those costs be based on actual service center experience. As with
disposition costs, legal costs must be justified. If the institutions
assume incorrectly that the foreclosure will be uncontested and
not followed by a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding, the insti-
tution should be requested to adjust its legal costs accordingly.
Item 2(d) Insurance and Repair: Generally, the insurance cost
for bare land will be 0. For buildings, it will be $9.00 per $1,000 of
insurable value. Repair needs and costs should be brought to the
attention of the institution. Some institutions are using 1-12% of
appraised value for their cost.
Item 4(b) Net Present Value of the Collateral: The .8780 net
present value factor reflects a 9% discount rate for 1-1/2 years. If
a longer time before recovery is anticipated, such as where a con-
tested foreclosure or reorganization proceeding is contemplated, a
lower net present value factor should be used.
Item 4(c) Other Recoverable Assets: This figure should reflect
net recovery value discounted from the date of anticipated recov-
ery. In other words, there will be costs associated with the recov-
ery of those assets, and the institution should take those costs into
account.
COST OF RESTRUCTURING:
Item 2 Present Interest Forgiven: Make sure that this future
has not been improperly included in the item 2 calculation above
it. If the item 2 calculation runs from the date of the initial
default, it necessarily will have included the accrued interest
reflected in the item 3(a) figure. Thus, the institution will have
392. These comments are based on Mr. Kelley's experiences in representing borrowers
seeking restructuring and on his conversations with other attorneys and borrowers.
393. See infra notes 444-73 and the accompanying text.
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"double-dipped" and improperly increased the cost of restructur-
ing amount.
Item 3 Present Value of Foregone Principal and Interest:
Make sure that the original loan payment used in the item 2 calcu-
lation is not based on a default interest rate. Using a default inter-
est rate is inappropriately punitive and will result in a higher cost
of restructuring. The institution should assume that the foregone
payments on the original note will be based on the interest rate
applicable to the loan prior to default. Also, be sure that the calcu-
lation is based only on foregone payments. In other words, the
present value factor used should correlate with the number of pay-
ments that will not be made, not the full term of the note from its
inception. Otherwise, the borrower is not given credit for pay-
ments made prior to default.
Item 5 Other Restructure Costs: This figure will usually be
$500.00.
In applying for restructuring, borrowers should be aware of
the "least cost alternative" provisions of section 2202a(f).39 4 That
section provides as follows:
If two or more restructuring alternatives are available to a
qualified lender under this section with respect to a dis-
tressed loan, the lender shall restructure the loan in con-
formity with the alternative that results in the least cost to
the lender.395
If a borrower's restructuring proposal does not contemplate pay-
ing to his primary creditors all of his income in excess of his reason-
able living and operating expenses, section 2202a(f) appears to
give the institution the option of proposing an alternative that cap-
tures that income.396
System institutions are required to provide written notice to a
borrower that the borrower's loan "may be suitable for restructur-
ing" when the institution determines that the loan is or has
394. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(f) (West 1989).
395. Id.
396. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(dX1XB) (West 1989) (a consideration in determining
whether a borrower is eligible for restructuring is "whether the borrower is applying all
income over and above necessary and reasonable living and operating expenses to the
payment of primary obligations"); 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(dX2) (West 1989) ("This section shall
not prevent a qualified lender from proposing a restructuring plan for an individual
borrower in the absence of an application for restructuring from the borrower."). See Hill
v. Farm Credit Banks of St. Louis, 726 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (E.D. Mo. 1989) ("The 1987 Act
specifically provides that a lender may propose a restructuring plan in the absence of an
application from the borrower." (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2202a(dX2)). See also 12 C.F.R.
§ 614.4516(c) (1990) ("A qualified lender may, in the absence of an application for
restructuring from a borrower, propose a restructuring plan for an individual borrower.").
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become a "distressed loan." '397 The notification must include a
copy of the appropriate restructuring policy and "all materials
necessary to enable the borrower to submit an application for
restructuring the loan."'398 A distressed loan is defined as follows:
The term "distressed loan" means a loan that the bor-
rower does not have the financial capacity to pay accord-
ing to its terms and that exhibits one or more of the
following characteristics:
(a) The borrower is demonstrating adverse financial
and repayment trends.
(b) The loan is delinquent or past due under the
terms of the loan contract.
(c) One or both of the factors listed in subpara-
graphs (a) and (b), together with inadequate col-
lateralization, present a high probability of loss
to the lender.399
Notice must also be given not later than 45 days before the
commencement of foreclosure proceedings against the bor-
rower. 40 0 In addition, section 2202(bX3) provides as follows:
No qualified lender may foreclose or continue any fore-
closure proceeding with respect to any distressed loan
before the lender has completed any pending considera-
tion of the loan for restructuring under this section.401
397. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bXl) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4516(a) (1990)
(restructuring procedures: notice); Erickson v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 101 Bankr.
124, 125-26 (D. Neb. 1989) (borrowers unsuccessfully argued that the FLB had failed to
make a specific determination that their loan was distressed before advising them of the
right to seek restructuring), aff'd, 894 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Wagner, 107 Bankr.
662, 663 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) ("The statute requires and the debtors have the right to
know that the Farm Credit Bank has made a determination that the loan 'is or has become
distressed' before any restructuring obligations fall upon debtors and before any foreclosure
rights accrue to Farm Credit Bank."); In re Rudloff, 107 Bankr. 663, 665 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1989) (interpreting the Act to require the lender to determine that the loan is distressed
prior to providing notice of restructuring rights).
398. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bX1XB) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 6 14.4516(aX2) (1990)
(same requirement).
399. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(3) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4512(d) (1990)
(defining "distressed loan").
400. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bX2) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4516(aX2),
614.4519(a) (1990) (same requirement).
401. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bX3) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4519(b) (1990)
(same requirement). The issue of whether a "foreclosure proceeding" is continuing or has
been completed is to be resolved under state law. See Harper v. Federal Land Bank of
Spokane, 692 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (D. Ore. 1988), rev'd 878 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 867 (1990); Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Cupples, 889 F.2d 764, 767-
68 (8th Cir. 1989); Griffin v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 708 F. Supp. 313 (D. Kan. 1989),
aff'd, 902 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1990); Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Engelken, No. C85-
2062 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 1988).
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The term "foreclosure proceeding" is specifically defined in
section 2202a(4) as follows:
The term "foreclosure proceeding" means:
(a) a foreclosure or similar legal proceeding to
enforce a lien on property, whether real or per-
sonal, that secures a nonaccrual or distressed
loan; or
(b) the seizing of and realizing on nonreal property
collateral, other than collateral subject to a statu-
tory lien arising under subchapters I or II of this
chapter to effect collection of a nonaccrual or
distressed loan.40 2
Apparently, an action to collect on an unsecured note would not
be a foreclosure proceeding within the meaning of section
2202a(4).
Section 2202a(c) requires institutions to give borrowers a "rea-
sonable opportunity" for a meeting between the borrower and a
loan officer or other representative.40 3
Specifically, that section provides as follows:
On determination by a qualified lender that a loan
made by the lender is or has become a distressed loan, the
lender shall provide a reasonable opportunity for the bor-
rower thereof to personally meet with a representative of
the lender -
(1) to review the status of the loan, the financial con-
dition of the borrower, and the suitability of the
loan for restructuring; and
(2) with respect to a loan that is in nonaccrual status,
to develop a plan for restructuring the loan if the
loan is suitable for restructuring.40 4
If the restructuring proposal is denied, the borrower may
request a review of the denial by a credit review committee. The
request must be made in writing within seven days after receiving
the notice of denial.40 5
402. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(4) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4512(e) (1990)
(defining "foreclosure proceeding").
403. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(c) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4516(b) (1990)
(opportunity for meeting).
404. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(4) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4516(bX1) (1990)
(same requirement).
405. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(bX2)(West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4518(c)(1990) (same
requirement).
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At the credit review committee, the borrower may appear in
person accompanied by counsel or any other representative. 4°
Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Credit Technical Cor-
rections Act of 1988,407 the borrower seeking review of a denial of
restructuring did not have the right to an independent appraisal
except when "additional collateral for a loan is demanded by the
qualified lender when determining whether to restructure the
loan."40 However, under the 1988 Act, the borrower now has a
right to request an independent appraisal. 40 9 The borrower must
be notified in writing of the decision of the credit review commit-
tee and the reasons for that decision.4 10
The credit review committee's review ends the institution's
review process. If the credit review committee affirms the initial
denial of the restructuring, the institution may and usually will
commence the appropriate legal proceedings to foreclose on the
collateral and obtain judgment on the'note.4 1 '
406. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(c) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(a) (1990)
(personal appearance).
407. Pub. L. No. 100-399, 102 Stat. 989 (1988).
408. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(dX4) (West Supp. 1989).
409. Agricultural Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-399, 103, 102
Stat. 989, 990 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(d) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R.
§ 614.4443(c) (1990) (same requirement). However, neither the statute nor the regulations
provide that the credit review committee must give any particular weight to the
independent appraisal. The only requirement is that the committee must "consider" the
results of the appraisal. In the absence of an implied cause of action permitting judicial
review of that "consideration," System institutions have little, if any, fear of recourse if the
appraisal is ignored. See also Payne v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 711 F. Supp. 851,
855 (W.D.N.C. 1989) ("It is common knowledge in land and lending circles that appraisers
can be selected with a view toward valuation of a given property that is congenial to the
employing party.... This is why many evaluation provisions in real estate contracts are
drafted to permit each side to choose an appraiser, the two of whom in turn choose a third;
the resulting three appraisals then being averaged").
410. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(e) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(d) (1990) (same
requirement).
411. If the institution has been certified by the Assistance Board pursuant to 12
U.S.C.A. § 2278a-4 (West 1989), there is one more stage in the review process. Specifically,
12 U.S.C.A. § 2202c(a) (West 1989) provides as follows:
Within 9 months after a qualified lender is certified under section 2278a-4 of
this title, such lender shall review each loan that has not 'been previously
restructured and that is in nonaccrual status on the date the lender is certified,
and determine whether to restructure the loan.
Id. The review contemplated by section 2202c(a) is to be done by a special asset group
established by each district. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2202, 2202c(bXl) (West 1989). If the district
special asset group determines that a loan should be restructured, "the group shall pre-
scribe a restructuring plan for the loan that the qualified lender shall implement." 12
U.S.C.A. § 2202c(bX2) (West 1989). If the group determines that a loan should not be
restructured, it must submit a report to the National Special Asset Council described below
explaining that decision. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202c(d) (West 1989).
The statute is silent as to the borrower's right to participate in the review by the dis-
trict special asset group. The regulations governing that review are also silent as to that
issue. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4520 (1990).
Pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202c(cX1) (West 1989), the Assistance Board is to establish a
National Special Asset Council to do the following:
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
G. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL
The 1987 Act requires System institutions, except for the bank
for cooperatives, holding agricultural real estate acquired through
foreclosure or voluntarily conveyed by a borrower who, in the
institution's determination, did not have the financial resources to
avoid foreclosure to give the former owner the right of first refusal
to repurchase or lease the property.4 12 With respect to the right of
first refusal to purchase the property, sections 2219a(b) (1) - (5) pro-
vide as follows:
(1) Election to sell and notification
Within 15 days after an institution of the System first
elects to sell acquired real estate, or any portion of
such real estate, the institution shall notify the previ-
ous owner by certified mail of the owner's right -
(A) to purchase the property at the appraised fair
market value of the property, as established by
an accredited appraiser; or
(B) to offer to purchase the property at a price less
than the appraised value.
(2) Eligibility to purchase
To be eligible to purchase the property under para-
graph (1), the previous owner must, within 30 days
after receiving the notice required by such para-
graph, submit an offer to purchase the property.413
(3) Mandatory sale
(A) monitor compliance with the restructuring requirements of this section by
qualified lenders certified to issue preferred stock under section 2278b-7 of this
title, and by special asset groups established under subsection (b) of this section;
and
(B) review a sample of determinations made by each special asset group that a
loan will not be restructured.
Id. In addition, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202c(cX2) (West 1989) provides that the National Special
Asset Council "shall review a sufficient number of determinations made by each special
asset group to foreclose on any loan to assure the Council that such group is complying with
this section." Id. For each determination reviewed, "the Council shall make an independ-
ent judgment on the merits of the decision to foreclose rather than restructure the loan."
Id. In addition:
If the National Asset Council determines that any special asset group is not
in substantial compliance with this section, the Council shall notify the group of
the determination, and may take such other action as the Council considers nec-
essary to ensure that such group complies with this section.
12 U.S.C.A. § 2202c(cX3) (West 1989). As with reference to the district special asset group,
the statute and the regulations are silent regarding the borrower's right to participate in
any review by the National Special Asset Council. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4520 (1990).
412. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4522(2) (1990) (defining
"previous owner").
413. As originally enacted, the 1987 Act prescribed a fifteen day time period. The
fifteen day period was changed to thirty days by the Agricultural Technical Corrections Act
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An institution of the System receiving an offer from
the previous owner to purchase the property at the
appraised value shall, within 15 days after the receipt
of such offer, accept such offer and sell the property
to the previous owner.414
(4) Permissive sale
An institution of the System receiving an offer from
the previous owner to purchase the property at a
price less than the appraised value may accept such
offer and sell the property to the previous owner.
Notice shall be provided to the previous owner of the
acceptance or rejection of such offer within 15 days
after the receipt of such offer.
(5) Rejection of offer of previous owner
(A) Duties of institution
An institution of the System that rejects an offer
from the previous owner to purchase the prop-
erty at a price less than the appraised value may
not sell the property to any other person -
(i) at a price equal to, or less than, that offered
by the previous owner, or
(ii) on different terms and conditions than
those that were extended to the previous
owner, without first affording the previous
owner an opportunity to purchase the
property at such price or under such terms
and conditions.
(B) Notice
Notice of the opportunity in subparagraph (A)
shall be provided to the previous owner by cer-
tified mail, and the previous owner shall have 15
days in which to submit an offer to purchase the
property at such price or under such terms and
conditions.4 15
The provisions governing the right of first refusal to lease acquired
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-399, 104, 102 Stat. 989, 990 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(bX2)
(West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4522(cX3) (1990) (thirty days).
414. As originally enacted, the 1987 Act prescribed a thirty day time period. The
thirty day period was changed to fifteen days by the Agricultural Technical Corrections Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-399, 104, 102 Stat. 989, 990 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(bX3)
(West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 6 14.4522(cX2) (1990) (fifteen days).
415. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(bXl)-(5) (West 1989).
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property are similar.4 16
The right of first refusal as set forth in sections 2219(aXb) (1) -
(5) presents several potential difficulties for borrowers. First,
neither the statute nor the regulations specifically define the event
constituting the institution's "first elect[ion] to sell."'4 17 In states
where corporations are prohibited from owning agricultural real
estate, it might be argued that the "election to sell" occurs as soon
as the land is acquired since the institution is not permitted to
retain it. On the other hand, it might be argued that no election to
sell occurs until an eligible purchaser actually has agreed to buy
the parcel.
A more troublesome difficulty for borrowers is the absence of
any express mechanism for challenging the appraisal of the prop-
erty. In addition, neither the statute nor the regulations define the
statute's term "accredited appraiser. '418 It can be expected that
some Farm Credit Banks will use "in house" appraisers who may
base their appraisals on sales of other inventory land that has been
sold with inflationary inducements such as money-back guarantees
and low interest rate financing that would not be offered to former
owners under the right of first refusal.419
The former owner who cannot match the appraised price
faces uncertainty as to whether he will receive another opportu-
nity to elect to buy the land. The statute does permit the former
owner to offer a sum less than the appraised value. However, if
that offer is rejected, the institution must again offer the right of
first refusal only if it subsequently desires to sell the land at "a
price equal to, or less than, that offered by the previous owner" or
"on different terms and conditions than those that were extended
to the previous owner."' 420 In areas where land values are increas-
ing, it is unlikely that the institution will desire to sell the land at a
price equal to, or less than, that offered by the previous owner. In
addition, it is very likely that the terms and conditions will be dif-
416. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(cX1)-(6) (West 1989).
417. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4522 (1990).
418. Id. See 55 FED. REC. 24,861 (1990) (prefatory comments stating that the FCA
intends to republish proposed regulations on appraisal standards "in the near future").
419. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(f) (West 1989) ("... a system institution shall not be
required to provide financing to the previous owner in connection with the sale of acquired
real estate"). See also Payne v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 711 F. Supp. 851, 855
(1989) ("It is common knowledge in land and lending circles that appraisers can be selected
with a view toward valuation of a given property that is congenial to the employing party");
In reJarrett Ranches, Inc., 107 Bankr. 969,973 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989) (invalidating the FCB's
appraisal of former borrowers' land in parcels rather than as a whole and setting an
appraised value).
420. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(bX5) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 6 14.4522(cX3) (1990)
(same requirement).
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ferent. This occurs because the only "terms and conditions" that
likely will have been initially offered to the former owner are the
sale of the land at a lump sum cash price. On the other hand, a
third-party prospective purchaser is likely to be offered many
other "terms and conditions" such as a money-back guarantee,
apportionment of real estate taxes, etc.42 1 The uncertainty regard-
ing a second chance to elect to buy the land arises because even if
the "terms and conditions" differ, it is possible that the institution
may neglect to inform the former owner not only of those differ-
ences but also, and more fundamentally, of the transaction itself,
because the institution may choose to ignore or narrowly read the
statute.
To date, some System institutions have attempted to avoid
giving former owners the benefits of sections 2219a(b) (1) - (5) by
choosing to sell the acquired property by auction without first giv-
ing the former owner the opportunity to buy it at its appraised
value.422 Institutions may sell acquired land by auction. In that
regard, sections 2219a(d) (1) - (3) provide as follows:
(d) Public Offerings
(1) Notification of previous owner
If an institution of the System elects to sell or
lease acquired property or a portion thereof through
a public auction, competitive bidding process, or
other similar public offering, the institution shall
notify the previous owner, by certified mail, of the
availability of the property. Such notice shall contain
the minimum amount, if any, required to qualify a
bid as acceptable to the institution and any terms and
conditions to which such sale or lease will be subject.
(2) Priority
If two or more qualified bids in the same amount
are received by the institution under paragraph (1),
such bids are the highest received, and one of the
qualified bids is offered by the previous owner, the
institution shall accept the offer by the previous
owner.
(3) Nondiscrimination
No institution of the System may discriminate
421. Financing is not considered a "term or condition" of sale. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(e)
(West Supp. 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4522(cX4) (1990) (same).
422. See infra notes 424-25 and the accompanying text.
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against a previous owner in any public auction, com-
petitive bidding process, or other similar public offer-
ing of property acquired by the institution from such
person.423
However, at least two federal district courts have held that sales by
auction must be preceded by giving the former owner the oppor-
tunity to buy the acquired land at its appraised value. 4 24 A third
federal district court has held to the contrary.425
Finally, with respect to the right of first refusal, 2219a(h) pro-
vides that "[t]he rights provided in this section shall not diminish
any such right of first refusal under the law of the State in which
the property is located."'426 This provision appears to provide that
state first refusal statutes will supplement the federal right.
H. PROHIBITION AGAINST WAIVER OF MEDIATION RIGHTS
The 1987 Act encourages the states to establish mediation
programs. Further, the Farm Credit System is required to partici-
pate in mediation.427 In addition, Congress had the foresight to
realize that the right to mediation could be used as a chip in nego-
tiations for a loan. In order to avoid that, the 1987 Act contains
the following language:
No System institution may make a loan secured by a mort-
gage or lien on agricultural property to a borrower on the
condition that the borrower waive any right under the
agricultural loan mediation program of any State.428
The Farm Credit Administration is required to promulgate rules
423. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(dXl)-(3) (West 1989).
424. Leckband v. Naylor, 715 F. Supp. 1451, 1455 (D. Minn. 1988), appeal dismissed,
Nos. 88-5301 MN & 89-5141 MN (8th Cir. May 5, 1989); Martinson v. Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul, 725 F. Supp. 469 (D.N.D. 1988), appeal dismissed, No. 88-5252 ND (8th Cir. May 5,
1989). See also In re Jarrett Ranches, Inc., 107 Bankr. 969, 975-76 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989)
(invalidating the particular bidding process used by a FCB under the right of first refusal).
425. Payne v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 711 F. Supp. 851, 859-60 (W.D.N.C.
1989) (holding that auction sales need not be preceded by opportunity to buy land at
appraisal value).
426. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219a(h) (West 1989). See generally Houser, A Comparative Study
of the Former Owner's Right of First Refusal Upon a Lender's Resale of Foreclosed
Agricultural Land: A New Form of State Mortgagor Relief Legislation, 13 J. CORP. L. 895
(1988) (discussing statutory rights of first refusal).
427. Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 503, 101 Stat. 1663 (1988).
Unlike other provisions of the 1987 Act relating to the Farm Credit System, this provision
was codified in Title 7 of the United States Code, not Title 12, at 7 U.S.C.A. § 5103(bXl)
(West 1988). See generally Note, Mediation in Debtor-Creditor Relationships, 20 U. MICH.
J. L. REF. 110 (1987) (discussing debtor-creditor mediation); Note, The American Response
to Farm Crises: Procedural Debtor Relief, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1037 (discussing various
farm debtor relief measures).
428. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202e (West 1989).
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regarding System lender's participation in mediation.429
I. DIFFERENTIAL INTEREST RATES
Farm Credit System institutions in the past have used differ-
ent interest rates on loans. This is commonly known as the "three-
tier" method. The interest rate was based on a number of factors,
including borrower qualifications. The 1987 Act allows the System
institutions to continue this practice.430 However, the borrower
can now ask a System institution:
1) to provide a review of the loan to determine if the
proper interest rate has been used;
2) give the borrower a written explanation of the basis
for charging the interest rate used; and
3) give the borrower a written explanation of what the
borrower must do to improve his credit status to
receive a lower interest rate.431
J. UNINSURED ACCOUNTS
Some System institutions have used uninsured accounts in the
past as part of their loan servicing procedures.4 32 Borrowers
would deposit funds in these accounts over a period of time in
order to insure that they would meet their scheduled payments.
The 1987 Act provided that if the institution becomes insolvent,
all of the funds in uninsured accounts are to be applied to a bor-
rower's debt.433
K. USE OF FMHA GUARANTEED LOANS, ETC.
The 1987 Act also expresses Congress' desire for the Farm
Credit System to look outside the System in restructuring:
It is the sense of Congress that the banks and associa-
tions (except for the banks for cooperatives) operating
under the Farm Credit Act of 1971, should administer dis-
tressed loans to farmers with the objective of using the
429. The rules regarding System lenders' participation in mediation are found at 12
C.F.R. § 614.4521 (1990).
430. Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 109, 101 Stat. 1584 (1988)
(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(b) (West 1989).
431. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(b) (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4368 (1990) (same
requirement).
432. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510 (1988) (currently found at 12 C.F.R. § 614.4513(b) (1990)).
433. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2219b (West 1989). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4513(a) (1990) (same
requirement).
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loan guarantee programs of the Farmers Home Adminis-
tration and other loan restructuring measures, including
participation in interest rate buy down programs that are
Federally or State funded or other Federal or State spon-
sored financial assistance programs that offer relief to
financially distressed farmers, as alternatives to foreclo-
sure, considering the availability and appropriateness of
such programs on a case-by-case basis.434
While this section has not been codified, it may prove helpful to
the borrower who wishes to use the FmHA guaranteed loan pro-
gram or other program in order to qualify for restructuring.
VIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RESTRUCTURING DENIALS
At least one court has declined to review decisions adverse to
the borrower under the former forbearance policies developed by
System institutions. In Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Read,435
the borrower's request for forbearance under the FLB's forbear-
ance policy adopted pursuant to pre-1985 Act forbearance regula-
tion4 36 had been denied.43 7 The policy conditioned forbearance
on the borrower meeting three conditions: the borrower must be
cooperative; the borrower must make an honest effort to meet the
conditions of the loan contract; and the borrower must be capable
of working out the debt burden. 438 The FLB found that the bor-
rower did not satisfy the third condition.439 In declining to review
the forbearance decision, the court expressed the belief that the
"matter is best left to those in whom the land bank places that
responsibility.... We find no statutory authority for court review
of such a determination." 440
For similar reasons, a federal district court recently declined
434. Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 102, 101 Stat. 1579 (1988).
For a description of the FmHA guaranteed loan program, see Scott & Roth, Guaranteed
Farmer Program Loans: Questions and Answers, FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GROUP REP. 1
(Winter 1989).
435. 703 P.2d 777 (Kan. 1985).
436. See 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510 (1985).
437. Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Read, 703 P.2d 777 (Kan. 1985).
438. Id. at 780. See 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(1) (1985).
439. Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Read, 703 P.2d at 779.
440. Id. at 780. See also Woodsmall v. Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1987)
(denial of Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loan on the grounds that the applicant
was not creditworthy was not reviewable because the federal courts "are not equipped to
undertake such a task, for in these matters we have neither the training nor the experience
of an FmHA loan officer"); Tuepker v. Farmers Home Admin., 708 F.2d 1329, 1332 (8th
Cir. 1983) (declining to review a Farmers Home Administration loan denial in the absence
of a claim "alleging a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a
misconstruction of governing legislation, or some like error 'going to the heart of the
administrative determination' ").
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to review the "quality and good faith" of an FLB's decision not to
restructure a borrower's loan under the 1987 Act.441 The court
expressed the view that "though courts will enforce consideration
of loan restructuring under the Act, they probably will not scruti-
nize the details of loan decisions when FLB has considered appli-
cations for restructure and reviewed denial. ' 442
However, despite the absence of express statutory authority
for judicial review under the Farm Credit Act and the regulations
and policies adopted pursuant to it, there are several potential the-
oretical bases for seeking judicial review. Listed in order of their
current state of judicial development, the respective basis for each
of those theories are as follows:
1. invocation of the maxim "he who seeks equity, must
do equity" as an equitable affirmative defense to the
institution's foreclosure proceeding;
2. failure to follow statutory directives asserted as an
implied cause of action under the Farm Credit Act, as
amended by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987;4 43
and
3. failure to adhere to state cooperative law requiring
procedural and substantive fairness in the expulsion
of members from cooperative institutions.
The latter two theories are discussed elsewhere in this arti-
cle.444 The following is a discussion of the first theory, the equita-
ble defense.
In most, if not all jurisdictions, a proceeding to foreclose a
mortgage is a proceeding in equity.445 One of the fundamental
441. Troutman v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, No. CV88-726-PA, Slip. op. at 4 (D.
Ore. Sept. 15, 1988) (order denying preliminary injunction).
442. Id. at 3 (citing Miller v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 587 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979)). See also Williams v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson,
729 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D.D.C. 1990) ("... once a federal land bank has properly
determined whether or not a particular borrower's offer of debt refinancing should be
accepted, this Court will not second-guess that determination." (citing Perez v. Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co., 781 F.2d 475, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1986); Federal Land Bank of Wichita
v. Read, 237 Kan. 751, 703 P.2d 777, 780 (1985)).
443. This basis is unavailable in the Ninth, Tenth, and Eighth Circuits. See Harper v.
Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
867 (1990); Griffn v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 902 F.2d 22, 24 (10th Cir. 1990); Zajac
v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, No. 88-5353ND (8th Cir. July 31, 1990) (en banc) (1990
U.S. App. LEXIS 12932). Given the trend represented by these decisions, review through
an implied cause of action is not likely to be available in any jurisdiction.
444. See supra notes 184-267 & 333-38, respectively, and the accompanying text.
445. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 1988)
("An action to foreclose a mortgage is an equitable proceeding"); Continental Federal
Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Okla. 1977) ("Foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage is an equitable action, and it is within the province of the court exercising
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precepts of equitable relief is that it "cannot be demanded as a
matter of right whenever specified facts are shown.. .," rather it
"is granted in the discretion of the court. '4 46 Judicial discretion is
".... to be exercised by applying established principle of equity to
the situation presented by all of the facts in the case, and adapting
the remedy to accomplish the most equitable result possible." 447
The discretionary nature of equitable relief is "rooted in the
historical concept of [a] court of equity as a vehicle for affirma-
tively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good
faith. ' 448 As emphasized by the United States Supreme Court:
A court of equity acts only when and as conscience com-
mands, and if the conduct of the plaintiff be offensive to
the dictates of natural justice, then, whatever may be the
rights he possesses and whatever use he may make of
them in a court of law, he will be held remediless in a
court of equity.449
The discretion inherent in the granting or denial of equitable
relief is guided by maxims or general principles.450 One of those
maxims is "he who seeks equity must do equity." As explained by
Pomeroy, "this maxim expressed the governing principles that
every action of a court of equity in determining rights and award-
ing remedies must be in accordance with conscience and good
faith."' 45 ' More specifically,
The meaning is, that whatever be the nature of the con-
troversy between two definite parties, and whatever be
the nature of the remedy demanded, the court will not
confer its equitable relief upon the party seeking its inter-
position and aid, unless he has acknowledged and con-
ceded or will admit and provide for all the equitable
rights, claims, and demands justly belonging to the adver-
sary party, and growing out of or necessarily involved in
its equitable power to see that the party seeking equity shall have dealt fairly before relief is
given." (quoting Murphy v. Fox, 278 P.2d 820, 826 (Okla. 1955)).
446. H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 49 (2nd ed. 1948).
447. Id.
448. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945) (holding that dismissal of a patent infringement suit was justified by the
"unclean hands" doctrine).
449. Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386,390 (1897) (stating that land dispute relief was
available at an action of law).
450. See Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814 (1945) ("The guiding doctrine ... that he
who comes into equity must come with clean hands ... is far more than a mere banality. It
is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with
inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief..
451. J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 51 (5th ed. 1941).
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the subject-matter of the controversy.45 2
The principle requires the plaintiff to do "equity. ' 453 In
essence, a condition precedent to the equity court's granting of
relief to the plaintiff is the awarding to the defendant any rights
possessed by the defendant, including those that have their gene-
sis in the principles of fair dealing.
The failure of the FLB to consider a borrower for forbearance
was held to be a defense to a foreclosure action in the case of Fed-
eral Land Bank of St. Paul v. Overboe.45 4 In Overboe, the bor-
rower obtained a loan from the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
which was secured by a mortgage.455 The borrower became late
in his payments, and in June, 1983, he requested that his annual
payment date be changed from July 1 to December 31 of each
year to coincide with the cash flow of his farm.45 6 The federal land
bank advised the borrower that a change in payment dates would
require a reamortization of his loan, and that, based on the bor-
rower's financial information on file, it was unable to grant a
reamortization. 457  The borrower subsequently provided new
financial information but the federal land bank declined to change
its position and initiated a foreclosure action.45 8
The borrower contested the foreclosure action on the grounds
that the federal land bank had failed to follow its policies, regula-
tions, and procedures adopted under the Farm Credit Act of 1971
relating to forbearance when it denied his request for reamortiza-
tion.45 9 The federal land bank responded by asserting that its fail-
ure to follow its policies and the regulations governing it could not
be raised as a defense to foreclosure, and, in the alternative, that it
had not violated its policies and the applicable regulations.460
The forbearance regulation at issue in Overboe was adopted
prior to the enactment of the Farm Credit Amendments Act of
1985.461 The regulation provided that the federal land bank was
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1987).
455. Federal Land Bank v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445, 446 (N.D. 1987).
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 447.
460. Id.
461. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(dXl) (1986). The Overboe equitable defense was applied to a
claim arising under the 1985 Act in Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d
855, 858-59 (N.D. 1988). See also Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Asbridge, 414 N.W.2d
596, 597 (N.D. 1987) (applying Overboe); Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Huether, 454
N.W.2d 710, 715 (N.D. 1990) (applying Overboe).
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to develop loan servicing policies that included a provision for "a
means of forbearance for cases when the borrower is cooperative,
making an honest effort to meet the conditions of the loan con-
tract, and is capable of working out of the debt burden. ' 4 2 Pursu-
ant to that regulation, the federal land bank had adopted a policy
authorizing the extension of "appropriate assistance" to borrowers
who met certain criteria.463
The federal land bank argued that its failure to follow the pol-
icy that it adopted pursuant to the forbearance regulation could
not be asserted as a defense because of the holding of several
courts that borrowers do not have a private cause of action for
damages under the Farm Credit Act of 1971 or the regulations
promulgated pursuant to that Act.4
Although the Overboe court acknowledged that the Farm
Credit Act of 1971 and the forbearance regulation did not create a
private cause of action, it rejected the federal land bank's argu-
ment that the absence of a private cause of action precluded a bor-
rower's assertion of noncompliance with the Act or the regulation
as a defense in a foreclosure action.465 The Overboe court's analy-
sis of the issue was grounded on the recognition that "an action to
foreclose a mortgage is an equitable proceeding. '466 With this rec-
ognition forming the basis of the court's analysis, the court then
examined other instances, specifically, cases involving noncompli-
ance with Department of Housing and Urban Development regu-
lations, where federal regulations which have been held not to
imply a private cause of action may nevertheless provide a basis
for an equitable defense to a foreclosure action.467
The Overboe court examined the notions of fair dealing appli-
cable to the Farm Credit System, and noted that the Congres-
sional goal under the Farm Credit Act was "fostering agricultural
development. '4 8 With that Congressional objective in mind, the
Supreme Court of North Dakota held as follows:
Allowing FLB to foreclose its mortgages without regard
to the administrative forbearance regulation would be
inimical to the achievement of this goal. We therefore
462. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d at 447 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(dXl)).
463. Id. at 447 (citing "District Policy 2501" of the Federal Land Bank of St. Paul).
464. Id. at 447-48. See, e.g., Farmers Production Credit Ass'n of Ashland v. Johnson, 24
Ohio St.3d 69, 493 N.E.2d 946 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1032 (1987).
465. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d at 449.
466. Id. at 448 (citations omitted).
467. Id. at 449.
468. Id. (citing Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Lillehaugen, 404 N.W.2d 452 (N.D.
1987)).
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conclude that the failure of FLB to comply with adminis-
trative forbearance regulation and policies adopted pur-
suant to the regulation gives rise to a valid equitable
defense to a foreclosure action under state law.469
Having held that a federal land bank's failure to abide by its
forbearance policies and the regulations governing it was a per-
missible affirmative defense to a foreclosure action, the Overboe
court also concluded that the administrative forbearance defense
permits judicial consideration of both the procedural and substan-
tive aspects of the System institution's action.47 ° In this regard,
the court stated that the initial inquiry is whether the institution
"has established a general policy of forbearance and whether it
applied that policy in arriving at its decision to seek
foreclosure."4
71
The Overboe court explained that if the trial court finds that
the borrower's qualifications were considered by the institution in
accordance with its procedures, the court's review of the merits of
that consideration is to be confined to whether the institution
abused its discretion.47 2 In other words, to prevail, the borrower
must show that the institution acted in an "arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable or unconscionable manner. '47 3 Finally, the Overboe
court indicated that appellate review of a trial court's determina-
tion of the substantive issue will be guided by the standard of
whether the abuse of discretion standard of review "appears to
have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.- 474
Litigation by member-borrowers against System institutions
will undoubtedly continue. The current interest in lender liability
in the farm community suggests that some of that litigation will
take the form of "generic" lender liability claims.475 However, a
number of issues concerning the borrowers' rights provisions of
the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 remain unresolved.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 449-50.
471. Id. at 449.
472. Id. at 450.
473. Id.
474. Id. (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S.
474,491(1951)). In jurisdictions providing for nonjudicial foreclosure, borrowers seeking to
invoke the equitable defense employed in Overboe will have to seek injunctive relief in
order to obtain judicial intervention. For a recent discussion and collection of authorities
regarding the enjoining of the nonjudicial foreclosure process, see Note, Nonjudicial
Foreclosure in Arkansas with the Statutory Foreclosure Act of 1987, 41 ARK. L. REV. 373,
389-403 (1988).
475. See Welsh, Are Banks to Blame?, FARM J., June-July 1988, at 11.
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IX. CONCLUSION
Two specific and fundamental issues relating to the new bor-
rowers' rights provisions are in need of immediate attention. A
third, more general, issue is not likely to arise until the secondary
agricultural mortgage market is implemented.
The first issue arises from the failure of most, if not all, of the
farm credit districts to adopt loan restructuring policies that
require the institutions within the district to explain in simple,
understandable terms the computational steps involved in the
determination of the cost of foreclosure and the cost of restructur-
ing. That information, which has been made available to loan
officers, is not routinely provided to borrowers holding distressed
loans.4 7 6 Without that information, the borrower is faced with the
extraordinarily difficult task of gleaning the computational steps
and arriving at an understanding of the restructuring formula
from language in current policies that merely restates the lan-
guage of the statute. Because the statutory language is not so spe-
cific as to make the computational steps self-evident, the practical
effect is that the borrower "shoots in the dark" when submitting a
restructuring application. Moreover, without knowledge of the
computational steps involved, the borrower is not in a position to
identify and urge the correction of computational errors made at
either the initial stage of the review of his application or at the
credit review committee level. As a matter of fundamental fair-
ness, both parties to the restructuring process should have the
instructions before them.
The second issue arises from the failure of most institutions to
disclose or justify their "costs of foreclosure." That information is
readily accessible to the institutions, but it is completely inaccessi-
ble to members unless the institution chooses to make it avail-
able.477 Although member-borrowers are required to make a full
disclosure of their current and projected financial and operational
conditions when they apply for restructuring, institutions have
routinely chosen not to disclose their costs. Thus, a member-bor-
rower without that information cannot submit a restructuring pro-
posal that will properly address each cost and other factors that
will be considered by the institution in evaluating that application.
If one accepts that premise that restructuring is intended to
476. See supra notes 386-91 and the accompanying text.
477. For a discussion of the availability of information regarding the costs of
foreclosure, see supra notes 386-91 and the accompanying text.
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produce "win-win" results, the failure of System institutions to
make the process accessible to its members by providing them
with adequate instructions and to disclose and justify their antici-
pated costs of foreclosure is inexcusable. Moreover, if System insti-
tutions are under either an equitable or legal duty to be fair, that
failure may be actionable. As discussed elsewhere in this article,
ample authority exists to impose enforceable duties of good faith
and fairness on System institutions in the restructuring process.478
The final, and less immediate, issue arises from sections 2279
aa-9(a) and (b) of the Farm Credit Act, as amended in 1987.47 1
Those provisions, concerning loans from System institutions that
may be pooled in the secondary market for farm mortgages, a
market that is being created pursuant to sections 2279aa-2279aa-
14,480 provide as follows:
(a) Restructuring
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sections
2202, 2202a, 2202b, 2202c, and 2219b of this title shall
not apply to any loan included in a pool of qualified loans
backing securities or obligations for which the Corpora-
tion provides guarantee. The loan servicing standards
established by the Corporation shall be patterned after
similar standards adopted by other federally sponsored
secondary market facilities.
(b) Borrowers rights
At the time of application for a loan, originators that
are Farm Credit System institutions shall give written
notice to each applicant of the terms and conditions of the
loan, setting forth separately terms and conditions for
pooled loans and loans that are not pooled. This notice
shall include a statement, if applicable, that the loan may
be pooled and that, if pooled, sections 2202, 2202a, 2202b,
2202c, and 2219b of this title shall not apply. This notice
also shall inform the applicant that he or she has the right
not to have the loan pooled. Within 3 days from the time
of commitment, an applicant has the right to refuse to
allow the loan to be pooled, thereby retaining rights
under sections 2202, 2202a, 2202b, 2202c, and 2219b of
478. See generally Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.
1987) (applying equitable principles); Copeland, Expulsion of Members by Agricultural
Cooperatives, 1 J. AGRIC. COOPERATION 76 (1986) (discussing the law governing the
expulsion of members from agricultural cooperatives).
479. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2279aa-9 (a), (b) (West 1989).
480. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2279aa-2279aa-14 (West 1989).
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this title, if applicable.4"'
It remains to be seen whether System institutions will attempt
to pool significant numbers of loans and thus avoid the administra-
tive expenses created by the restructuring provisions and whether
borrowers will be "encouraged" to waive their rights in order to
allow the pooling of loans. 48 2 The primary goal of farm credit sys-
tem loan restructuring is to gain lender acceptance of a restructur-
ing proposal that the borrower can actually perform. However,
such a proposal may be denied, and judicial review may be sought.
To prepare for this, documentation of any procedural irregulari-
ties or other arbitrary and capricious lender behavior is essential.
But borrowers and their counsel must be aware that judicial inter-
vention in the restructuring program is likely to be limited or even
nonexistent. Thus, a realistic restructuring of a farm credit loan
that is acceptable to the Farm Credit lender must be the para-
mount aim of the borrowers and counsel.
481. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2279aa-9(a), (b) (West 1989).
482. An overriding issue for the future, one beyond the scope of this article, is the
availability of credit and the Farm Credit System's role in providing that credit. For recent
discussions of those issues, see Boehije and Pederson, Farm Finance: The New Issues,
CHOICES, Third Quarter, 1988, at 16; Thompson, The Farm Credit System. Rebuilding
After the Big Debt Crisis, AGRIFINANCE, Sept. 1990, at 30; Maio, Think About It! Duncan
Worries About Farm Credit System's Future, ABA Bankers Weekly, Sept. 18, 1990 at 8;
Duncan, Rural Credit Markets: More Changes Ahead, CHOICES, Third Quarter 1988, at 20;
Lessons From a System That Didn't Go Under, WASH. POST NAT. WEEKLY ED., June 26-July
2, 1989, at 18, col.1.
228 [Vol. 66:127
A GUIDE TO BORROWER LITIGATION
APPENDIX A
THOUGHTS, COMMENTS AND A ROUGH CHECKLIST ON
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM LOAN RESTRUCTURING FROM THE
BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE
I. GOALS:
A. Primary: Lender acceptance of a restructuring proposal
that the borrower can perform. Unrealistic borrower cash flows
may gain lender acceptance, but inability to perform may pre-
clude subsequent loan restructuring.
B. Secondary: Because judicial review of a restructuring
denial ultimately may be sought, documentation of any procedural
irregularities or other arbitrary and capricious behavior on the
part of the lender should be a continuing consideration through-
out the process.483 However, borrowers and their counsel should
be mindful that judicial intervention in the restructuring process is
likely to be very limited and, in some circumstances and jurisdic-
tions, nonexistent.48 4
II. ELIGIBILITY FOR RESTRUCTURING
A. Definition of distressed loan:
The term of "distressed loan" means a loan that the borrower
does not have the financial capacity to pay according to its terms
and that exhibits one or more of the following characteristics:
A. The borrower is demonstrating adverse financial and
repayment trends.
B. The loan is delinquent or past due under the terms of
the loan contract.
483. See Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Overboe, 404 N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1987).
484. See, e.g., Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 878 F.2d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 867 (1990) (no implied cause of action to enforce borrowers'
rights under the 1987 Act); Griffin v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 902 F.2d 22, 24 (10th
Cir. 1990) (same); Zajac v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, No. 88-5353ND (8th Cir. July 31,
1990) (1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 12932) (same); Williams v. Federal Land Bank of Jackson, 729
F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D.D.C. 1990). "[O]nce a federal land bank has properly determined
whether or not a particular borrower's offer of debt refinancing should be accepted, this
Court will not second-guess that determination .... Williams, 729 F. Supp. at 1390
(citations omitted); Troutman v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, No. CV88-726-PA, slip op.
at 4 (D. Or. Sept. 15, 1988) (order denying preliminary injunction) (declining to review the
"quality and good faith" of FLB in denying restructuring); Kramer v. Federal Land Bank of
St. Paul, No. Civ. 3-88-297 (D. Minn. Sept. 16, 1988) (order denying preliminary injunction)
(finding, inter alia, that foreclosure does not present irreparable harm in view of state
redemption and first refusal rights). See also Woodsmall v. Lyng, 816 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th
Cir. 1987) (denial of FMHA loan on the grounds that the applicant was not creditworthy
was not reviewable because the federal courts "are bit equipped to undertake such a task,
for in these matters we have neither the training nor the experience of a Farmers Home
Administration loan officer"); Tuepker v. Farmers Home Admin., 708 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th
Cir. 1983) (declining to review an FmHA loan denial in the absence of a claim "alleging a
substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of governing
legislation, or some like error going to the heart of the administrative determination").
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C. One or both of the factors listed in subparagraph (A)
and (B), together with inadequate collateralization,
present a high probability of loss to the lender.48 5
The regulations provide that the lender has discretion in
determining if the borrower has the financial capacity to repay the
loan.4 8
6
B. What does a borrower do when he believes that his loan is a
"distressed loan" eligible for consideration for restructuring, but
the lender disagrees?
1. Creating a monetary default to "get the attention"
of the lender is rarely, if ever, advisable. The lender may
deem the default "voluntary" and continue to maintain
that the loan is not distressed. Moreover, a "voluntary
default" may result in the borrower being ineligible for
the right of first refusal. "Previous owner," for purposes
of the right of first refusal, is limited to prior record own-
ers who "did not have the financial resources, as deter-
mined by the institution, to avoid foreclosure.... 487
2. A better alternative would be to prepare a cash
flow that both illustrates that the borrower faces the pros-
pect of being unable to pay the original loan according to
the terms and also demonstrates that the borrower could
repay a restructured note that would meet the criteria for
mandatory loan restructuring. The lender may be more
willing to consider a distressed loan if the borrower also
presents to the lender an acceptable restructuring propo-
sal with the request for a determination that the loan is
distressed.
C. What does a borrower do if he has created a "voluntary
default" and now desires to backtrack to avoid a foreclosure with-
out the opportunity to be considered for restructuring? The best
alternative may be to cure the default. Lenders may not enforce
acceleration for monetary default "after a borrower has made all
accrued payments of principal, interest, and penalties.... 488
485. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(aX3) (West 1989).
486. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4522(aX2) (1990).
487. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4522(aX2) (1990).
488. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202d(cXWest 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4514(c) (1990). In most
instances, when a loan is accelerated, the loan accrues interest based on the accelerated
principal. An unresolved issue is whether the borrower desiring to "de-accelerate" the loan
must pay the interest on the accelerated principal or only the interest that had accrued
irrespective of the accelerated principal. The Act's legislative history is ambiguous. The
House bill, H.R. 3030, provided that the interest was to be computed "without regard to
230 [Vol. 66:127
A GUIDE TO BORROWER LITIGATION
D. Is a borrower who has converted collateral eligible for
restructuring?
1. Conversion of System lender's collateral is a fed-
eral criminal offense.489
2. Conversion may prevent the borrower from avoid-
ing acceleration by paying all accrued principal, interest,
and penalties.490
3. Conversion or the dissipation, destruction, or dete-
rioration of the collateral may also excuse the lender from
having to provide the 45 day notice of the availability of
restructuring prior to commencing foreclosure proceed-ings.491 However, even though the 45 day notice is
excused, the loan theoretically is still eligible for restruc-
turing if it is a distressed loan.492 As a practical matter, a
conversion will probably provide a sufficient basis to deny
restructuring, and the prior replevin or foreclosure of the
collateral will have substantially impaired the borrower's
ability to "cash flow" a restructured loan. The availability
of restructuring may have practical significance only if
the borrower can somehow excuse the loss or deteriora-
tion of the collateral and can file for bankruptcy relief
prior to the replevying or foreclosure seizure. Of course,
in such a case, the failure to excuse the conversion may
result in the debt not being discharged.493
E. If the lender began foreclosure proceedings but did not
complete those proceedings (according to state law) prior to Janu-
ary 6, 1988, the effective date of the Agricultural Credit Act of
1987, the loan is still eligible for restructuring.4 94
F. So long as a reorganization plan has not been confirmed, a
borrower in bankruptcy appears to be eligible for consideration
for restructuring. 9 5
acceleration." The Senate amendment did not contain a comparable provisions, and the
Conference report adopted the House provision, but deleted the language "without regard
to acceleration." HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 100-490, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 175, reprinted in
1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2956, 2970.
489. 18 U.S.C.A. § 658 (West 1976).
490. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4514 (1990).
491. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(j) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4519 (1990).
492. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bXl) (West 1989).
493. 11 US.C.A. § 523(aX4) (West 1979).
494. See 53 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,428 (1988). See also Griffin v. Federal Land Bank of
Wichita, 708 F. Supp. 313, 317 (D. Kan. 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1990); Federal
Land Bank of Omaha v. Engleken, No. C85-2062 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 25, 1988); Federal Land
Bank of St. Louis v. Cupples Bros., 889 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1989).
495. E.g., In the Matter of Dilsaver, 86 Bankr. 1010 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); Stainback v.
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III. APPLYING FOR RESTRUCTURING:
A. Notification by a lender to the borrower of eligibility for
loan restructuring consideration:
1. When lender determines loan is distressed;496 or
2. 45 days prior to the commencement of foreclosure
proceedings.497
B. Suit on the note or debt instrument is probably not a fore-
closure proceeding.498
C. Notification must include a copy of the district restructur-
ing policy and all material necessary to enable the borrower to
submit an application.499
D. What should the borrower do upon receipt of the
notification?
1. Immediately assemble financial records and obtain
expert assistance in developing and exploring cash flow
potentials and possibilities. If necessary, explore farm
reorganization alternatives. Good cash flow projections
take time to prepare. The borrower's financial data,
including cash flow alternatives, will be the most signifi-
cant information under consideration in most cases.
2. Consider requesting additional information from
the lender, including the following:
(a) the computational formula that the lender
will use to determine and compare cost of foreclosure
with the cost of restructuring;
(b) the known costs of foreclosure, i.e., attorney's
fees, disposition costs, etc.; and
(c) the appraised value of the collateral.
3. If the request is not answered, send another
request bearing in mind the secondary goal listed under
the first heading, "Goals," above. Stress that restructur-
ing is designed to produce a "win-win" result, requiring
good faith and full disclosure by both lender and bor-
Federal Land Bank of Jackson, No. GC 88-25-NB-O (N.D. Miss. Feb. 5, 1988) (order
granting preliminary injunction); In re Kraus, No. BK 86-2677 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 20,
1988); In re James Desmond Woods, Jr., No. 88-BK-01659-Mll (W.D. La. March 16, 1989)
(interim order in adversary proceeding).
496. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bXl) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. 614.4516 (1990).
497. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bX2) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4518) (1990).
498. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(4) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4512(eX1), (2) (1990).
499. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(bX1) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4516(a) (1990).
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rower.500 Restructuring is not a poker game - it involves
a major business decision by both parties, each having
legally enforceable duties to the other. In that regard, not
all of the lender's duties arise from the Farm Credit Act,
state cooperative law may impose overlapping and addi-
tional duties of good faith and full disclosure.50 '
4. Remember that all expenses and income consid-
ered in the cost of foreclosure and cost of restructuring
are present-valued. Knowledge of the lender's discount
rate is essential. Borrowers must be aware that in most
districts the proposed restructured note will be dis-
counted to reflect its present value.
5. Borrowers should also consider applying for a
lower interest rate during the 45 day period.5 °2 The
required written response by the lender may identify
problem areas with the loan that can be addressed in the
restructuring proposal.
6. Consider meeting with the loan officer before sub-
mitting the restructuring proposal. 0 3 Document all
requests for information, responses, and other discussions
at such a meeting.
7. Consider using any available mediation proceed-
ings to obtain information from the lender. A provision of
the 1987 Act, 504 requires that FCS lenders:
(a) "present and explore debt restructuring pro-
posals advanced in the course of such mediation" and
(b) "cooperate in good faith with requests for
information or analysis of information made in the
course of mediation.... 4
8. Remember to provide all the information
requested by the lender in submitting the borrower's
applications for restructuring. This may include balance
sheets, income tax returns, projected cash flow, produc-
tion records, etc.
9. The application must be accompanied by a propo-
500. See 53 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,433 (1988) ("A reading of the statute and regulation,
[sic] indicates that both parties must put forth a good faith effort and work together").
501. See, e.g., Snyder v. Colwell Cooperative Grain Exchange, 231 Iowa 1210, 1213, 3
N.W.2d 507, 509 (1942) (officers of a corporative have a duty of full and fair disclosure to
members).
502. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 2199(b) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4368 (1990).
503. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(c) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4516(b) (1990).
504. 7 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West 1988).
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sal for the restructuring of the loan.505
10. Consider "packaging" the application and plan in
"brochure" from or as an extended letter beginning with
a discussion of the background of the borrower, the
nature of the borrower's farming operation, and the rea-
sons for the default. Then, discuss in detail the proposed
plan and justify it with specific references to the pro-
jected cash flow. Also an analysis of the cost of foreclosure
and the cost of restructuring, including the necessary
computations. Do not assume that there will be consider-
able negotiations. Put the best plan the borrower can
propose on the table. The lender has a right to the
"[ileast cost alternative, '"506 and the borrower may not be
well served by a proposal that does not reflect that the
borrower "is applying all income over and above neces-
sary and reasonable living and operating expenses to the
payment of primary obligations. '50 7 Remember that the
burden of justifying restructuring is ultimately borne by
the borrower.
IV. CREDIT REVIEW COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS:
A. The borrower must receive prompt written notice of denial
and the reasons for the denial.5 08
B. Insist on lender disclosure of all "critical assumptions and
relevant information" (whatever that means) prior to the credit
review committee meeting. 0 9
C. Remember that the review process is just that, a review;
most credit review committees will not consider new proposals at
the committee meeting.5 10
D. The loan officer who made the initial denial of the restruc-
turing proposal may participate in the review meeting by provid-
ing information and answering questions, but he may not vote or
participate in the committee's deliberations.5 1'
E. Borrowers may obtain "independent" appraisals of
505. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4521(a), (b) (1990).
506. Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Christensen, No. 22641 (Buena Vista Co. Dist.
Ct., Iowa, July 6, 1988) (order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that an application for restructuring unaccompanied by a plan was fatally
defective).
507. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(f) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4517(b) (1990).
508. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202a(dX1XB) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4517(aX2) (1990).
509. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2201(b) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4518 (1990).
510. 53 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,444 (1988) (prefatory comments to the regulations).
511. 53 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,426 (1988) (prefatory comments to the regulations).
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collateral.5 12
F. The board member serving on the committee must be a
member of the board of the lender having ultimate authority over
the loan.5 '3 Where the review is a consolidated one involving both
an FLB loan and a PCA loan, a board member from each entity
must be present, unless the district Farm Credit Bank has the ulti-
mate authority over both loans.5' 4
512. 53 Fed. Reg. 35,427, 35,436 (1988) (prefatory comments to the regulations). See
also 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(aX2) (West 1989) ("In no case shall a loan officer involved in the
initial decision on a loan serve on the credit review committee when the committee
reviews such loan."); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4442 (1990) (same).
513. 12 U.S.C.A. § 2202(d) (West 1989); 12 C.F.R. § 614.4443(c) (1990).
514. 12 C.F.R. § 614.4442 (1990).
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